24 February 2012

More Tech Issues

1) Am having some serious issues with email reception. I have reverted to nousdefionsranger@yahoo.com. Sorry for any inconvenience.

2) Will not have any article posted this weekend, probably. Have some "secret squirrel" stuff going on. Involves being outside the home AO, so not much time for typing beyond checking emails. Call it flashbacks to Suck School (Ranger School for the uninitiated).

Nous Defions!
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

20 February 2012


The phenomenon of urbanization is an exponentially increasing trend. In virtually every nation in the world, but especially in the Third World, urban population centers continue to grow both in population and area. Even in the USA, the ratio of rural-to-urban population has reversed itself in less than a century. Internationally or domestically, modern military forces are finally recognizing that most battlefields of the future will be urban rather than rural or wilderness.

For political resistance movements, the urban operational area has historically provided both a great deal of danger, as well as ample opportunity. If even a large minority of the civilian population supports the resistance, and the majority is either neutral, or has been alienated by the actions of the regime, the resistance will be able to survive and continue the fight. The classical concept of a resistance movement controlling the rural countryside while forcing the regime to function solely in large, built-up urban areas still has merit, but a multi-pronged approach wherein rural guerrillas use interdiction missions as their primary modus operandi to prevent regime utilization of lines of communication (LOC) and supply routes in rural areas, while urban guerrillas utilize raids and ambushes on security force facilities, infrastructure, and personnel in built-up areas, while the subversive underground continues its campaign of subversion and sabotage against regime-specific infrastructure, is the future of successful resistance movements.

The ready access to portable, high-resolution video recording devices, even in pocket-sized cell phones, as well as the easy upload of such video recordings to the internet, provides an instant worldwide audience for the resistance to spread its message. The ability of the regime to readily identify fleeing resistance personnel in rural terrain, while certainly not precluding the successful execution of a rural guerrilla campaign in suitable environments, such as alpine areas and thickly wooded terrain, and jungle-like swamp terrain, does offer numerous obvious advantages to the resistance movement who can utilize urban environments to their advantage.

Cities are the centers of human activity, but each city possesses its own unique characteristics. These characteristics are the basis of METT-TC analysis of the environment for mission-planning. Whatever else characterizes a given built-up area, its location may wholly or partially limit its development and thus determine the external form and dimension of the activity. Just as no two cities are alike externally, no city is uniform internally. A city is composed of various different nuclei or neighborhoods. There are business, industrial, and service areas, as well as residential neighborhoods that may range from inner-city ghettos to comfortable, affluent suburbs. Depending on the city and its local surrounding environment, as well as the socio-political attitudes of the civilian population, there may be large wooded parks and “green-belts” in the midst of the built-up areas.

While a truly rural area has the potential to be completely self-sustaining in its essential needs, an urban area can never fulfill all of its own essential survival needs. The resources, goods, and services that residents of an urban area need as well as the goods and services it provides to other communities and/or the surrounding areas determine the essential function of a given city. Included in the standard functions that determine a city's purpose for existance may include economic, political, religious, educational, residential, or any combination of these.

Despite the differences from one built-up area to the next urban areas possess certain similarities that provide us with some general characteristics that influence the inherent nature of guerrilla tactical operations in urban areas. The nature of cities offer some critical challenges to the military/paramilitary planner as well as the operative. Successful planning must be far more detailed than is normally required for even the most challenging rural missions. As the saying claims, “Proper prior planning prevents piss-poor performance.”

The nature of a city involved in a guerrilla resistance favors the defender who is native to the city. Like the rural guerrilla, the man on the ground, with an inherent knowledge of his daily surroundings, possesses a unique perspective and advantage in urban guerrilla conflict. While to an outsider, an urban area may appear as a hopelessly confusing tangle of buildings, streets, and alleys, they are as familiar to the observant, experienced resident as his own living room. Those buildings, streets, and alleys restrict the vehicular movement and reduce his mobility, providing more than ample opportunities for the guerrilla force to utilize traditional guerrilla tactics such as route and site interdiction operations, ambushes, and sniper attacks with little vulnerability, as long as the guerrilla force is indigenous to the local operational environment, or has adequate experience living in the area to know its peculiarities and characteristics. Obstacles are easy to construct in urban areas, further facilitating guerrilla control of the battlespace. The three-dimensional nature of the battlefield, offering observation and canalization found in no other operational environment other than alpine areas, further provides key tactical advantages to the resistance.

Urban combat operations, like alpine fights, are inherently small-unit operations. Combat elements smaller than platoons, including squads, fire-teams, and buddy-teams will dominate the urban battlefield, just like they do the alpine battlefield. Whether the political nature of the conflict requires surgical applications of violence, targeting only regime security apparatus, or general warfare, where there are no civilians in the battle-space, any operations in urban terrain devolve to the small-unit fight, favoring the well-trained guerrilla unit. Combat occurs at extreme close-range, with occasional opportunities for long-range engagement due to the canalization effects of streets and buildings, allowing for engagement by well-trained riflemen at intermediate-distance ranges. The nature of urban construction, combined with the presence of large numbers of civilian population will limit the performance of indirect-fire weapons by regime security forces in order to prevent pushing the popular opinion further to the side of the resistance (it's one thing to piss off the locals in Mosul by bombing neighborhoods with “precision” munitions from high-altitude aircraft. It's something else entirely when the constituency that is bombed consists of the people who voted you into office). Additionally, indigenous military personnel may be hesitant to fire area-effect weapons that will put their own families and friends at risk.

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.222 Special Forces Sniper Training and Employment, April 2003, categorizes built-up areas into four basic subdivisions:

  1. The first category is large cities of 100,000 residents or more. These areas typically provide the core of a larger populated region with a high population density consisting of the city itself, surrounding suburbs, and small towns. Normally, in the case of American cities, these metropolitan complexes appear to be a single large and continuous city with millions of people, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, Denver, and much of the Northeastern seaboard.
  2. The second category, towns and small cities of 3,000-100,000 residents are typically located along LOCs such as navigable rivers, railways, and interstate highways. Like larger metropolitan areas, these built-up areas are continuing to expand and tend to either form new metro concentrations or merge with pre-existing metropolitan areas.
  3. The third category, small villages of less than 3,000 people tend to be agriculturally oriented. These may exist anywhere, but typically exist in cultivated areas of farmland, developed grazing pastures, or in thickly timbered areas facilitating historic logging operations.
  4. The final category, strip areas form along LOCs and serve as connections between villages and towns. In the wide expanses of the largely unpopulated western USA, these areas tend to serve as refueling and rest areas between villages, towns, and large cities/metropolitan areas.

Within any given built-up area, as previously mentioned, urban terrain differs based on size, location, and history. The areas within the city are categorized as:

  1. Industrial areas and residential sprawl. These typically consist of smome houses with yards, gardnes, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving, while the industrial areas consist of one- or two-story flat-roofed factories or warehouses, typically close to traditional LOCs such as rail lines and highways. In both types of area, there are generally large open areas in the form of vacant lots, open parks, and other forms. Due to the inherently political nature of UW, operations in residential areas should be minimized in resistance planning due to the risk of collateral damage that will negatively impact relations with the civilian population.
  2. Core periphery. The core periphery consists of narrow streets with continuous building fronts of concrete, brick, or other masonry. These are typically uniformly two or three stories in small towns and villages, and five to ten stories in large cities/metropolitan areas.
  3. City cores and outlying high-rise areas. Typical American city cores today consist of high-rise areas that vary greatly in height and allow for more open space between buildings, depending on the specific city. Generally, city streets form along rectangular patterns, with four to eight-lanes of traffic, allowing uncomfortably high levels of mobility for regime security vehicles in the view of the guerrilla. Outside of limited sniper-interdiction missions, there may be little opportunity for resistance forces to successfully engage regime forces in these environments.
  4. Commerical ribbons. These “strip mall” rows of stores, shops, and fast food joints are built along the sides of major highway LOCs and interstate highways throughout built-up areas.

Urban combat in unconventional warfare operations typically occurs when control of the city contributes to the political strategy goals of the resistance. If a given city offers no political advantage to the resistance, there is little reason for the loss of personnel and logistics support requirements necessary to perform successful urban guerrilla operations. Nevertheless, any serious resistance planner looking towards the future must consider the applications of urban guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage throughout urban areas in any given operational environment during active resistance actions.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains


Unconventional warfare is a doctrinal military term covering a wide spectrum of military and paramilitary activities, generally carried out by irregular forces. For purposes of the contemporary American resistance movement (I will forthwith refer to this “movement” as the American Constitutional Liberty Resistance, or ACLR, for lack of a better term. ARM would work, if it hadn't already been taken and misused), the term should be considered to encompass guerrilla warfare (GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and information operations (IO) including psychological operations (PSYOPs) in support of resistance activities.

Guerrilla warfare is simply one aspect of a resistance movement's activities. GW is comprised of paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, local indigenous personnel against technologically-superior regime forces in denied areas. It is the overt military aspect of a resistance movement. The urbanization of American society, like most of the world, has led to significant necessary changes within the doctrinal requirements of UW/GW. The emphasis has, in many cases, and will continue to, shift away from rural guerrilla operations towards more urban-centric guerrilla operations in built-up areas. This paradigm shift does not discount the feasibility of rural-based guerrilla warfare elements, but does tend to create a role reversal in many operational areas, as the rural-based guerrilla element supports the operations of the urban guerrilla force, rather than the historical precedent of vice-versa.

Sabotage is an act or acts, which are intended to disable or destroy the ability of regime security forces to operate effectively by damaging critical infrastructure support such as war materials, premises, or utilities, including human and material resources. Sabotage may be the most efficient, and/or only available means to attack and destroy specific targets beyond the ability of the conventional weapons typically deployed by resistance forces. Sabotage selectively neutralizes enemy capabilities with minimal manpower, material demands, and collateral damage.

Subversion is any activity developed and carried out in order to undermine the strength and moral of a regime. All three aspects of a resistance movement—guerrilla force, subversive underground, and auxiliaries—will contribute directly, or indirectly, to the subversive activities of the resistance, but the clandestine nature of subversion activities mandates that the subversive underground performs the bulk of the activity. Subversion is doctrinally defined as an effects-based targeting of human terrain assets.

Intelligence activities incorporate overt, clandestine, and covert collection efforts, and the assembly and dissemination of available information resources for operational planning. Target analysis of potential resistance movements should utilize the doctrinal CARVER format, and satisfy stated operational requirements, while reducing the risk to resistance operatives at the tactical level.This detail forms the backbone of effective resistance intelligence activities.

Information operations, including psychological operations in a resistance movement focus on two aspects. First is the demoralization of regime forces through the application of propaganda and education of the illegality of their actions under constitutional law. The second is developing and building increased rapport between the resistance movement and the local civilian populace, in order to garner the requisite material, political, and psychological support for the resistance.

UW operations require proficiency on the part of active resistance movement cadre in training development and execution, direct-action small-unit combat operations, sabotage, intelligence activities, and information operations before hostilities openly occur. This will allow the dedicated resistance cadre to act as force-multipliers by training and leading newly recruited and developed resistance operatives in the wake of the commencement of open hostilities. Until these hostilities develop, it is imperative that the resistance cadre wait for the appropriate “operational sweet spot” to develop. A resistance potential must already exist (I would argue that we are already there. Even the statists in power have declared the American people to be “pre-revolutionary,” evidence by the DoJ's ongoing attempts to demonize innocuous activities and interests shared by large segments of the American civilian populace. When is the right time? I would argue that you will know it's time to strap on your guns when you notice key regime figures in your local operational area disappearing and the public is cheering it. That's your indication that the local public has taken action on its own accord).

The government's inability to meet the legitimate needs of the people, combined with its intransigent unwillingness to abide by the constitutional restraints of our republican system, has caused widespread frustration and dissatisfaction. People have lost faith in and respect for the legitimacy of the government.

Socio-economic and/or political conditions must exist that divide or weaken the regime's mechanisms to exert control over the civilian populace. Historically, this has been indicated by factional/ethnic discord within the military/security forces apparatus of the regime, geographical realities, combined with technological weaknesses that preclude positive central command-and-control of those forces, and a general refusal on the part of the civilian populace to pay attention to the edicts of the regime government, combined with a resultant inability or unwillingness on the part of security forces to retaliate against the civilian populace.

Regardless of the general dissatisfaction of the civilian populace towards the regime's policies, a resistance movement has little chance of success against a regime that has a well-organized, connected, and effective security forces apparatus. The existance of a successful security apparatus leaves little opportunity for the organization and execution of the core clandestine and/or covert auxiliary support for a resistance guerrilla campaign.

The civilian populace must possess not only a general will to resist passively, but also the intestinal fortitude to bear significant hardships that result from the typically repressive counterinsurgency measures practiced by tyrannical regimes. A population that has been subjected to long-term brutality or psychological indocrination espousing the supremacy of the regime, by an otherwise benign government will not likely possess adequate willpower to sustain long-term struggle, especially as their neighbors start disappearing in the middle of the night, while their favored “leaders” tell continue to preach that the tyranny and violence is to safeguard their security.

Resistance will, initially be non-violent, as it should be. At a local level, great strides can be made through coordination of efforts to ostracize government agents and representatives, legally or illegally evading taxes to reduce the ability of the government to continue to provide unconstitutional functions, and other forms of civil disobedience, including protests, sit-ins, and non-compliance with official directives of an unconstitutional nature. Stepping up to violent resistance will initially include subversion, sabotage, and ultimately, direct-action guerrilla warfare against regime security forces. Historically oppressed peoples have resorted to non-violent resistance initially, only resorting to violence if their demands are not met, if regime security forces respond to non-violence with violent repression (both of which we are currently witnessing in the government responses to the leftists protests of the Occupy Wall Street movement), or if nudged towards violent action by subversive cadre. If the societal conditions are repressive enough, or the repression increases, unorganized resistance efforts will coalesce into a resistance movement.

A resistance movement must be capable of integrating the civilian populace's moral indignation at their repression, with their actual willingness to accept the kind of mental and physical hardships, as well as the risk of actual bodily harm and/or death on behalf of that indignation. It is imperative, even during the preparatory phases of a resistance movement, that the resistance develop and conduct an intensive and extensive psychological operations campaign to help move the disillusioned segments of society away from passive resistance towards providing active support to the resistance, either by providing supplies, food, shelter, transportation, or even simply information of intelligence value. These efforts to increase the public's dissatisfaction with the behavior and policy of the regime should strive to simultaneously portray the resistance movement's philosophy as a viable and desirable alternative. Without developing this psychological support from at least large segments of the general public, there is no way for the resistance to function clandestinely or coverty, as the public will continue to follow the dictates of their “leaders,” to report any “suspicious behaviors.” This is THE central facet of any successful resistance.

In almost every historical example of successful resistance to tyranny by a moral resistance element, the rebellious factions have faced a civilian populace with a small but active minority who ardently supported the regime as being incapable of doing wrong, as well as an equally ardent faithful minority who actively supports the aims and goals of the resistance movement. These two groups will generally not have their opinions changed on the matter, regardless of the PSYOPs campaigns of the regime or the resistance. The large, uncommitted mass in the middle; those who don't really care either way, should be the target of resistance element PSYOPs campaigns. In order for the resistance to succeed, they must develop a way to convince the large, emotionally uncommitted majority of the public to support the resistance, or at the very least, to accept it as a legitimate alternative authority to the established regime. The reality is, most human beings WANT some sort of guidance. Explaining to them that they need to do whatever they want to do is not going to elicit support from the majority. Providing a “shadow government” that provides the minimum necessary aspects of local governance, in the form of security/police protective services will go further to establish support within the populace than telling them that they're “on their own.”

As will be seen later, there are fortunately, many opportunities, even during the preparatory phases of resistance, for a movement to conduct these types of PSYOPs. Well-written blogs that manage to convey the valuable messages of liberty, self-reliance, responsibility, and the truth of constitutional governance, in an entertaining, engaging, and educational manner, are one simple example of these types of PSYOPs efforts. Posting flyers, speaking at political events, purchasing radio ads, and face-to-face conversations with people all provide oppoprtunities for the resistance to prepare the psychological battle space in advance, to gain the popular support necessary for successful execution of irregular warfare.

The single most important aspect of a successful insurgency is the viability of its message of grievance against the regime and the established status quo. This message must reach the civilian populace and it must resonate within their socio-economic, political, and philosophical/religious worldviews. The resistance must develop and voice a unified, coherent message of hope that can serve as a rallying call to the populace to join or at least, to support the resistance. It must also serve as a unifying force to align the many diverging interests and goals of the varied elements within the resistance movement itself.

A mob, committing random political violence, no matter how noble their aims, is not a resistance or an insurgency. It is a mob. A resistance movement is a political movement using directed and focused tactical violence, to achieve specific operational objectives in pursuit of a strategic goal. That strategic goal must provide the focus that will coalesce the resistance into a functional political movement that actually has a chance of success at achieving its aims. A movement that cannot develop a coherent ideology to present to the civilian populace and to provide a unifying moral basis for the resistance will never amount to anything beyond the armed bandits and brigands that the regime will attempt to portray them as.

Until all of these pre-conditions and more, can be achieved within and by the resistance, there is no reason, let alone chance of success, for a resistance movement to begin active hostilities in retaliation for perceived wrongs by the regime. All the guns and ammunition in the free world will not overcome the civilian populace's reservations concerning un-affiliated armed groups in their midst attempting to change their comfortable status quo.

The ACLR possesses an advantage unique in the history of unconventional warfare, should the need arise in the future to actively engage a totalitarian regime in this country. For the first time in the history of insurgency, we not only possess individual fighting weapons on a level of parity with the regime, we possess ready access to the most advanced technology the regime possesses. Additionally, the knowledge that we will probably be required to engage hostile regime security forces in a guerrilla warfare environment provides us with the unparalleled opportunity to prepare for these challenges now, while the required logistical supplies are relatively readily available. The primary tasks of the auxiliary, and indeed, all factions of the resistance should currently revolve around:

  1. Procuring and stockpiling, in readily accessible, but secured caches throughout their area for future use by resistance forces. These may range from the obvious such as ammunition in common military calibers and staple storage foodstuffs, to the more mundane, such as high-quality outdoors clothing and boots (thrift stores and second-hand stores are a spectacularly good supply source for these) in various sizes. Anything that can foreseeably be applied by the resistance movement in the future provides critical leverage for the resistance to apply in the execution of their aims when conflict becomes impossible to avoid further.
  2. Preparing and dispersing written, recorded, and verbal information to further the preparatory phase of the resistance PSYOPs campaign. This may range from a blog on the internet (of which we have many, thanks to the efforts of many patriots more erudite than I am), radio spot advertising (such as Kerodin's current efforts which we should all be supporting), speaking with friends, neighbors, and co-workers, and even the surreptitious posting of flyers on bulletin boards in your neighborhood and community that deliver and support the message of the ACLR.
  3. Developing a solid network of fellow future auxiliary members in your community, to provide further active support for the resistance and the future development of a network of safehouses, transportation networks, and communications networks. This may involve everything from developing secret hiding places that facilitate hiding resistance personnel in the future, to developing the ability to utilize open-source, free-ware encryption technologies and field-craft techniques such as the use of dead-drops and other covert communications methods. It may be as simple as performing in-depth research into the smuggling methods used by criminal enterprises to move their products through controlled areas (one key thing to consider though is, if the information is available to the resistance from open-source information, it's equally available to regime security forces. Realistically, learning effective smuggling methods might require interfacing with rather disagreeable people who are currently actively part of the criminal underground, to the extent necessary to earn and gain their trust in discussing these topics).

The structure of a successful resistance movement is best illustrated by the iceberg analogy. While the relatively small peak of the iceberg is visible (the effects of subversion, sabotage, and paramilitary combat operations), the massive bulk of the iceberg remains out of sight, below the surface (the development of a support infrastructure of the auxiliary). The task of the resistance cadre will, in the unfortunate event that the resistance transitions to an insurgency, be first focused on the development of this support infrastructure. Putting into place, the pieces necessary for the future support infrastructure, in case it becomes necessary, should be the primary focus of the resistance movement cadre.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Individual Task Skills Training

In order to understand the forthcoming additions to the blog of specific individual task skills training, I am going to briefly mention some underlying concepts on the design and utilization of this method of training development.

Resistance elements do not and will not typically have the time or the resources to achieve and sustain proficiency on every conceivable training task the resistance operative will need to master. For this reason, resistance cadre must identify the tasks that will be most critical to their units' specific operational area and potential taskings. The use of mission-essential task lists is critical to developing a team training plan that will develop the requisite skills in critical areas to ensure the element's ability to function in combat.

The purpose of these task listings and descriptions is to provide an overview of historically relevant specific skills that resistance operatives may find critically important to have mastered. It is important that team trainers use these task descriptions to develop training programs for their teams. These listings will provide task performance and evaluation criteria, in accordance with U.S. Army soldier training publications that will provide a basis for individual task performance-based training.

Subject areas will cover those skillsets necessary to provide survivability to resistance members in times of conflict. Examples include: small-arms proficiency, resistance tactical communications methods, trauma medical aid for common battlefield injuries and wounds, and fieldcraft/survival skills.

These individual task skills are the foundation cornerstone of training that collective-task training (CTT) is built on. Without a solid footing in these skills, CTT will fall apart and be ineffectual. CTT is a collection of group/team skills designed to allow elements to react to and survive common combative scenarios. Examples include react-to-contact/break contact, establish a remain-over-night (RON) site, move tactically as a buddy team or fire team, and others.

These task listings will provide the team trainer and individual resistance members the information necessary to support integration of these critical skills into their organizational training programs. It allows trainers to plan and prepare, execute, and evaluate the training of all members of their organizational elements. Developing a mission-based training plan using these task listings will help provide a comprehensive training plan to develop skill and tactical expertise in all relevant and important areas for the resistance element.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

14 February 2012

I fibbed, sort of, unintentionally....

This is a violation of the promised new format of the blog, but due to the furor it has apparently raised, I penned this response. I'll post it once, than return to the promised format changes.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains


My comments opposed to the anarcho-capitalist point-of-view as a reality, including this one:

the first dumb motherfucker that comments on this about how the Constitution was a Hamiltonian power-grab and that anarchy is superior to any form of governance, needs to email me through the blog with their contact information. I will personally pay for a one-way ticket to Somalia, or another suitably anarchic society, in order for you to put your precious, assinine, and unrealistic views to the test”

have elicited a great deal of comment on others' blogs who have linked to my articles. As I have repeated, ad nauseum, I support anyone's right to say anything they want.

That having been said, I notice that no one has emailed asking for their air-fare...

I will try and respond, this once, to this question, before reverting to the promised new format for the blog.

I do not view Somalia as a “straw man” argument whatsoever. Someone at WRSA anonymously claimed that Somalia is no more anarchist than the USA. While the idiocy of that statement is beyond comment, I do agree that Somalia gets thrown out as an example of a failed-state example of anarchy far too frequently, without comment. I'm as guilty of it as anyone. So, here's my comment on it for those not current on Somali history.

Somalia has a long history of relatively successful pastoral tribalism. Let's ignore their role in failed ancient kingdoms and empires, and focus on relatively modern history. Following the fall of the Socialist government through military junta, Somalia was ruled by a military “Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)” led by Barre. This came about in 86 or 87 (I want to say 86, but I'm too lazy to Google it at the moment).

Obviously, as we can all guess (and are pretty much experiencing at the moment), life under a military dictatorship pretty much sucks goat's ass (no pun intended in reference to pastoral Islamic societies and goats...I promise). So, local tribal groups banded together long enough to overthrow the regime. That's fair. After all, a government should only be allowed to rule as long as it maintains the consent of the governed. No one disagrees with that, except the government that lacks the consent of the governed. The problem that arose was that, once the government was overthrown, the tribalists didn't really have any plan...except to return to their tribes and live happily ever after. Cool again. Hell, that's pretty much exactly what I want. Unfortunately, without some form of limited governance, they did what people do: They looked out for number one, using their tribe to take what they wanted from weaker neighboring tribes who didn't have the manpower to stop them. Dying for your private property is a noble concept, but staying alive to enjoy the fruits of that property beats it any day of the week, and twice on Sundays.

We can argue the semantics of what constitutes “anarchism” until we're all blue in the face. I'll sit and drink a beer with anyone and debate the relative merits of the philosophy all weekend long. Unfortunately, the reality that history demonstrates to us, every single time, is that when you pull out all the stops, with no plans to develop some method of protecting the rights of individuals/minorities, you end up with a situation that most rational people would not want, and one that few who clamor for it would survive.

I don't advocate for limited government because I'm besotted with love and adoration for the state. I don't advocate for limited government because I particularly NEED it's protections. Let's face it, I happen to possess a certain personality/psychology that made my personal professional background possible. Even without the government-provided training, I'd still have developed many of the same attributes and skills, even if through private “military/security” work, albeit in a less compressed time and convenience manner. I'll be just fine in a violent tribal society, and make no mistake about it, for all of our vaunted Judeo-Christian cultural ethics, if the government collapses, we WILL experience a similar state of affairs to what Somalia experienced following the fall of the Barre regime.

I advocate for a LIMITED government to help provide for the protection of those without my personal psychological make-up from incursions by other “tribes” against their persons and their private property rights. I advocate for limited government to protect the rights of the minority from the will and mass of the majority.

I think Cato, in a comment on AP's blog, hit the nail on the head, intentionally or not. If the PEOPLE won't protect the liberties and rights enshrined in the Constitution and BoR, what the fuck makes anyone think they'll protect their rights and liberties under an anarchist “system” (how's THAT for an oxymoron)? They won't. Instead, they'll revert to their basic nature and be clamoring for guys like me, with the critical psychological make-up (for definition: no innate psychological restraint proscribing the use of force, other than the recognition that an ordered, civil society with rule-of-law, makes life more pleasant than having to look over my shoulder every 30 seconds to make sure the brother of the guy I killed last week isn't sneaking up behind me), to go to guns in order to protect them.

The anarchist/”voluntarist” argument that free-market economic theory would provide for that defense through their ability to buy protection from mercenary companies is flawed as well. As historians like to point out, Rome ultimately fell because the citizenry decided it was easier to levy taxes and hire out the defense of the Republic rather than perform the duty themselves. Hiring mercenaries to defend your property and security is not a particularly sensible way to protect it, since they have guns, and the will to kill (they'd be pretty unprofessional mercenaries if they lacked either). Eventually, one or two of them are bound to realize that, if they just kick your ass and take your shit, they can get paid more, and not have to risk getting shot at for peanuts. The argument that society would go ahead and organize then, to overthrow them is ridiculous. If you're such a chicken shit, or just too weak, to defend your interests in the first place, what makes you think your neighbors are going to come to your rescue? They have their own self-interests to look out for. Tribalism is not the Disney-esque, pastoral nirvana too many anarchists have been suckered into believing it is.

So, yes, I advocate for limited governance, under the constitutional republican system enshrined in the Constitution.

13 February 2012

An Introduction to the New Format for "Nous Defions!"

As you will notice in the coming days, some changes are being made here at “Nous Defions!” These changes have been made in the interest of making this blog more reader-friendly for non-SOF military personnel in it's conveyance of what is, essentially, professional information that demands some level of pre-existing professional knowledge to make the most sense.

To start, I will be returning to the foundational theory of unconventional warfare, from both a historical and a current doctrinal context. I have had nearly 55,000 views of this material, in just over a month of writing, yet I still receive several email requests each week to cover information that has already been discussed, in varying levels of detail. In order to curtail the wasted effort of those readers, I will start over, with a general introduction to Unconventional Warfare Theory, particularly as I believe it does, or will, pertain to future resistance activities in the United States of America, against the ever-increasing encroachments of the statist agenda.

Second, I will refrain from my previous, intellectually dishonest referrals to “potential future resistance personnel.” The reality is, we are, each of us already members of the resistance. We have simply not started active counter-measures yet. This is NOT to be misconstrued as a call to action. That is not my place, and I do not want it to be my place.

Third, while I will continue to provide narrative discussions of the underlying concepts of small-unit tactics, techniques, and procedures in unconventional warfare, training programs-of-instruction outlines, and individual and collective task training outlines, I will abstain from posting op-ed pieces. Not because I believe these are unimportant, but because I believe that the inane comments they sometimes elicit detract from the mission-focus of this blog's key intent: to convey critical unconventional warfare TTPs and concepts to members of the resistance (for the record, I really don't give two shits whether or not you agree with my specific politics. If I offend you by stating my opinion that your favorite libertarian guru is full-of-shit on a given subject, or because I happen to think that the vast majority of your neighbors are statist lackeys who prefer the taste of boot leather and Kiwi polish to the sweat of earning and keeping their liberties, or because I somehow offend your delicate Aryan-supremacist, anti-Semitic horseshit worldview...I really could not possibly give less of a shit. Get over your self-righteous inferiority complexes and drive the fuck on!).

I am providing this information, garnered through the blood, sweat, and tears of myself and my colleagues within the U.S. Military special operations community, for fucking free, because I believe it is coming down to the point where it will be up to individual citizens and bands of partisans, to ensure the re-birth and lasting survival of the constitutional American dream, rather than the organized security forces of the United States government (the first dumb motherfucker that comments on this about how the Constitution was a Hamiltonian power-grab and that anarchy is superior to any form of governance, needs to email me through the blog with their contact information. I will personally pay for a one-way ticket to Somalia, or another suitably anarchic society, in order for you to put your precious, assinine, and unrealistic theories to the test).

I am not a Democrat. I am not a Republican. I am not a member of some “Aryan” resistance movement. I am a republican individualist who really just wants to be left the fuck alone to raise my family. My first concern is my family. My second is my community. My third is the restoration of the Republic. This third concern is the reason I write this blog.

For those SF and SOF veterans, and any others who may understand the reference, I am not now, nor was I ever, a member of the SFU. This blog is not, in any way, shape, or form, related to the TR newsletter. I agree with some of what SFC B had to say, but certainly not all of it.

This new format is intended to provide new information weekly, in three areas:

  1. an in-depth discussion of some aspect of UW at the strategic and/or operational level.
  2. A description of a critical individual or collective training task. This will be presented in the standard format of task, conditions, standards used through soldier training publications and mission-training plans by the U.S. Army, because I believe that is the best format for describing these in a manner that even a novice can comprehend and utilize.
  3. An ongoing series of articles on developing specific programs-of-instruction to assist readers in developing training for the critical skills they will need to know and understand in the future.

Some of the information I will provide in the coming pages will be repeated from previous articles. Some will be a different outlook on the same subjects. Some will be completely different, and perhaps occasionally seem contradictory (although it won't be—the doctrine works pretty well across operational environments).

I will, in the future, include SOME photographic reference material, when I am able to do so without jeopardizing the PERSEC considerations of my family, associates, or myself.

I am providing you with more than ample material to help you develop a comprehensive personal and organizational training program. It is up to you to actually implement it. If you choose to simply sit in front of the computer, playing Call-Of-Duty: Black Ops, instead of getting out of your mother's basement and training, do not in the future, whine about how Sergeant Mosby was an asshole who did not provide you with adequate training information to face the threats that are “suddenly” confronting you. It's on you to do the work.

As I mentioned, I am currently in the process of updating and hardening my PERSEC considerations. If there are any delays in implementing the described changes, it is a result of the challenges of performing these updates. I assure yo that I will continue posting these articles until either A) the federals shut down the internet with their SOPA/PIPA horseshit, or B) I am compromised and have to go either further underground, or I am interred at Guantanamo Bay as an enemy terrorist, or I am killed repelling a home invasion by Stasi-wannabe stormtroopers.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains


As was previously mentioned, I am available to travel and present clinics on selected aspects of training. I will not do so for free. While I don't need the money, I do need to be sure I am able to support my family while taking time off my real job to help YOU. If there is interest in this, I will travel to the following states: New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota (western region only), and South Dakota (western region only). I will charge a very reasonably amount in order to cover my expenses to travel, missed wages from my real job, lodging for my family while in the local operational area, and the cost of any ammunition I may need for my personnal weapons to demonstrate specific skills. I estimate it will cost me around $1000-1500 to conduct a three-day weekend seminar. I will train any number of personnel for that price, up to ten at a time (for the reader from California who queried me on this: check your email. If I can determine a way to traverse that obstacle, I am still willing to do it for you, once).

12 February 2012


I'm going to change things up a bit. Instead of trying to churn out and post an article every night, I'm going to slow it down some, and try to do two or three articles per week. This will allow me to not only provide more detail in each article, but to ensure I've adequately edited each one, to my satisfaction. I will post a minimum of one article per week, at the least, but I will try to post more.

This is largely in response to current changes occurring in my real-world life (nothing bad, just changing) that are happening to improve and restore my personal security and that of my family in the form of better PERSEC/OPSEC (HH6 is not real tuned-in on OPSEC/PERSEC...it's a work-in-progress).

I have agreed to conduct a training course for a small group here in the Rockies in the coming months. Once that has happened, I will try and get the host to write an AAR for inclusion here.

John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

10 February 2012


Sorry folks. Spent the evening with some fellow Ranger Regiment veterans, hanging out, talking guns and war stories, with the wives and kids. Needed the de-compress. Good times.

Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

09 February 2012


In his excellent book “The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander,” LTC Pete Blaber (retired), discusses and illustrates some critical lessons for leaders that he developed as a SOF officer. While I believe that many doctrinal lessons of the U.S. Military are extremely valid for irregular warfare as well (As a team sergeant once explained to me, “You can't master the unconventional, if you don't know the conventional.” While not always true, as history has illustrated, it's a valid generalization that is true on many levels—J.M.), these lessons from LTC Blaber are important to understand in order to mitigate those elements that do not fit the unconventional paradigm.

LTC Blaber's lessons are:

-The Mission, The Men, and Me: This is valid, even in the conventional paradigm. As a leader, or even just as a subordinate member of a combat unit, the first priority, in order to ensure success, has always got to be the success of the mission. This may require the sacrifice of personnel. A war-fighter cannot allow his personal interests in the well-being of his comrades to cause the mission to fail. Otherwise, he might as well sit at home and watch the latest episode of “Dancing with the Stars,” for all the success he will experience in the field. Conflict, especially armed conflict, is difficult, uncomfortable, and dangerous. Potential future resistors need to understand that before they need to take up arms. Directly ancillary to that fact is the reality that, as a leader (whether official or unofficial), the war-fighter holds a moral obligation to, as much as the mission's success allows, put the welfare of his comrades ahead of his own. This is the definition of the self-sacrifice of the warrior. If someone needs to stay awake to pull security, after running a continuous operation for the previous 24 or 72 hours, any leader worth listening to will put himself at the top of the list, to ensure that his people are rested and healthy.

-Imagine the Unimaginable, Humor Your Imagination: The conventional military is largely a hide-bound institution. Special operations forces cannot afford to adhere too closely to the party line, or they would accomplish nothing. As an example, conventional doctrine mandates a 3:1 numerical advantage when planning offensive operations. Yet, during many successful special operations historically, fortune has favored the bold and success has been accomplished despite willfully choosing to conduct operations that do not facilitate the doctrinally-mandated numerical advantage.

When guerrilla/resistance forces plan operations, they may often be forced to develop plans that would seem, to a conventional-force trained and experienced leader, to be fatally flawed from the inception. The lack of logistical support, indirect-fire support (I highly suggest doing some research into the concept of “knee mortars” and the indigenous, expedient development of indirect-fire support weapons –J.M.), and numbers is foreign to most conventional-force commanders. Yet, guerrillas have managed, throughout history, to use audacity and imaginative planning to overcome these short-comings. As LTC Blaber states, “History has proven that it's not the quantity of men or the quality of weapons that make the ultimate difference; it's the ability to out-think and out-imagine the enemy that always has, and always will, determine the ultimate victor.” Being willing, and able, to think outside the box will provide resistance forces with many apparently outlandish opportunities for success, as long as they humor their imagination and develop those plans before automatically writing them off.

-When in doubt, develop the situation: One shortcoming often displayed by “leaders,” even within the special operations community, is fear of the unknown. Commanders refuse to commit people to missions with potential to be amazing success, unless they can fill in every single blank space on a checklist of “necessary” information. Like special operations personnel, resistance elements cannot be bound by fear of the unknown (imagine what would happen if an SF ODA, performing a HALO infiltration of a hostile country, to perform a Strategic Reconnaissance mission, would fare if they insisted on having every bit of information they wanted, instead of simply maximizing what was available. How do you determine the state of affairs on the ground if you don't have someone on the ground? You don't—J.M.). The skilled leader in irregular warfare will utilize every single piece of relevant information intelligence available to him. He will not however, allow himself to be strait-jacketed by a lack of some information (as a fellow SF alumni pointed out recently via email, “You can never have too much intel!” I agree, but also believe in the British SAS motto, “Who Dares Wins!” Sometimes, you have to take the approach of, “We've got to go with what we've got. Plan for what we can, we'll make the rest up as we go—J.M.). He will plan for what he has, then develop the rest of the plan, even if mid-operation, as he receives new information (there is a reason we perform a leader's recon of an objective before executing the final stages of a plan, after all—J.M.).

The LTC goes on, discussing other lessons he learned. “The only failure is the failure to try,” “Don't get treed by a Chihuahua,” and more (I HIGHLY recommend the book to anyone concerned about unconventional warfare planning and execution, despite my ambivelance towards LTC Blaber's former unit—J.M.).

The purpose of leadership and planning in any combat element is to develop a course of action for the successful execution of unit goals. There is a common misconception among the inexperienced, that combat leadership is predicated on the concept of “Do what I say, or I'll shoot you.” While this has, historically, been used as a “leadership” method, it's not a highly recommended method, since it both fails to instill an effective level of motivation towards success, and it tends to backfire, since as soon as provided the opportunity, troops will either desert, or shoot the “leader” in an effort to maximize their personal survivability. Good leadership, under the stresses of combat, is comprised of influencing a desired behavior in people by providing a sense of purpose, motivation, and direction to accomplish a stated task or mission.

When voluntary war-fighters are provided with information on the reason why a mission needs to be executed (“Because I told you to!” is a good way to earn the response, “Piss off!”--J.M.), a coherent plan to successfully execute the mission, and they are offered the motivation to succeed (I believe that a thorough understanding of the purpose of a mission, assuming the purpose is legitimately important, will provide ample motivation to serious freedom fighters in any resistance campaign. --J.M.), they will put themselves in the path of danger, without a gun at their backs. The ability to provide these key pieces of information are critical to the success of resistance leadership, and good leadership is critical to the success of successful resistance activities.

Doctrinally speaking, mission-oriented leadership is comprised of four key factors: Commander's intent, individual initiative at all levels, down to the newest, least experienced member of the unit, clearly developed and expressed operational plans, and a judicious allocation of all available, necessary resources.

Commander's intent may, in many resistance scenarios be as simple as a statement of the goal of the mission (even “leaderless” resistance, someone has to be responsible for the leadership and direction of a cellular element. It may be more realistic, in such as situation to develop a mission intent, rather than a commander's intent, per se. The purpose, regardless of the title used, is to provide a clear, concise statement of what will define a successful end-state to the mission).

Directly related to the mission intent is the developed ability and willingness of even the most junior war-fighter involved, to step up and take the initiative for independent action, when necessary, to continue the mission to achieve the stated mission intent. A fighting unit that lacks initiative will not succeed. A trained fighter should be willing to step up and develop the situation even if the planned course of action is suddenly no longer viable, or when an unforeseen opportunity to expand on the mission intent is discovered.

Clearly developed and expressed operational plans are of obvious importance. If the least experienced fighter cannot decipher the purpose or plan of execution, not only will he be unable to effectively carry out his particular responsibilities in order to help the mission succeed, but he will be unable to recognize the opportunities that often present themselves during operations to expand on the mission intent. There is often a misconception amongst the uninitiated that SOF personnel and/or guerrillas do not plan operations, but rather, simply do things “by the seat of their pants.” This is so far from the truth as to be laughable. Special operations, due to the complexity of their nature, are thoroughly planned, sometimes to the point of the absurd (this is the source of LTC Blaber's suggestion that, “when in doubt, develop the situation”). Resistance operations should be planned, in as much detail as possible, and the five-paragraph operations order (OPORD) is a doctrinal method for doing so, and expressing those plans in a comprehensive, coherent manner that allows every member of an element to understand their role in the operation.

Resistance forces will never enjoy the luxury of an all-encompassing logistics support network. Very seldom will a resistance element be able to easily procure every item on their material “dream sheet” of necessary equipment, in order to facilitate their operations. This shortcoming of support should never be utilized as an excuse to preclude the execution of a necessary operation. Nevertheless, every effort should be made, through all three branches of the resistance movement, to supply whatever material support is needed and available, to facilitate the success of any mission.

Mission-oriented leadership and planning focuses on the objective of any given operation, in relation to the strategic goals of the resistance, rather than simply adhering to some preconceived notion of “how guerrillas operate” (this may be a large part of the reason so many people have difficulty distinguishing between the mission parameters of the different elements of a successful resistance movement—J.M.). Successful resistance operational planning must rely on the individual initiative of the fighter to determine the best course of action for the execution of a given mission, rather than some centralized, plan-by-decree paradigm.

While the OPORD format is a splendid planning and leadership tool, it has the tendency to be mis-used and made more important and detailed than it needs to be. A well-planned operation, and a well-developed OPORD should be as brief and simple as possible, as long as the necessary information is clearly and completely communicated.

A plan should be the foundation of any operation. To develop a plan, a patrol leader (PL) must understand the mission intent and the stragic and operational goals of the resistance. These three factors must provide the overall concept of the operation, in order to plan the mission. The application of the doctrinal “troop-leading procedures” (TLP), in view of the concept of the operation, allows the PL to develop a a complete plan and develop and construct a comprehensive OPORD. The mission statement of a plan must incorporate and cover the five “W's” of who, what, when, where, and why.

(i.e. ODA 000 (who) will execute a HALO insertion (what) to infiltrate the UWOA (unconventional warfare operational area) NLT 0130 on 24FEB12 (when), (please note that, while this is not the military doctrinal format for writing a date-time group, I wrote it this way to make it more readily understandable for non-military personnel—J.M.) at Drop Zone Formaldehyde (where) to effect a link-up with local indigenous resistance elements (why). In such a case, the mission intent/commander's intent might be “ODA 000 will conduct a link-up with local resistance elements to perform a UW mission.)

We will continue the discussion of mission-planning and operational order formats tomorrow.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains


HOLY SHIT BATMAN! I guess I need to post op-ed pieces more often.....

  1. Amerisraeldoomed: Congratulations you fucking moron! You win the “I'm a fucking retard!” Post-of-the-Month Award. Have you ever even met a Jew? Or, as CausaPatet pointed out, do you just copy-and-paste the stupidity of others to demonstrate your complete lack of situational awareness (You DID notice I said I was pro-Israel, right?). I hope; I sincerely pray; that you will be so offended by this response (as you should be, it is intentional), that you never read this blog again, and that you point out to all of your fellow fat-ass, redneck hillbilly-wannabe, Klan/Aryan Resistance/Silent Brotherhood buddies, that I'm a Jew-lover who they shouldn't bother reading. You are a fucktard. (edited to delete the suggestion that you eat your own fucking gun, at HH6's request).
  2. For those who were concerned about my apparent respect for the President: Rest assured, I despise the man. I despise his intents towards the Republic, just as I despise his means of circumventing the republican system to install his dictatorship. I do not believe he is as brilliant as he or his sycophants believe he is. I also don't think he is genius enough to wreak the havoc he is managing, on purpose. I believe he is honestly convinced that he is doing God's work. He's just not smart enough to recognize the fallacy and evil nature of his failings. My intent was NOT to suggest that people not belittle the President for the stupidity and malice of his actions and statements. Obviously (see above), I'm not very reticent about voicing my opinion of stupidity, and someone's office does not hold much water with me. As someone pointed out above, as long as he pulls his trousers on the same way I do (feet first, I don't do the one leg at a time thing....it's way too slow), he's still a man, and certainly not my superior (I constantly got in trouble in the military, even as a NCO, because I refused to refer to those with ranks senior to mine as my “superiors”). I do however, wholeheartedly support the Constitution, regardless of the ludicrous pipe-dream of a return to the Articles of Confederation that many hold dear. There's a reason the Founding Fathers were smart enough to recognize that the AoC wasn't going to work. That having been said, were the Republic to continue fracturing along the lines it seems to be fracturing along, rest assured, not only will I stand with my local community, but I will also do everything in my power to ensure that, whatever arises out of the aftermath, it has a Constitutional base (ANONYMOUS 01:06: I've read BTP's “Hologram of Liberty.” While I agree that he makes some interesting points, I think he's full of shit, overall. That's not intended to attack the man, or his efforts towards Liberty. I think the premise behind the Free State Wyoming project was grand, albeit unrealistic, bordering on delusional. I just believe the Constitution, as written and ratified, and with appropriately ratified amendments, is the best system of governance available in human history).
  3. I do not think Israel, as a nation, is flawless. I think, like most governments (all governments?), that they lack any sort of understanding of the realities of counter-insurgency. I think they need to develop a better plan for the integration of Palestinians into Israeli culture. I do NOT believe the argument that Israel is on a conscious campaign of genocide. I also believe/know that the Arab nations around Israel are utilizing the Palestinian issue to continue their irregular warfare attacks on Israel. When they have established refugee camps for Palestinians in their own countries, they have made it abundantly obvious that they will never allow any Palestinian to participate in their societies. So much for Islamic brotherood....
  4. Shermezh: I am well aware of the planning processes necessary to successfully execute a covert operation. Despite not having been a Tier one JSOC jedi, I do have some little bit of experience with covert operations planning. I agree that “someone” (cough...cough...Israel...cough...cough) has been very successful in derailing the Iranian development of nuclear weapons. The question then becomes....why do we need to invade Iran with massed conventional forces when irregular warfare is already succeeding so well? Because someone needs the public relations/media images of a “real” war to sell something. Thus, I don't support an invasion of Iran under these circumstances. As far as an ultimatum? “You attack Israel, the Persian culture will be a minor footnote in history from now until eternity” sounds agreeable to me.

Alright, I'm done.

Hope everyone is having a wonderful day, otherwise.\

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

08 February 2012


To begin with, I'd like to apologize to readers, for not posting a typical training/organizational related article here tonight. I worked a longer than normal day, and have been fighting a raging headache all day that neither copious amounts of water imbibed, several 1000mg doses of Tylenol, and even a good supper of Chinese food seems to want to cure. I'm guessing my cervical spine is out of alignment and needs to be adjusted, so I may have to simply gut it out until I can make it to the chiropractor in a couple of weeks. C'est la vie.

I did want to take the time to post on a couple of things I've noticed going on, in the world in general, and in the blogosphere (within the Liberty movement blogosphere, specifically). I hope you will allow me the Liberty of doing so (Oh, wait, it's my blog! I can do what I want! Yay me....I hope it won't turn too many readers off).

To begin, let's face reality. There is a strong core of belief outside of the political right, that most of us of the “survivalist/preparedness” culture, at some level, are all racist, and anti-Semitic, specifically. I know ArcticPatriot has been accused of this recently. I don't personally know AP. I've traded emails with him a couple of times, we seem to share some common beliefs. That's it. This is not directed at AP, nor at those who have accused him of anti-Semitism. This is MY personal statement on the subject.

You would be hard-pressed to find a more ardent supporter of the state of Israel than myself. I'm possibly the most pro-Israel, non-Jew I've ever met. I support the continued existance of the state of Israel, unquestionably, and 100%. Not because they are God's Chosen People (I'm entirely too agnostic to buy into that), but because I believe that every culture has the right to a homeland, assuming they can hold it. The Israelis, sent to an undesired chunk of rocky desert, managed to carve a nation out of it, while surrounded on all sides by blood-oath enemies. They have held it since, despite the best efforts of the enemies who surround them on three sides, to shove them into the ocean. Big brass balls and the willingness to fight for what you hold dear means a lot to me. The Islamist nations that surround and hate Israel try and leverage the Palestinian issue, falsely. Israel does not hate Palestinians. Palestinians have not managed to let it sink in that they are being used, by those with ulterior motives, who hold no concern for Palestine, other than as a tool to rid the region of the Israelis.

I am 100% convinced, based on significant amounts of time spent in Muslim cultural centers, and in face-to-face conversations with Muslims of various social classes, that the return of the Caliphate, and its global advancement, is a serious goal of a large percentage of Muslims, including many so-called “moderates.” I know that Muslims throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, despise the Israelis, and want to see them driven into the sea.

I've noted it in this blog before, but I'll reiterate: I abhor Islam. Nevertheless, I recognize, and respect, the natural human right of any person to worship God in whatever manner suits them—as long as that worship does not negatively impact the religious freedoms or other human rights of anyone else. So, in the Middle East, I support Israel. I always have and I always will.

Lest anyone mistake me for an anti-Semite, let me reiterate: I support the national sovereignty and survival of the state of Israel (Hell, I've dated Jewish girls, and was even engaged to one, once upon a time. Pin an anti-Semite tag on THAT one...). I would personally go, without a moment's hesitation, and put on the uniform of the IDF, to help protect Israel from aggressive action, if I thought it necessary to help ensure the nation's survival.

All of that having been said, our rapidly impending, and apparently unavoidable invasion of Iran, and the subsequent counter-insurgency we are going to embroiled in, just like the one we just left in Iraq, is stupid. I genuinely believe it is intended not to secure peace in the Middle East (good luck with that fucking pipe dream!), but to provide ammunition to further tighten the chokehold of the police-state here in the United States, that we are currently beginning to suffer under.

Let's look at historical fact. If the Israelis genuinely believe that Iran poses a clear and present danger to the security of the Jewish state, they are more than capable of pre-emptively ending that threat, with no direct help from the United States government. They've done it before, on more than once occasion.

The current claim is that Iran is less than one year away from the completion of a functional nuclear weapon. That's been the claim for well over half a decade! I put that into the same category as using Hussein's WMDs as an excuse to legitimize the invasion of Iraq (i.e. it's a load of horse-shit).

Now, if the Iranians were massing tactical forces and saying, “We're going to invade Israel and shove the Jews into the ocean?” If one of their other Islamist neighbors decide to actually attack Israel? I would, at that point, support direct American military intervention to help defend the state and people of Israel. I view Israel as the little brother of the United States, on a geo-political scale. If someone attacked my younger brother (my brother is a currently serving SOF service member with numerous multiple tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan; he's probably capable of taking care of himself), I can assure you, I'd go after them, in his support. However, if he got his ass kicked, because he was talking out his ass, libeling someone with no evidence to support his accusations? I'd consider the ass-kicking to be a lesson he had coming. I'd chalk it up as a learning experience for him.

The IAEA claims that Iran is less than a year from possession of a functional nuclear weapon? They've been saying the exact same thing for a MINIMUM of five years, and it's been suggested for longer than that. I put it in the same category as Hussein's possession of WMDs to legitimize the invasion of Iraq. In other words, a load of horseshit.

Now, if someone actually invades Israel? Or says, “We're going to invade Israel?” I would support American military intervention in that case, 100% and then some. In MY eyes, it is no different than if someone attacked or said they were getting ready to attack, my younger brother (My younger brother is a currently serving SOF service member. He's probably capable of taking care of himself. I'd still go after someone for threatening or attacking him). However, just like if my younger brother picked a fight, for no legitimate reason, and subsequently got his ass kicked, I would chalk it up as a learning experience.

I will not support the invasion of a sovereign nation, simply because the leaders of that country are a bunch of idiots who think it makes them look tough to talk smack to the biggest, baddest bully on the block (The U.S. Not Israel).

As I mentioned, this post is apropos of nothing, but the subject has been on my mind all day, considering the announcement today of the President's Executive Order declaring a National Emergency in regards to the “threat” Iran poses to the United States' economy and “national security.”

I would like to point out however that, regardless of our disagreement in many areas, there are too few of us in this nation who are aware of the games being played on us. We cannot afford to let misconceptions and misperceptions tear us asunder. The only way a resistance can hope to successfully function, is to put aside our differences in the interest of the common cause. If you are an anti-Semite (besides being a dumbass; I've yet to meet an anti-Semite who even knew any Jewish people to base their prejudices on), keep it to yourself. If you are racist against blacks, hispanics, asians, or fucking Martians, KEEP IT TO YOURSELF!!! Do not, A) drive a wedge between yourself and potential allies, or B) provide the statists with any sort of ammunition to help them wage their PSYOPs campaign on the public against us. People are people. Gross generalizations about a group of people (all gun owners have penis envy, and want to go on a rampage killing babies!), is fucking retarded. I have family members whom I adore, who are married to, or descended from all of the above racial and/or ethnic groups. I would fight and kill for them, just like I would for my wife and children.

On the other hand, automatically labeling someone as an undesirable, because you have a suspicion of incorrect thought processes/beliefs on their part, WITHOUT proof and verification, is a tool of the statists. If you have a problem with someone's words, go to them in private and express your concerns. Just fucking quit airing dirty laundry in public. No one, especially the statists who want justification for trying to control us, needs to see your wife's dirty underwear. Keep it private people. OPSEC is OPSEC.

Another concern that arises, is the frequency with which I see the President labeled in the most derogatory manner that someone can come up with. Look, I despise the man's publicly stated beliefs and goals. I despise everything he stands for in the political spectrum. Nevertheless, I still maintain my respect and love for the Constitutional institutions of the Republic. He sits in the office of the President of the United States. Calling him, “Obummer,” “the Kenyan,” or anything else intended to be personally derogatory, is insulting not to him, but to the office he holds. You will never read, anywhere on this blog, him addressed as anything other than “President Obama” or “the President.” Whatever you believe regarding his eligibility for office, he IS in the office. Demonstrating the sort of childish name-calling behavior I continuously see in regards to the President, is NOT going to build rapport with un-aligned members of the civilian population. Labeling him, “The Kenyan” may the dumbest shit I've ever seen, from a PSYOPs PoV. It plays right into the argument of his supporters that those who oppose him are racist. Face the facts: The man's father was a Kenyan national, not the President.

If you watch some of the videos on YouTube of drills taught at different tactical shooting courses, you can come across some weird, acrobatic shit. It's just that—shit. The thing you have to consider (and this is one reason I have no interest in running a “school”) is that these guys want to make a living. They have a limited number of people who are potential students. The best customer for a tactical shooting school is a repeat customer. They HAVE to come up with “new,” novel ways of teaching you to do shit, just to keep you coming back.

99.9% of what you will ever need to know how to do to survive and win a gunfight, can be taught in a weekend. You won't MASTER it in a weekend, but you can LEARN it in a weekend (the shooting part, or the tactical movement part, probably not both). Then, you go home and practice it until you master it. In the event you do need that 0.1% that wasn't covered in class? If you've truly mastered the fundamentals, you have the framework to adapt it on the fly, in order to overcome the unforseen. Focus on the fucking basics, folks. Advanced shooting and advanced tactical skill is nothing more than expert execution of the basic fundamentals. Quit looking for new shit to get the same result, without doing the work.

If you are preparing for potential future hostilities, beyond home- or personal-defense (i.e. if you're preparing for the possible need for future armed resistance), you need to answer two very critical questions, right the fuck now:

  1. Next time you're at a stop light, look at the vehicle two cars in front of you. Imagine it was a member of the regime security forces. Could you, with no warning to the driver of that vehicle, lean out your car door and put two to three rounds in the back of his head, instantly, without remorse or doubt, then drive away as if nothing untoward had happened? There is a vast chasm of difference between shooting a home-invader, during the heat of a fight in your own home, and calmly shooting someone in the back of the head, in cold-blood, with no warning.
  2. If you do decide you could do that, what do you think the necessary catalyst would be that would drive you to being able to justify that action to yourself?

You need to determine YOUR answers to these questions, right now, in your own heart, with no false bravado for the sake of maintaining appearances in front of your friends, before you need to know the answers.

Alright, my rant is over. I promise to return to your regularly scheduled programming post-haste. Right now though? My head hurts. I'm going to bed. Good-night.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains