NousDefions-We Defy!

More Tech Issues

2012-02-24T22:05:00.000-07:00

1) Am having some serious issues with email reception. I have reverted to nousdefionsranger@yahoo.com. Sorry for any inconvenience.

2) Will not have any article posted this weekend, probably. Have some "secret squirrel" stuff going on. Involves being outside the home AO, so not much time for typing beyond checking emails. Call it flashbacks to Suck School (Ranger School for the uninitiated).

Nous Defions!
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

RESISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR URBAN CONFLICT OPERATIONAL AREAS

2012-02-20T18:50:00.000-07:00

The phenomenon of urbanization is an exponentially increasing trend. In virtually every nation in the world, but especially in the Third World, urban population centers continue to grow both in population and area. Even in the USA, the ratio of rural-to-urban population has reversed itself in less than a century. Internationally or domestically, modern military forces are finally recognizing that most battlefields of the future will be urban rather than rural or wilderness.

For political resistance movements, the urban operational area has historically provided both a great deal of danger, as well as ample opportunity. If even a large minority of the civilian population supports the resistance, and the majority is either neutral, or has been alienated by the actions of the regime, the resistance will be able to survive and continue the fight. The classical concept of a resistance movement controlling the rural countryside while forcing the regime to function solely in large, built-up urban areas still has merit, but a multi-pronged approach wherein rural guerrillas use interdiction missions as their primary modus operandi to prevent regime utilization of lines of communication (LOC) and supply routes in rural areas, while urban guerrillas utilize raids and ambushes on security force facilities, infrastructure, and personnel in built-up areas, while the subversive underground continues its campaign of subversion and sabotage against regime-specific infrastructure, is the future of successful resistance movements.

The ready access to portable, high-resolution video recording devices, even in pocket-sized cell phones, as well as the easy upload of such video recordings to the internet, provides an instant worldwide audience for the resistance to spread its message. The ability of the regime to readily identify fleeing resistance personnel in rural terrain, while certainly not precluding the successful execution of a rural guerrilla campaign in suitable environments, such as alpine areas and thickly wooded terrain, and jungle-like swamp terrain, does offer numerous obvious advantages to the resistance movement who can utilize urban environments to their advantage.

Cities are the centers of human activity, but each city possesses its own unique characteristics. These characteristics are the basis of METT-TC analysis of the environment for mission-planning. Whatever else characterizes a given built-up area, its location may wholly or partially limit its development and thus determine the external form and dimension of the activity. Just as no two cities are alike externally, no city is uniform internally. A city is composed of various different nuclei or neighborhoods. There are business, industrial, and service areas, as well as residential neighborhoods that may range from inner-city ghettos to comfortable, affluent suburbs. Depending on the city and its local surrounding environment, as well as the socio-political attitudes of the civilian population, there may be large wooded parks and “green-belts” in the midst of the built-up areas.

While a truly rural area has the potential to be completely self-sustaining in its essential needs, an urban area can never fulfill all of its own essential survival needs. The resources, goods, and services that residents of an urban area need as well as the goods and services it provides to other communities and/or the surrounding areas determine the essential function of a given city. Included in the standard functions that determine a city's purpose for existance may include economic, political, religious, educational, residential, or any combination of these.

Despite the differences from one built-up area to the next urban areas possess certain similarities that provide us with some general characteristics that influence the inherent nature of guerrilla tactical operations in urban areas. The nature of cities offer some critical challenges to the military/paramilitary planner as well as the operative. Successful planning must be far more detailed than is normally required for even the most challenging rural missions. As the saying claims, “Proper prior planning prevents piss-poor performance.”

The nature of a city involved in a guerrilla resistance favors the defender who is native to the city. Like the rural guerrilla, the man on the ground, with an inherent knowledge of his daily surroundings, possesses a unique perspective and advantage in urban guerrilla conflict. While to an outsider, an urban area may appear as a hopelessly confusing tangle of buildings, streets, and alleys, they are as familiar to the observant, experienced resident as his own living room. Those buildings, streets, and alleys restrict the vehicular movement and reduce his mobility, providing more than ample opportunities for the guerrilla force to utilize traditional guerrilla tactics such as route and site interdiction operations, ambushes, and sniper attacks with little vulnerability, as long as the guerrilla force is indigenous to the local operational environment, or has adequate experience living in the area to know its peculiarities and characteristics. Obstacles are easy to construct in urban areas, further facilitating guerrilla control of the battlespace. The three-dimensional nature of the battlefield, offering observation and canalization found in no other operational environment other than alpine areas, further provides key tactical advantages to the resistance.

Urban combat operations, like alpine fights, are inherently small-unit operations. Combat elements smaller than platoons, including squads, fire-teams, and buddy-teams will dominate the urban battlefield, just like they do the alpine battlefield. Whether the political nature of the conflict requires surgical applications of violence, targeting only regime security apparatus, or general warfare, where there are no civilians in the battle-space, any operations in urban terrain devolve to the small-unit fight, favoring the well-trained guerrilla unit. Combat occurs at extreme close-range, with occasional opportunities for long-range engagement due to the canalization effects of streets and buildings, allowing for engagement by well-trained riflemen at intermediate-distance ranges. The nature of urban construction, combined with the presence of large numbers of civilian population will limit the performance of indirect-fire weapons by regime security forces in order to prevent pushing the popular opinion further to the side of the resistance (it's one thing to piss off the locals in Mosul by bombing neighborhoods with “precision” munitions from high-altitude aircraft. It's something else entirely when the constituency that is bombed consists of the people who voted you into office). Additionally, indigenous military personnel may be hesitant to fire area-effect weapons that will put their own families and friends at risk.

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.222 Special Forces Sniper Training and Employment, April 2003, categorizes built-up areas into four basic subdivisions:

The first category is large cities of 100,000 residents or more. These areas typically provide the core of a larger populated region with a high population density consisting of the city itself, surrounding suburbs, and small towns. Normally, in the case of American cities, these metropolitan complexes appear to be a single large and continuous city with millions of people, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, Denver, and much of the Northeastern seaboard.
The second category, towns and small cities of 3,000-100,000 residents are typically located along LOCs such as navigable rivers, railways, and interstate highways. Like larger metropolitan areas, these built-up areas are continuing to expand and tend to either form new metro concentrations or merge with pre-existing metropolitan areas.
The third category, small villages of less than 3,000 people tend to be agriculturally oriented. These may exist anywhere, but typically exist in cultivated areas of farmland, developed grazing pastures, or in thickly timbered areas facilitating historic logging operations.
The final category, strip areas form along LOCs and serve as connections between villages and towns. In the wide expanses of the largely unpopulated western USA, these areas tend to serve as refueling and rest areas between villages, towns, and large cities/metropolitan areas.

Within any given built-up area, as previously mentioned, urban terrain differs based on size, location, and history. The areas within the city are categorized as:

Industrial areas and residential sprawl. These typically consist of smome houses with yards, gardnes, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving, while the industrial areas consist of one- or two-story flat-roofed factories or warehouses, typically close to traditional LOCs such as rail lines and highways. In both types of area, there are generally large open areas in the form of vacant lots, open parks, and other forms. Due to the inherently political nature of UW, operations in residential areas should be minimized in resistance planning due to the risk of collateral damage that will negatively impact relations with the civilian population.
Core periphery. The core periphery consists of narrow streets with continuous building fronts of concrete, brick, or other masonry. These are typically uniformly two or three stories in small towns and villages, and five to ten stories in large cities/metropolitan areas.
City cores and outlying high-rise areas. Typical American city cores today consist of high-rise areas that vary greatly in height and allow for more open space between buildings, depending on the specific city. Generally, city streets form along rectangular patterns, with four to eight-lanes of traffic, allowing uncomfortably high levels of mobility for regime security vehicles in the view of the guerrilla. Outside of limited sniper-interdiction missions, there may be little opportunity for resistance forces to successfully engage regime forces in these environments.
Commerical ribbons. These “strip mall” rows of stores, shops, and fast food joints are built along the sides of major highway LOCs and interstate highways throughout built-up areas.

Urban combat in unconventional warfare operations typically occurs when control of the city contributes to the political strategy goals of the resistance. If a given city offers no political advantage to the resistance, there is little reason for the loss of personnel and logistics support requirements necessary to perform successful urban guerrilla operations. Nevertheless, any serious resistance planner looking towards the future must consider the applications of urban guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage throughout urban areas in any given operational environment during active resistance actions.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE THEORY

2012-02-20T18:48:00.002-07:00

Unconventional warfare is a doctrinal military term covering a wide spectrum of military and paramilitary activities, generally carried out by irregular forces. For purposes of the contemporary American resistance movement (I will forthwith refer to this “movement” as the American Constitutional Liberty Resistance, or ACLR, for lack of a better term. ARM would work, if it hadn't already been taken and misused), the term should be considered to encompass guerrilla warfare (GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and information operations (IO) including psychological operations (PSYOPs) in support of resistance activities.

Guerrilla warfare is simply one aspect of a resistance movement's activities. GW is comprised of paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, local indigenous personnel against technologically-superior regime forces in denied areas. It is the overt military aspect of a resistance movement. The urbanization of American society, like most of the world, has led to significant necessary changes within the doctrinal requirements of UW/GW. The emphasis has, in many cases, and will continue to, shift away from rural guerrilla operations towards more urban-centric guerrilla operations in built-up areas. This paradigm shift does not discount the feasibility of rural-based guerrilla warfare elements, but does tend to create a role reversal in many operational areas, as the rural-based guerrilla element supports the operations of the urban guerrilla force, rather than the historical precedent of vice-versa.

Sabotage is an act or acts, which are intended to disable or destroy the ability of regime security forces to operate effectively by damaging critical infrastructure support such as war materials, premises, or utilities, including human and material resources. Sabotage may be the most efficient, and/or only available means to attack and destroy specific targets beyond the ability of the conventional weapons typically deployed by resistance forces. Sabotage selectively neutralizes enemy capabilities with minimal manpower, material demands, and collateral damage.

Subversion is any activity developed and carried out in order to undermine the strength and moral of a regime. All three aspects of a resistance movement—guerrilla force, subversive underground, and auxiliaries—will contribute directly, or indirectly, to the subversive activities of the resistance, but the clandestine nature of subversion activities mandates that the subversive underground performs the bulk of the activity. Subversion is doctrinally defined as an effects-based targeting of human terrain assets.

Intelligence activities incorporate overt, clandestine, and covert collection efforts, and the assembly and dissemination of available information resources for operational planning. Target analysis of potential resistance movements should utilize the doctrinal CARVER format, and satisfy stated operational requirements, while reducing the risk to resistance operatives at the tactical level.This detail forms the backbone of effective resistance intelligence activities.

Information operations, including psychological operations in a resistance movement focus on two aspects. First is the demoralization of regime forces through the application of propaganda and education of the illegality of their actions under constitutional law. The second is developing and building increased rapport between the resistance movement and the local civilian populace, in order to garner the requisite material, political, and psychological support for the resistance.

UW operations require proficiency on the part of active resistance movement cadre in training development and execution, direct-action small-unit combat operations, sabotage, intelligence activities, and information operations before hostilities openly occur. This will allow the dedicated resistance cadre to act as force-multipliers by training and leading newly recruited and developed resistance operatives in the wake of the commencement of open hostilities. Until these hostilities develop, it is imperative that the resistance cadre wait for the appropriate “operational sweet spot” to develop. A resistance potential must already exist (I would argue that we are already there. Even the statists in power have declared the American people to be “pre-revolutionary,” evidence by the DoJ's ongoing attempts to demonize innocuous activities and interests shared by large segments of the American civilian populace. When is the right time? I would argue that you will know it's time to strap on your guns when you notice key regime figures in your local operational area disappearing and the public is cheering it. That's your indication that the local public has taken action on its own accord).

The government's inability to meet the legitimate needs of the people, combined with its intransigent unwillingness to abide by the constitutional restraints of our republican system, has caused widespread frustration and dissatisfaction. People have lost faith in and respect for the legitimacy of the government.

Socio-economic and/or political conditions must exist that divide or weaken the regime's mechanisms to exert control over the civilian populace. Historically, this has been indicated by factional/ethnic discord within the military/security forces apparatus of the regime, geographical realities, combined with technological weaknesses that preclude positive central command-and-control of those forces, and a general refusal on the part of the civilian populace to pay attention to the edicts of the regime government, combined with a resultant inability or unwillingness on the part of security forces to retaliate against the civilian populace.

Regardless of the general dissatisfaction of the civilian populace towards the regime's policies, a resistance movement has little chance of success against a regime that has a well-organized, connected, and effective security forces apparatus. The existance of a successful security apparatus leaves little opportunity for the organization and execution of the core clandestine and/or covert auxiliary support for a resistance guerrilla campaign.

The civilian populace must possess not only a general will to resist passively, but also the intestinal fortitude to bear significant hardships that result from the typically repressive counterinsurgency measures practiced by tyrannical regimes. A population that has been subjected to long-term brutality or psychological indocrination espousing the supremacy of the regime, by an otherwise benign government will not likely possess adequate willpower to sustain long-term struggle, especially as their neighbors start disappearing in the middle of the night, while their favored “leaders” tell continue to preach that the tyranny and violence is to safeguard their security.

Resistance will, initially be non-violent, as it should be. At a local level, great strides can be made through coordination of efforts to ostracize government agents and representatives, legally or illegally evading taxes to reduce the ability of the government to continue to provide unconstitutional functions, and other forms of civil disobedience, including protests, sit-ins, and non-compliance with official directives of an unconstitutional nature. Stepping up to violent resistance will initially include subversion, sabotage, and ultimately, direct-action guerrilla warfare against regime security forces. Historically oppressed peoples have resorted to non-violent resistance initially, only resorting to violence if their demands are not met, if regime security forces respond to non-violence with violent repression (both of which we are currently witnessing in the government responses to the leftists protests of the Occupy Wall Street movement), or if nudged towards violent action by subversive cadre. If the societal conditions are repressive enough, or the repression increases, unorganized resistance efforts will coalesce into a resistance movement.

A resistance movement must be capable of integrating the civilian populace's moral indignation at their repression, with their actual willingness to accept the kind of mental and physical hardships, as well as the risk of actual bodily harm and/or death on behalf of that indignation. It is imperative, even during the preparatory phases of a resistance movement, that the resistance develop and conduct an intensive and extensive psychological operations campaign to help move the disillusioned segments of society away from passive resistance towards providing active support to the resistance, either by providing supplies, food, shelter, transportation, or even simply information of intelligence value. These efforts to increase the public's dissatisfaction with the behavior and policy of the regime should strive to simultaneously portray the resistance movement's philosophy as a viable and desirable alternative. Without developing this psychological support from at least large segments of the general public, there is no way for the resistance to function clandestinely or coverty, as the public will continue to follow the dictates of their “leaders,” to report any “suspicious behaviors.” This is THE central facet of any successful resistance.

In almost every historical example of successful resistance to tyranny by a moral resistance element, the rebellious factions have faced a civilian populace with a small but active minority who ardently supported the regime as being incapable of doing wrong, as well as an equally ardent faithful minority who actively supports the aims and goals of the resistance movement. These two groups will generally not have their opinions changed on the matter, regardless of the PSYOPs campaigns of the regime or the resistance. The large, uncommitted mass in the middle; those who don't really care either way, should be the target of resistance element PSYOPs campaigns. In order for the resistance to succeed, they must develop a way to convince the large, emotionally uncommitted majority of the public to support the resistance, or at the very least, to accept it as a legitimate alternative authority to the established regime. The reality is, most human beings WANT some sort of guidance. Explaining to them that they need to do whatever they want to do is not going to elicit support from the majority. Providing a “shadow government” that provides the minimum necessary aspects of local governance, in the form of security/police protective services will go further to establish support within the populace than telling them that they're “on their own.”

As will be seen later, there are fortunately, many opportunities, even during the preparatory phases of resistance, for a movement to conduct these types of PSYOPs. Well-written blogs that manage to convey the valuable messages of liberty, self-reliance, responsibility, and the truth of constitutional governance, in an entertaining, engaging, and educational manner, are one simple example of these types of PSYOPs efforts. Posting flyers, speaking at political events, purchasing radio ads, and face-to-face conversations with people all provide oppoprtunities for the resistance to prepare the psychological battle space in advance, to gain the popular support necessary for successful execution of irregular warfare.

The single most important aspect of a successful insurgency is the viability of its message of grievance against the regime and the established status quo. This message must reach the civilian populace and it must resonate within their socio-economic, political, and philosophical/religious worldviews. The resistance must develop and voice a unified, coherent message of hope that can serve as a rallying call to the populace to join or at least, to support the resistance. It must also serve as a unifying force to align the many diverging interests and goals of the varied elements within the resistance movement itself.

A mob, committing random political violence, no matter how noble their aims, is not a resistance or an insurgency. It is a mob. A resistance movement is a political movement using directed and focused tactical violence, to achieve specific operational objectives in pursuit of a strategic goal. That strategic goal must provide the focus that will coalesce the resistance into a functional political movement that actually has a chance of success at achieving its aims. A movement that cannot develop a coherent ideology to present to the civilian populace and to provide a unifying moral basis for the resistance will never amount to anything beyond the armed bandits and brigands that the regime will attempt to portray them as.

Until all of these pre-conditions and more, can be achieved within and by the resistance, there is no reason, let alone chance of success, for a resistance movement to begin active hostilities in retaliation for perceived wrongs by the regime. All the guns and ammunition in the free world will not overcome the civilian populace's reservations concerning un-affiliated armed groups in their midst attempting to change their comfortable status quo.

The ACLR possesses an advantage unique in the history of unconventional warfare, should the need arise in the future to actively engage a totalitarian regime in this country. For the first time in the history of insurgency, we not only possess individual fighting weapons on a level of parity with the regime, we possess ready access to the most advanced technology the regime possesses. Additionally, the knowledge that we will probably be required to engage hostile regime security forces in a guerrilla warfare environment provides us with the unparalleled opportunity to prepare for these challenges now, while the required logistical supplies are relatively readily available. The primary tasks of the auxiliary, and indeed, all factions of the resistance should currently revolve around:

Procuring and stockpiling, in readily accessible, but secured caches throughout their area for future use by resistance forces. These may range from the obvious such as ammunition in common military calibers and staple storage foodstuffs, to the more mundane, such as high-quality outdoors clothing and boots (thrift stores and second-hand stores are a spectacularly good supply source for these) in various sizes. Anything that can foreseeably be applied by the resistance movement in the future provides critical leverage for the resistance to apply in the execution of their aims when conflict becomes impossible to avoid further.
Preparing and dispersing written, recorded, and verbal information to further the preparatory phase of the resistance PSYOPs campaign. This may range from a blog on the internet (of which we have many, thanks to the efforts of many patriots more erudite than I am), radio spot advertising (such as Kerodin's current efforts which we should all be supporting), speaking with friends, neighbors, and co-workers, and even the surreptitious posting of flyers on bulletin boards in your neighborhood and community that deliver and support the message of the ACLR.
Developing a solid network of fellow future auxiliary members in your community, to provide further active support for the resistance and the future development of a network of safehouses, transportation networks, and communications networks. This may involve everything from developing secret hiding places that facilitate hiding resistance personnel in the future, to developing the ability to utilize open-source, free-ware encryption technologies and field-craft techniques such as the use of dead-drops and other covert communications methods. It may be as simple as performing in-depth research into the smuggling methods used by criminal enterprises to move their products through controlled areas (one key thing to consider though is, if the information is available to the resistance from open-source information, it's equally available to regime security forces. Realistically, learning effective smuggling methods might require interfacing with rather disagreeable people who are currently actively part of the criminal underground, to the extent necessary to earn and gain their trust in discussing these topics).

The structure of a successful resistance movement is best illustrated by the iceberg analogy. While the relatively small peak of the iceberg is visible (the effects of subversion, sabotage, and paramilitary combat operations), the massive bulk of the iceberg remains out of sight, below the surface (the development of a support infrastructure of the auxiliary). The task of the resistance cadre will, in the unfortunate event that the resistance transitions to an insurgency, be first focused on the development of this support infrastructure. Putting into place, the pieces necessary for the future support infrastructure, in case it becomes necessary, should be the primary focus of the resistance movement cadre.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Individual Task Skills Training

In order to understand the forthcoming additions to the blog of specific individual task skills training, I am going to briefly mention some underlying concepts on the design and utilization of this method of training development.

Resistance elements do not and will not typically have the time or the resources to achieve and sustain proficiency on every conceivable training task the resistance operative will need to master. For this reason, resistance cadre must identify the tasks that will be most critical to their units' specific operational area and potential taskings. The use of mission-essential task lists is critical to developing a team training plan that will develop the requisite skills in critical areas to ensure the element's ability to function in combat.

The purpose of these task listings and descriptions is to provide an overview of historically relevant specific skills that resistance operatives may find critically important to have mastered. It is important that team trainers use these task descriptions to develop training programs for their teams. These listings will provide task performance and evaluation criteria, in accordance with U.S. Army soldier training publications that will provide a basis for individual task performance-based training.

Subject areas will cover those skillsets necessary to provide survivability to resistance members in times of conflict. Examples include: small-arms proficiency, resistance tactical communications methods, trauma medical aid for common battlefield injuries and wounds, and fieldcraft/survival skills.

These individual task skills are the foundation cornerstone of training that collective-task training (CTT) is built on. Without a solid footing in these skills, CTT will fall apart and be ineffectual. CTT is a collection of group/team skills designed to allow elements to react to and survive common combative scenarios. Examples include react-to-contact/break contact, establish a remain-over-night (RON) site, move tactically as a buddy team or fire team, and others.

These task listings will provide the team trainer and individual resistance members the information necessary to support integration of these critical skills into their organizational training programs. It allows trainers to plan and prepare, execute, and evaluate the training of all members of their organizational elements. Developing a mission-based training plan using these task listings will help provide a comprehensive training plan to develop skill and tactical expertise in all relevant and important areas for the resistance element.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

I fibbed, sort of, unintentionally....

2012-02-14T23:43:00.002-07:00

This is a violation of the promised new format of the blog, but due to the furor it has apparently raised, I penned this response. I'll post it once, than return to the promised format changes.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

My comments opposed to the anarcho-capitalist point-of-view as a reality, including this one:

“the first dumb motherfucker that comments on this about how the Constitution was a Hamiltonian power-grab and that anarchy is superior to any form of governance, needs to email me through the blog with their contact information. I will personally pay for a one-way ticket to Somalia, or another suitably anarchic society, in order for you to put your precious, assinine, and unrealistic views to the test”

have elicited a great deal of comment on others' blogs who have linked to my articles. As I have repeated, ad nauseum, I support anyone's right to say anything they want.

That having been said, I notice that no one has emailed asking for their air-fare...

I will try and respond, this once, to this question, before reverting to the promised new format for the blog.

I do not view Somalia as a “straw man” argument whatsoever. Someone at WRSA anonymously claimed that Somalia is no more anarchist than the USA. While the idiocy of that statement is beyond comment, I do agree that Somalia gets thrown out as an example of a failed-state example of anarchy far too frequently, without comment. I'm as guilty of it as anyone. So, here's my comment on it for those not current on Somali history.

Somalia has a long history of relatively successful pastoral tribalism. Let's ignore their role in failed ancient kingdoms and empires, and focus on relatively modern history. Following the fall of the Socialist government through military junta, Somalia was ruled by a military “Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)” led by Barre. This came about in 86 or 87 (I want to say 86, but I'm too lazy to Google it at the moment).

Obviously, as we can all guess (and are pretty much experiencing at the moment), life under a military dictatorship pretty much sucks goat's ass (no pun intended in reference to pastoral Islamic societies and goats...I promise). So, local tribal groups banded together long enough to overthrow the regime. That's fair. After all, a government should only be allowed to rule as long as it maintains the consent of the governed. No one disagrees with that, except the government that lacks the consent of the governed. The problem that arose was that, once the government was overthrown, the tribalists didn't really have any plan...except to return to their tribes and live happily ever after. Cool again. Hell, that's pretty much exactly what I want. Unfortunately, without some form of limited governance, they did what people do: They looked out for number one, using their tribe to take what they wanted from weaker neighboring tribes who didn't have the manpower to stop them. Dying for your private property is a noble concept, but staying alive to enjoy the fruits of that property beats it any day of the week, and twice on Sundays.

We can argue the semantics of what constitutes “anarchism” until we're all blue in the face. I'll sit and drink a beer with anyone and debate the relative merits of the philosophy all weekend long. Unfortunately, the reality that history demonstrates to us, every single time, is that when you pull out all the stops, with no plans to develop some method of protecting the rights of individuals/minorities, you end up with a situation that most rational people would not want, and one that few who clamor for it would survive.

I don't advocate for limited government because I'm besotted with love and adoration for the state. I don't advocate for limited government because I particularly NEED it's protections. Let's face it, I happen to possess a certain personality/psychology that made my personal professional background possible. Even without the government-provided training, I'd still have developed many of the same attributes and skills, even if through private “military/security” work, albeit in a less compressed time and convenience manner. I'll be just fine in a violent tribal society, and make no mistake about it, for all of our vaunted Judeo-Christian cultural ethics, if the government collapses, we WILL experience a similar state of affairs to what Somalia experienced following the fall of the Barre regime.

I advocate for a LIMITED government to help provide for the protection of those without my personal psychological make-up from incursions by other “tribes” against their persons and their private property rights. I advocate for limited government to protect the rights of the minority from the will and mass of the majority.

I think Cato, in a comment on AP's blog, hit the nail on the head, intentionally or not. If the PEOPLE won't protect the liberties and rights enshrined in the Constitution and BoR, what the fuck makes anyone think they'll protect their rights and liberties under an anarchist “system” (how's THAT for an oxymoron)? They won't. Instead, they'll revert to their basic nature and be clamoring for guys like me, with the critical psychological make-up (for definition: no innate psychological restraint proscribing the use of force, other than the recognition that an ordered, civil society with rule-of-law, makes life more pleasant than having to look over my shoulder every 30 seconds to make sure the brother of the guy I killed last week isn't sneaking up behind me), to go to guns in order to protect them.

The anarchist/”voluntarist” argument that free-market economic theory would provide for that defense through their ability to buy protection from mercenary companies is flawed as well. As historians like to point out, Rome ultimately fell because the citizenry decided it was easier to levy taxes and hire out the defense of the Republic rather than perform the duty themselves. Hiring mercenaries to defend your property and security is not a particularly sensible way to protect it, since they have guns, and the will to kill (they'd be pretty unprofessional mercenaries if they lacked either). Eventually, one or two of them are bound to realize that, if they just kick your ass and take your shit, they can get paid more, and not have to risk getting shot at for peanuts. The argument that society would go ahead and organize then, to overthrow them is ridiculous. If you're such a chicken shit, or just too weak, to defend your interests in the first place, what makes you think your neighbors are going to come to your rescue? They have their own self-interests to look out for. Tribalism is not the Disney-esque, pastoral nirvana too many anarchists have been suckered into believing it is.

So, yes, I advocate for limited governance, under the constitutional republican system enshrined in the Constitution.

An Introduction to the New Format for "Nous Defions!"

2012-02-13T06:08:00.000-07:00

As you will notice in the coming days, some changes are being made here at “Nous Defions!” These changes have been made in the interest of making this blog more reader-friendly for non-SOF military personnel in it's conveyance of what is, essentially, professional information that demands some level of pre-existing professional knowledge to make the most sense.

To start, I will be returning to the foundational theory of unconventional warfare, from both a historical and a current doctrinal context. I have had nearly 55,000 views of this material, in just over a month of writing, yet I still receive several email requests each week to cover information that has already been discussed, in varying levels of detail. In order to curtail the wasted effort of those readers, I will start over, with a general introduction to Unconventional Warfare Theory, particularly as I believe it does, or will, pertain to future resistance activities in the United States of America, against the ever-increasing encroachments of the statist agenda.

Second, I will refrain from my previous, intellectually dishonest referrals to “potential future resistance personnel.” The reality is, we are, each of us already members of the resistance. We have simply not started active counter-measures yet. This is NOT to be misconstrued as a call to action. That is not my place, and I do not want it to be my place.

Third, while I will continue to provide narrative discussions of the underlying concepts of small-unit tactics, techniques, and procedures in unconventional warfare, training programs-of-instruction outlines, and individual and collective task training outlines, I will abstain from posting op-ed pieces. Not because I believe these are unimportant, but because I believe that the inane comments they sometimes elicit detract from the mission-focus of this blog's key intent: to convey critical unconventional warfare TTPs and concepts to members of the resistance (for the record, I really don't give two shits whether or not you agree with my specific politics. If I offend you by stating my opinion that your favorite libertarian guru is full-of-shit on a given subject, or because I happen to think that the vast majority of your neighbors are statist lackeys who prefer the taste of boot leather and Kiwi polish to the sweat of earning and keeping their liberties, or because I somehow offend your delicate Aryan-supremacist, anti-Semitic horseshit worldview...I really could not possibly give less of a shit. Get over your self-righteous inferiority complexes and drive the fuck on!).

I am providing this information, garnered through the blood, sweat, and tears of myself and my colleagues within the U.S. Military special operations community, for fucking free, because I believe it is coming down to the point where it will be up to individual citizens and bands of partisans, to ensure the re-birth and lasting survival of the constitutional American dream, rather than the organized security forces of the United States government (the first dumb motherfucker that comments on this about how the Constitution was a Hamiltonian power-grab and that anarchy is superior to any form of governance, needs to email me through the blog with their contact information. I will personally pay for a one-way ticket to Somalia, or another suitably anarchic society, in order for you to put your precious, assinine, and unrealistic theories to the test).

I am not a Democrat. I am not a Republican. I am not a member of some “Aryan” resistance movement. I am a republican individualist who really just wants to be left the fuck alone to raise my family. My first concern is my family. My second is my community. My third is the restoration of the Republic. This third concern is the reason I write this blog.

For those SF and SOF veterans, and any others who may understand the reference, I am not now, nor was I ever, a member of the SFU. This blog is not, in any way, shape, or form, related to the TR newsletter. I agree with some of what SFC B had to say, but certainly not all of it.

This new format is intended to provide new information weekly, in three areas:

an in-depth discussion of some aspect of UW at the strategic and/or operational level.
A description of a critical individual or collective training task. This will be presented in the standard format of task, conditions, standards used through soldier training publications and mission-training plans by the U.S. Army, because I believe that is the best format for describing these in a manner that even a novice can comprehend and utilize.
An ongoing series of articles on developing specific programs-of-instruction to assist readers in developing training for the critical skills they will need to know and understand in the future.

Some of the information I will provide in the coming pages will be repeated from previous articles. Some will be a different outlook on the same subjects. Some will be completely different, and perhaps occasionally seem contradictory (although it won't be—the doctrine works pretty well across operational environments).

I will, in the future, include SOME photographic reference material, when I am able to do so without jeopardizing the PERSEC considerations of my family, associates, or myself.

I am providing you with more than ample material to help you develop a comprehensive personal and organizational training program. It is up to you to actually implement it. If you choose to simply sit in front of the computer, playing Call-Of-Duty: Black Ops, instead of getting out of your mother's basement and training, do not in the future, whine about how Sergeant Mosby was an asshole who did not provide you with adequate training information to face the threats that are “suddenly” confronting you. It's on you to do the work.

As I mentioned, I am currently in the process of updating and hardening my PERSEC considerations. If there are any delays in implementing the described changes, it is a result of the challenges of performing these updates. I assure yo that I will continue posting these articles until either A) the federals shut down the internet with their SOPA/PIPA horseshit, or B) I am compromised and have to go either further underground, or I am interred at Guantanamo Bay as an enemy terrorist, or I am killed repelling a home invasion by Stasi-wannabe stormtroopers.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

Post-Script:

As was previously mentioned, I am available to travel and present clinics on selected aspects of training. I will not do so for free. While I don't need the money, I do need to be sure I am able to support my family while taking time off my real job to help YOU. If there is interest in this, I will travel to the following states: New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota (western region only), and South Dakota (western region only). I will charge a very reasonably amount in order to cover my expenses to travel, missed wages from my real job, lodging for my family while in the local operational area, and the cost of any ammunition I may need for my personnal weapons to demonstrate specific skills. I estimate it will cost me around $1000-1500 to conduct a three-day weekend seminar. I will train any number of personnel for that price, up to ten at a time (for the reader from California who queried me on this: check your email. If I can determine a way to traverse that obstacle, I am still willing to do it for you, once).

NEW FORMAT

2012-02-12T21:02:00.000-07:00

Folks,
I'm going to change things up a bit. Instead of trying to churn out and post an article every night, I'm going to slow it down some, and try to do two or three articles per week. This will allow me to not only provide more detail in each article, but to ensure I've adequately edited each one, to my satisfaction. I will post a minimum of one article per week, at the least, but I will try to post more.

This is largely in response to current changes occurring in my real-world life (nothing bad, just changing) that are happening to improve and restore my personal security and that of my family in the form of better PERSEC/OPSEC (HH6 is not real tuned-in on OPSEC/PERSEC...it's a work-in-progress).

I have agreed to conduct a training course for a small group here in the Rockies in the coming months. Once that has happened, I will try and get the host to write an AAR for inclusion here.

NousDefions!
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

NO ARTICLE TONIGHT

2012-02-10T23:19:00.003-07:00

Sorry folks. Spent the evening with some fellow Ranger Regiment veterans, hanging out, talking guns and war stories, with the wives and kids. Needed the de-compress. Good times.

Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESISTANCE ELEMENTS, PART ONE

2012-02-09T20:07:00.003-07:00

In his excellent book “The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander,” LTC Pete Blaber (retired), discusses and illustrates some critical lessons for leaders that he developed as a SOF officer. While I believe that many doctrinal lessons of the U.S. Military are extremely valid for irregular warfare as well (As a team sergeant once explained to me, “You can't master the unconventional, if you don't know the conventional.” While not always true, as history has illustrated, it's a valid generalization that is true on many levels—J.M.), these lessons from LTC Blaber are important to understand in order to mitigate those elements that do not fit the unconventional paradigm.

LTC Blaber's lessons are:

-The Mission, The Men, and Me: This is valid, even in the conventional paradigm. As a leader, or even just as a subordinate member of a combat unit, the first priority, in order to ensure success, has always got to be the success of the mission. This may require the sacrifice of personnel. A war-fighter cannot allow his personal interests in the well-being of his comrades to cause the mission to fail. Otherwise, he might as well sit at home and watch the latest episode of “Dancing with the Stars,” for all the success he will experience in the field. Conflict, especially armed conflict, is difficult, uncomfortable, and dangerous. Potential future resistors need to understand that before they need to take up arms. Directly ancillary to that fact is the reality that, as a leader (whether official or unofficial), the war-fighter holds a moral obligation to, as much as the mission's success allows, put the welfare of his comrades ahead of his own. This is the definition of the self-sacrifice of the warrior. If someone needs to stay awake to pull security, after running a continuous operation for the previous 24 or 72 hours, any leader worth listening to will put himself at the top of the list, to ensure that his people are rested and healthy.

-Imagine the Unimaginable, Humor Your Imagination: The conventional military is largely a hide-bound institution. Special operations forces cannot afford to adhere too closely to the party line, or they would accomplish nothing. As an example, conventional doctrine mandates a 3:1 numerical advantage when planning offensive operations. Yet, during many successful special operations historically, fortune has favored the bold and success has been accomplished despite willfully choosing to conduct operations that do not facilitate the doctrinally-mandated numerical advantage.

When guerrilla/resistance forces plan operations, they may often be forced to develop plans that would seem, to a conventional-force trained and experienced leader, to be fatally flawed from the inception. The lack of logistical support, indirect-fire support (I highly suggest doing some research into the concept of “knee mortars” and the indigenous, expedient development of indirect-fire support weapons –J.M.), and numbers is foreign to most conventional-force commanders. Yet, guerrillas have managed, throughout history, to use audacity and imaginative planning to overcome these short-comings. As LTC Blaber states, “History has proven that it's not the quantity of men or the quality of weapons that make the ultimate difference; it's the ability to out-think and out-imagine the enemy that always has, and always will, determine the ultimate victor.” Being willing, and able, to think outside the box will provide resistance forces with many apparently outlandish opportunities for success, as long as they humor their imagination and develop those plans before automatically writing them off.

-When in doubt, develop the situation: One shortcoming often displayed by “leaders,” even within the special operations community, is fear of the unknown. Commanders refuse to commit people to missions with potential to be amazing success, unless they can fill in every single blank space on a checklist of “necessary” information. Like special operations personnel, resistance elements cannot be bound by fear of the unknown (imagine what would happen if an SF ODA, performing a HALO infiltration of a hostile country, to perform a Strategic Reconnaissance mission, would fare if they insisted on having every bit of information they wanted, instead of simply maximizing what was available. How do you determine the state of affairs on the ground if you don't have someone on the ground? You don't—J.M.). The skilled leader in irregular warfare will utilize every single piece of relevant information intelligence available to him. He will not however, allow himself to be strait-jacketed by a lack of some information (as a fellow SF alumni pointed out recently via email, “You can never have too much intel!” I agree, but also believe in the British SAS motto, “Who Dares Wins!” Sometimes, you have to take the approach of, “We've got to go with what we've got. Plan for what we can, we'll make the rest up as we go—J.M.). He will plan for what he has, then develop the rest of the plan, even if mid-operation, as he receives new information (there is a reason we perform a leader's recon of an objective before executing the final stages of a plan, after all—J.M.).

The LTC goes on, discussing other lessons he learned. “The only failure is the failure to try,” “Don't get treed by a Chihuahua,” and more (I HIGHLY recommend the book to anyone concerned about unconventional warfare planning and execution, despite my ambivelance towards LTC Blaber's former unit—J.M.).

The purpose of leadership and planning in any combat element is to develop a course of action for the successful execution of unit goals. There is a common misconception among the inexperienced, that combat leadership is predicated on the concept of “Do what I say, or I'll shoot you.” While this has, historically, been used as a “leadership” method, it's not a highly recommended method, since it both fails to instill an effective level of motivation towards success, and it tends to backfire, since as soon as provided the opportunity, troops will either desert, or shoot the “leader” in an effort to maximize their personal survivability. Good leadership, under the stresses of combat, is comprised of influencing a desired behavior in people by providing a sense of purpose, motivation, and direction to accomplish a stated task or mission.

When voluntary war-fighters are provided with information on the reason why a mission needs to be executed (“Because I told you to!” is a good way to earn the response, “Piss off!”--J.M.), a coherent plan to successfully execute the mission, and they are offered the motivation to succeed (I believe that a thorough understanding of the purpose of a mission, assuming the purpose is legitimately important, will provide ample motivation to serious freedom fighters in any resistance campaign. --J.M.), they will put themselves in the path of danger, without a gun at their backs. The ability to provide these key pieces of information are critical to the success of resistance leadership, and good leadership is critical to the success of successful resistance activities.

Doctrinally speaking, mission-oriented leadership is comprised of four key factors: Commander's intent, individual initiative at all levels, down to the newest, least experienced member of the unit, clearly developed and expressed operational plans, and a judicious allocation of all available, necessary resources.

Commander's intent may, in many resistance scenarios be as simple as a statement of the goal of the mission (even “leaderless” resistance, someone has to be responsible for the leadership and direction of a cellular element. It may be more realistic, in such as situation to develop a mission intent, rather than a commander's intent, per se. The purpose, regardless of the title used, is to provide a clear, concise statement of what will define a successful end-state to the mission).

Directly related to the mission intent is the developed ability and willingness of even the most junior war-fighter involved, to step up and take the initiative for independent action, when necessary, to continue the mission to achieve the stated mission intent. A fighting unit that lacks initiative will not succeed. A trained fighter should be willing to step up and develop the situation even if the planned course of action is suddenly no longer viable, or when an unforeseen opportunity to expand on the mission intent is discovered.

Clearly developed and expressed operational plans are of obvious importance. If the least experienced fighter cannot decipher the purpose or plan of execution, not only will he be unable to effectively carry out his particular responsibilities in order to help the mission succeed, but he will be unable to recognize the opportunities that often present themselves during operations to expand on the mission intent. There is often a misconception amongst the uninitiated that SOF personnel and/or guerrillas do not plan operations, but rather, simply do things “by the seat of their pants.” This is so far from the truth as to be laughable. Special operations, due to the complexity of their nature, are thoroughly planned, sometimes to the point of the absurd (this is the source of LTC Blaber's suggestion that, “when in doubt, develop the situation”). Resistance operations should be planned, in as much detail as possible, and the five-paragraph operations order (OPORD) is a doctrinal method for doing so, and expressing those plans in a comprehensive, coherent manner that allows every member of an element to understand their role in the operation.

Resistance forces will never enjoy the luxury of an all-encompassing logistics support network. Very seldom will a resistance element be able to easily procure every item on their material “dream sheet” of necessary equipment, in order to facilitate their operations. This shortcoming of support should never be utilized as an excuse to preclude the execution of a necessary operation. Nevertheless, every effort should be made, through all three branches of the resistance movement, to supply whatever material support is needed and available, to facilitate the success of any mission.

Mission-oriented leadership and planning focuses on the objective of any given operation, in relation to the strategic goals of the resistance, rather than simply adhering to some preconceived notion of “how guerrillas operate” (this may be a large part of the reason so many people have difficulty distinguishing between the mission parameters of the different elements of a successful resistance movement—J.M.). Successful resistance operational planning must rely on the individual initiative of the fighter to determine the best course of action for the execution of a given mission, rather than some centralized, plan-by-decree paradigm.

While the OPORD format is a splendid planning and leadership tool, it has the tendency to be mis-used and made more important and detailed than it needs to be. A well-planned operation, and a well-developed OPORD should be as brief and simple as possible, as long as the necessary information is clearly and completely communicated.

A plan should be the foundation of any operation. To develop a plan, a patrol leader (PL) must understand the mission intent and the stragic and operational goals of the resistance. These three factors must provide the overall concept of the operation, in order to plan the mission. The application of the doctrinal “troop-leading procedures” (TLP), in view of the concept of the operation, allows the PL to develop a a complete plan and develop and construct a comprehensive OPORD. The mission statement of a plan must incorporate and cover the five “W's” of who, what, when, where, and why.

(i.e. ODA 000 (who) will execute a HALO insertion (what) to infiltrate the UWOA (unconventional warfare operational area) NLT 0130 on 24FEB12 (when), (please note that, while this is not the military doctrinal format for writing a date-time group, I wrote it this way to make it more readily understandable for non-military personnel—J.M.) at Drop Zone Formaldehyde (where) to effect a link-up with local indigenous resistance elements (why). In such a case, the mission intent/commander's intent might be “ODA 000 will conduct a link-up with local resistance elements to perform a UW mission.)

We will continue the discussion of mission-planning and operational order formats tomorrow.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

A RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON THE APOLOGIA ARTICLE

2012-02-09T20:06:00.002-07:00

HOLY SHIT BATMAN! I guess I need to post op-ed pieces more often.....

Amerisraeldoomed: Congratulations you fucking moron! You win the “I'm a fucking retard!” Post-of-the-Month Award. Have you ever even met a Jew? Or, as CausaPatet pointed out, do you just copy-and-paste the stupidity of others to demonstrate your complete lack of situational awareness (You DID notice I said I was pro-Israel, right?). I hope; I sincerely pray; that you will be so offended by this response (as you should be, it is intentional), that you never read this blog again, and that you point out to all of your fellow fat-ass, redneck hillbilly-wannabe, Klan/Aryan Resistance/Silent Brotherhood buddies, that I'm a Jew-lover who they shouldn't bother reading. You are a fucktard. (edited to delete the suggestion that you eat your own fucking gun, at HH6's request).
For those who were concerned about my apparent respect for the President: Rest assured, I despise the man. I despise his intents towards the Republic, just as I despise his means of circumventing the republican system to install his dictatorship. I do not believe he is as brilliant as he or his sycophants believe he is. I also don't think he is genius enough to wreak the havoc he is managing, on purpose. I believe he is honestly convinced that he is doing God's work. He's just not smart enough to recognize the fallacy and evil nature of his failings. My intent was NOT to suggest that people not belittle the President for the stupidity and malice of his actions and statements. Obviously (see above), I'm not very reticent about voicing my opinion of stupidity, and someone's office does not hold much water with me. As someone pointed out above, as long as he pulls his trousers on the same way I do (feet first, I don't do the one leg at a time thing....it's way too slow), he's still a man, and certainly not my superior (I constantly got in trouble in the military, even as a NCO, because I refused to refer to those with ranks senior to mine as my “superiors”). I do however, wholeheartedly support the Constitution, regardless of the ludicrous pipe-dream of a return to the Articles of Confederation that many hold dear. There's a reason the Founding Fathers were smart enough to recognize that the AoC wasn't going to work. That having been said, were the Republic to continue fracturing along the lines it seems to be fracturing along, rest assured, not only will I stand with my local community, but I will also do everything in my power to ensure that, whatever arises out of the aftermath, it has a Constitutional base (ANONYMOUS 01:06: I've read BTP's “Hologram of Liberty.” While I agree that he makes some interesting points, I think he's full of shit, overall. That's not intended to attack the man, or his efforts towards Liberty. I think the premise behind the Free State Wyoming project was grand, albeit unrealistic, bordering on delusional. I just believe the Constitution, as written and ratified, and with appropriately ratified amendments, is the best system of governance available in human history).
I do not think Israel, as a nation, is flawless. I think, like most governments (all governments?), that they lack any sort of understanding of the realities of counter-insurgency. I think they need to develop a better plan for the integration of Palestinians into Israeli culture. I do NOT believe the argument that Israel is on a conscious campaign of genocide. I also believe/know that the Arab nations around Israel are utilizing the Palestinian issue to continue their irregular warfare attacks on Israel. When they have established refugee camps for Palestinians in their own countries, they have made it abundantly obvious that they will never allow any Palestinian to participate in their societies. So much for Islamic brotherood....
Shermezh: I am well aware of the planning processes necessary to successfully execute a covert operation. Despite not having been a Tier one JSOC jedi, I do have some little bit of experience with covert operations planning. I agree that “someone” (cough...cough...Israel...cough...cough) has been very successful in derailing the Iranian development of nuclear weapons. The question then becomes....why do we need to invade Iran with massed conventional forces when irregular warfare is already succeeding so well? Because someone needs the public relations/media images of a “real” war to sell something. Thus, I don't support an invasion of Iran under these circumstances. As far as an ultimatum? “You attack Israel, the Persian culture will be a minor footnote in history from now until eternity” sounds agreeable to me.

Alright, I'm done.

Hope everyone is having a wonderful day, otherwise.\

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

APOLOGIA...AND A RANT.

2012-02-08T22:56:00.002-07:00

To begin with, I'd like to apologize to readers, for not posting a typical training/organizational related article here tonight. I worked a longer than normal day, and have been fighting a raging headache all day that neither copious amounts of water imbibed, several 1000mg doses of Tylenol, and even a good supper of Chinese food seems to want to cure. I'm guessing my cervical spine is out of alignment and needs to be adjusted, so I may have to simply gut it out until I can make it to the chiropractor in a couple of weeks. C'est la vie.

I did want to take the time to post on a couple of things I've noticed going on, in the world in general, and in the blogosphere (within the Liberty movement blogosphere, specifically). I hope you will allow me the Liberty of doing so (Oh, wait, it's my blog! I can do what I want! Yay me....I hope it won't turn too many readers off).

To begin, let's face reality. There is a strong core of belief outside of the political right, that most of us of the “survivalist/preparedness” culture, at some level, are all racist, and anti-Semitic, specifically. I know ArcticPatriot has been accused of this recently. I don't personally know AP. I've traded emails with him a couple of times, we seem to share some common beliefs. That's it. This is not directed at AP, nor at those who have accused him of anti-Semitism. This is MY personal statement on the subject.

You would be hard-pressed to find a more ardent supporter of the state of Israel than myself. I'm possibly the most pro-Israel, non-Jew I've ever met. I support the continued existance of the state of Israel, unquestionably, and 100%. Not because they are God's Chosen People (I'm entirely too agnostic to buy into that), but because I believe that every culture has the right to a homeland, assuming they can hold it. The Israelis, sent to an undesired chunk of rocky desert, managed to carve a nation out of it, while surrounded on all sides by blood-oath enemies. They have held it since, despite the best efforts of the enemies who surround them on three sides, to shove them into the ocean. Big brass balls and the willingness to fight for what you hold dear means a lot to me. The Islamist nations that surround and hate Israel try and leverage the Palestinian issue, falsely. Israel does not hate Palestinians. Palestinians have not managed to let it sink in that they are being used, by those with ulterior motives, who hold no concern for Palestine, other than as a tool to rid the region of the Israelis.

I am 100% convinced, based on significant amounts of time spent in Muslim cultural centers, and in face-to-face conversations with Muslims of various social classes, that the return of the Caliphate, and its global advancement, is a serious goal of a large percentage of Muslims, including many so-called “moderates.” I know that Muslims throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, despise the Israelis, and want to see them driven into the sea.

I've noted it in this blog before, but I'll reiterate: I abhor Islam. Nevertheless, I recognize, and respect, the natural human right of any person to worship God in whatever manner suits them—as long as that worship does not negatively impact the religious freedoms or other human rights of anyone else. So, in the Middle East, I support Israel. I always have and I always will.

Lest anyone mistake me for an anti-Semite, let me reiterate: I support the national sovereignty and survival of the state of Israel (Hell, I've dated Jewish girls, and was even engaged to one, once upon a time. Pin an anti-Semite tag on THAT one...). I would personally go, without a moment's hesitation, and put on the uniform of the IDF, to help protect Israel from aggressive action, if I thought it necessary to help ensure the nation's survival.

All of that having been said, our rapidly impending, and apparently unavoidable invasion of Iran, and the subsequent counter-insurgency we are going to embroiled in, just like the one we just left in Iraq, is stupid. I genuinely believe it is intended not to secure peace in the Middle East (good luck with that fucking pipe dream!), but to provide ammunition to further tighten the chokehold of the police-state here in the United States, that we are currently beginning to suffer under.

Let's look at historical fact. If the Israelis genuinely believe that Iran poses a clear and present danger to the security of the Jewish state, they are more than capable of pre-emptively ending that threat, with no direct help from the United States government. They've done it before, on more than once occasion.

The current claim is that Iran is less than one year away from the completion of a functional nuclear weapon. That's been the claim for well over half a decade! I put that into the same category as using Hussein's WMDs as an excuse to legitimize the invasion of Iraq (i.e. it's a load of horse-shit).

Now, if the Iranians were massing tactical forces and saying, “We're going to invade Israel and shove the Jews into the ocean?” If one of their other Islamist neighbors decide to actually attack Israel? I would, at that point, support direct American military intervention to help defend the state and people of Israel. I view Israel as the little brother of the United States, on a geo-political scale. If someone attacked my younger brother (my brother is a currently serving SOF service member with numerous multiple tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan; he's probably capable of taking care of himself), I can assure you, I'd go after them, in his support. However, if he got his ass kicked, because he was talking out his ass, libeling someone with no evidence to support his accusations? I'd consider the ass-kicking to be a lesson he had coming. I'd chalk it up as a learning experience for him.

The IAEA claims that Iran is less than a year from possession of a functional nuclear weapon? They've been saying the exact same thing for a MINIMUM of five years, and it's been suggested for longer than that. I put it in the same category as Hussein's possession of WMDs to legitimize the invasion of Iraq. In other words, a load of horseshit.

Now, if someone actually invades Israel? Or says, “We're going to invade Israel?” I would support American military intervention in that case, 100% and then some. In MY eyes, it is no different than if someone attacked or said they were getting ready to attack, my younger brother (My younger brother is a currently serving SOF service member. He's probably capable of taking care of himself. I'd still go after someone for threatening or attacking him). However, just like if my younger brother picked a fight, for no legitimate reason, and subsequently got his ass kicked, I would chalk it up as a learning experience.

I will not support the invasion of a sovereign nation, simply because the leaders of that country are a bunch of idiots who think it makes them look tough to talk smack to the biggest, baddest bully on the block (The U.S. Not Israel).

As I mentioned, this post is apropos of nothing, but the subject has been on my mind all day, considering the announcement today of the President's Executive Order declaring a National Emergency in regards to the “threat” Iran poses to the United States' economy and “national security.”

I would like to point out however that, regardless of our disagreement in many areas, there are too few of us in this nation who are aware of the games being played on us. We cannot afford to let misconceptions and misperceptions tear us asunder. The only way a resistance can hope to successfully function, is to put aside our differences in the interest of the common cause. If you are an anti-Semite (besides being a dumbass; I've yet to meet an anti-Semite who even knew any Jewish people to base their prejudices on), keep it to yourself. If you are racist against blacks, hispanics, asians, or fucking Martians, KEEP IT TO YOURSELF!!! Do not, A) drive a wedge between yourself and potential allies, or B) provide the statists with any sort of ammunition to help them wage their PSYOPs campaign on the public against us. People are people. Gross generalizations about a group of people (all gun owners have penis envy, and want to go on a rampage killing babies!), is fucking retarded. I have family members whom I adore, who are married to, or descended from all of the above racial and/or ethnic groups. I would fight and kill for them, just like I would for my wife and children.

On the other hand, automatically labeling someone as an undesirable, because you have a suspicion of incorrect thought processes/beliefs on their part, WITHOUT proof and verification, is a tool of the statists. If you have a problem with someone's words, go to them in private and express your concerns. Just fucking quit airing dirty laundry in public. No one, especially the statists who want justification for trying to control us, needs to see your wife's dirty underwear. Keep it private people. OPSEC is OPSEC.

Another concern that arises, is the frequency with which I see the President labeled in the most derogatory manner that someone can come up with. Look, I despise the man's publicly stated beliefs and goals. I despise everything he stands for in the political spectrum. Nevertheless, I still maintain my respect and love for the Constitutional institutions of the Republic. He sits in the office of the President of the United States. Calling him, “Obummer,” “the Kenyan,” or anything else intended to be personally derogatory, is insulting not to him, but to the office he holds. You will never read, anywhere on this blog, him addressed as anything other than “President Obama” or “the President.” Whatever you believe regarding his eligibility for office, he IS in the office. Demonstrating the sort of childish name-calling behavior I continuously see in regards to the President, is NOT going to build rapport with un-aligned members of the civilian population. Labeling him, “The Kenyan” may the dumbest shit I've ever seen, from a PSYOPs PoV. It plays right into the argument of his supporters that those who oppose him are racist. Face the facts: The man's father was a Kenyan national, not the President.

If you watch some of the videos on YouTube of drills taught at different tactical shooting courses, you can come across some weird, acrobatic shit. It's just that—shit. The thing you have to consider (and this is one reason I have no interest in running a “school”) is that these guys want to make a living. They have a limited number of people who are potential students. The best customer for a tactical shooting school is a repeat customer. They HAVE to come up with “new,” novel ways of teaching you to do shit, just to keep you coming back.

99.9% of what you will ever need to know how to do to survive and win a gunfight, can be taught in a weekend. You won't MASTER it in a weekend, but you can LEARN it in a weekend (the shooting part, or the tactical movement part, probably not both). Then, you go home and practice it until you master it. In the event you do need that 0.1% that wasn't covered in class? If you've truly mastered the fundamentals, you have the framework to adapt it on the fly, in order to overcome the unforseen. Focus on the fucking basics, folks. Advanced shooting and advanced tactical skill is nothing more than expert execution of the basic fundamentals. Quit looking for new shit to get the same result, without doing the work.

If you are preparing for potential future hostilities, beyond home- or personal-defense (i.e. if you're preparing for the possible need for future armed resistance), you need to answer two very critical questions, right the fuck now:

Next time you're at a stop light, look at the vehicle two cars in front of you. Imagine it was a member of the regime security forces. Could you, with no warning to the driver of that vehicle, lean out your car door and put two to three rounds in the back of his head, instantly, without remorse or doubt, then drive away as if nothing untoward had happened? There is a vast chasm of difference between shooting a home-invader, during the heat of a fight in your own home, and calmly shooting someone in the back of the head, in cold-blood, with no warning.
If you do decide you could do that, what do you think the necessary catalyst would be that would drive you to being able to justify that action to yourself?

You need to determine YOUR answers to these questions, right now, in your own heart, with no false bravado for the sake of maintaining appearances in front of your friends, before you need to know the answers.

Alright, my rant is over. I promise to return to your regularly scheduled programming post-haste. Right now though? My head hurts. I'm going to bed. Good-night.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

A BRIEF INTERLUDE AND NOTE TO READERS

2012-02-08T00:31:00.000-07:00

A book I can do, even with photographs. I will even consider the idea of a DVD on some skills to accompany a book. I will not be doing a YouTube channel, for a couple of reasons:

there's too much shit on YouTube anyway, and I'm not willing to waste my time so it can get lost in the noise:signal ration on YT.
A YT channel would put my face out in public far more than I am comfortable with for PERSEC reasons. While a DVD accompaniment to the book would do so also, it would be less of an issue. Folks, we're all dead anyway, as CA at WRSA likes to point out, and if I have to go, I'm damned sure going to deserve it, but I'd LIKE to see my daughter grow up, so I'm not going to hasten my demise or compromise any sooner than is unavoidable.
Beyond the individual training tasks, which are actually pretty widely available in video format anyway, there's no way for one guy, by himself, to do a video presentation of SUT and other collective tasks, that would be worth a shit.

I have also been asked, several times now, both in comments, and via email, if I would consider doing classes. I would be more than willing to, if I could figure out a way to support my family, while taking the necessary time off from my real job. If someone wants me to come to their location (western United States only, at this time, weekend courses only), I would be willing to do that, assuming they can get 5-10 participants for a class, and those participants are willing to pay enough to cover my travel expenses, lodging, and time missed from work. I'm not greedy, and I'm not in it for the money, but I DO have an obligation to support my family. I can assure you however, that if this were done, the cost would be significantly less than less in-depth training from other instructors, who will not cover some of the same specifics I am willing to discuss (nothing illegal!).

Also, I just discovered a couple of comments had been stuck in the Spam folder. I apologize for not noticing them earlier. Rest assured, if you try to post a comment, I WILL NOT DELETE IT, unless it's over-the-top illegal. I may respond with a comment of my own telling you that you're fucking retarded, but I believe in free expression, even of stupidity. Your comments will not be deleted (if you say anything disparaging about HH6 or the mini-morale officer though, I'm likely to hunt you down and kill you in your own bed though, just for the record).

Thank you all, for your support and time spent reading my work.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

BUILDING SMALL TEAMS: DEVELOPING COMBAT-EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS, PART TWO: DEVELOPING TRAINING

2012-02-08T00:16:00.000-07:00

Properly conducted tactical training is preparation for interpersonal violence: combat. Improperly conducted training is a waste of time, energy, and limited finance. It is essential that potential future resistance elements train how they will fight. Training must be planned to ensure that not only are all necessary individual and collective tasks are fully learned and practiced, but that the training is as realistic as safely possible. Combat is harsh, unforgiving, and unpredictable, but well-planned and executed training can help to mitigate the hazards of combat by preparing fighters to face them. Training must be kept relevant and real.

Properly planned training should first concentrate on common skills. Many individual and collective task skills are common to all, or most, potential missions that a small-unit resistance element will face. Learning and mastering these common critical tasks should always be prioritized. Only after the most commonly necessary tasks have been mastered should training branch out to more esoteric skills (don't worry about “how to conduct a 'precious cargo' recovery operation before you know how to conduct a basic combat patrol. Don't sweat multiple hostile target engagements before you can hit a single target at a given range with your primary weapon. --J.M.) Training should be progressive. The successful execution of advanced tactical skills is simply a sublime mastery of the fundamental basic tactical skills. Even these basic collective tasks skills cannot be effectively conducted though, if the requisite individual task skills are not first mastered.

Training should always focus on eliminating the weak links in operational capacities. Whether individual or collective tasks skills, training should always be evaluated, regularly and objectively. Follow-on training should focus on those skills that were evaluated as being the least skillfully executed (If you don't have a training plan, follow that training plan, and evaluate that training, you're not training; you're just fucking around. --J.M.). As the cliché states, “Amateurs train until they get it right. Professionals train until they cannot get it wrong.”

Individual task training, as the foundation of successful collective task training, is the most critical aspect of a practical, effective tactical training plan. Individual critical tasks encompass a wide range of necessary fundamental skillsets, such as combat weaponcraft and marksmanship, unarmed combatives, medical aid, communications, field-craft, and tactical skills. A well-designed training plan should describe the individual training tasks required accomplish the perceived future mission. Doctrinally speaking, the experience of centuries of training war-fighters has demonstrated that the ideal format for expressing these skills is the task-conditions-standards method. A well-developed and organized training plan, utilizing the task-conditions-standards methodology will also include a specific, step-by-step sequence for teaching, executing, and evaluating these skills.

It should be remembered that individual task requirements, even for similar collective tasks, will often require a different focus, depending on the local operational and environmental conditions. A group operating in the bayous of Louisianna will require a different set of performance parameters for the task “move tactically,” than a group operating in Atlanta, Georgia. In turn, both of these groups' parameters for that task will differ greatly from the parameters needed by a group functioning in the sagebrush-covered desert valleys of the mountains of western Montana.

While there is a great deal of value available in utilizing the Soldier Training Publications (STP) and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) of the U.S. Army as a framework for developing a well-developed local training plan, it is critically important that potential future resistors understand that not all of those tasks will fit their specific needs/conditions. Even those that do fit local environmental/operational needs will generally require a great deal of modification to benefit a local, indigenous defense force.

Initial individual task training should focus on correct performance of a specific individual tactical skill, rather than on doing so under difficult conditions. As training in that skill progresses, and a level of expertise is reached, the conditions can be modified to more closely resemble reality—in the rain, in the snow, in the dark, etc—but the standards should never be lowered. (Whether the fighter is shooting, while standing still on the square range, in broad daylight, or while moving to cover, in a pouring-down rain shower, in the dark of night, the standards MUST remain the same). The advantage that a well-trained, well-disciplined small-unit irregular warfare element can leverage over a larger, conventional force element in unconventional warfare operations is a more sublime, advanced mastery of fundamental war-fighting skills. In order to do so however, the standards must be set high, and maintained.

Collective tasks are team- or unit-based skills. These require individual group members to perform multiple individual tactical tasks collectively, for the achievement of a single, shared goal. The training is responsible for training his group/unit to work together, in cooperation, in order to successfully achieve whatever mission(s) they may find themselves required to accomplish. This is the crux of genuine combat leadership. Efficient teamwork results from group cohesion, and group cohesion results from good leadership that manages and directs excellent, elite training.

Very seldom will an irregular warfare unit find that it is able to execute the same mission twice in the same manner. Each mission will need to be examined in light of specific METT-TC considerations, and the unit's trained and proven tactical capabilities. The two basic types of collective tasks are battle drills (also referred to as Immediate Action Drills/IADs), and team-level missions.

IADs are standardized, doctrinal (for the unit) methods for executing specific collective tasks. IADs are detailed responses to to specific tactical situations that must be conducted on a trained, instinctive level, in response to a specific command or cue. IADs must be trained and practiced until their execution becomes second nature. The majority of collective task training in elite units is focused on mastering IADs, because these are the skills that keep units alive and functional in emergency situations in combat.

Team-level missions are tasks that may not be standardized, generally due to the intrinsically METT-TC dependent nature of their execution. These will seldom, if ever be performed twice in the same manner, and thus a well-planned training program will provide only general guidance for the performance of team-level missions, covering specific necessary aspects, while leaving adequate room for good judgement and tactical ingenuity on the part of team members and leaders.

Whether a trainer is developing a plan for individual or collective task training, the basic training course of action remains similar. First of all, obviously is to plan the training. Once the trainer has determined what specific task(s) will be trained, he must find or create a training standard for that task. If a suitable example of the requisite task cannot be located in the STPs or other resources, and modified to the specific needs of the element, the trainer must create his own training standard for that task.

The trainer needs to determine and develop a creative, attention-gaining and -keeping way to present the training information to the students. This may range from a video format lesson, photos and graphic training aids (GTA), or a simple war-story/anecdote to explain the lesson's importance (training time should never be wasted on war stories for the sake of war stories or ego gratification by the trainer however), to a demonstration of the skill in action by already well-trained personnel (As an example, one method I've often used when teaching a camouflage POI, is to provide the students a specific location and time for training to begin. They arrive and sit there for 10-20 minutes, waiting for me to show up. Suddenly arising in front of them, from plain sight, is their instructor, in ghillie camouflage, demonstrating the incredible effectiveness of good camouflage. --J.M.). Students should be advised, well ahead of the scheduled training, what information, equipment, and uniform/clothing they need to possess and have ready in order to complete the training. Typically, this should be provided in the form of a warning order, which serves the double training purpose of thoroughly familiarizing them with this aspect of mission preparation.

When presenting training, the trainer must be well-spoken, and present the information in a clear, concise manner that facilitates ready understanding by all personnel. The task, conditions, and standards should be stated at the beginning, in order to ensure that all participants in the training know and understand what the standards are. They cannot be expected to meet the standards if they are not informed of what they are.

For the second step of the presentation, the trainer should explain and demonstrate the task, performed to standard. Using the crawl-walk-run method of teaching, the trainer explains the task, in step-by-step detail. He then demonstrates the task, step-by-step, in slow motion, re-iterating the description of what he is executing. Finally, the trainer should demonstrate the task, at full-speed, performed to standard (especially with extremely technical skills such as combat shooting, this last phase also serves as a motivational stimulus. There's little better way of motivating a student to want to shoot better than seeing his trainer clean “El Presidente” in a master-class time).

Finally, in order to ensure that the “lecture” portion of the training has taken with the students, they should be expected to perform the task. The first step, “crawl,” is for the trainer to walk the students through the task, step-by-step, in cadence, “by-the-numbers.” Following this, they execute the task, on command, at half-speed. Finally, students should be expected to execute the task, as close to standard as they are capable. No student, learning a brand-new skill, should be expected to perform it perfectly to standard, the first time they execute it. A well-planned training program will allow them ample repetitive practice at evaluated skill tasks before they are expected to perform it to standard.

The only difference between the above-described method of teaching individual tactical tasks and teaching collective tasks, is that the trainer, by himself, cannot demonstrate a collective task skill that requires an entire team to execute properly. Instead, he provides a “talk-through” initially, followed by a walk-through and a run-through.

To execute a talk-through, the trainer states the standards, and explains how the task will be evaluated. He should explain the step-by-step sequence of the execution of the task, and what role each individual team member must play to ensure correct execution of the collective task. Once the steps have been thoroughly understood, and briefed-back by the individual members of the team, the team walks through the entire collective task, in slow-motion, allowing the trainer time to explain any mistakes, to the entire team.

The walk-through is a dry-run performance of the collective task. On command, the students should perform the entire task, without stopping, from start to finish, at half-speed. Upon completion of the walk-through, the trainer can elicit criticism of the performance from the students themselves, before offering his own observations on their performance.

Finally, the team should perform the task, at speed, to standard, without hesitation. As the student team performs better and better, the trainer should modify the conditions to make the task more challenging and more realistic—add smoke, darkness, battlefield noises, realistic terrain conditions, and simulated casualties. At some point, the students should be required to perform the collective task, on a suitable range, live-fire, as long as requisite safety precautions can be emplaced (the more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in combat, but bleeding in training because of stupidity of a trainer is...well...stupid.--J.M.)

Some tips to make training more effective:

Grab students' attention from the beginning. This may range from showing a suitably relevant movie the first night of a weekend training course, to initiating the first classroom/lecture portion of the class with flash-bangs and blank-fire automatic gunfire to ensure they are paying attention.
Always inform students beforehand, of all the equipment they will need in order to perform the training in accordance with the training plan. Make sure they know ahead of time, what tasks they will be expected to learn, allowing them to read up and study the task steps beforehand. This will accelerate the learning curve for them.
You do not need high-tech training aids, but don't be shy about using training aids, from butcher board sheets with illustrations, to hand-outs, to specific weapons systems to demonstrate certain elements (For the love of Christ Almighty though...do not EVER use fucking PowerPoint as a training aid. No one knows how to do it properly, in or out of the military. –J.M.).
Involve the students in the lesson and be animated. Move around, keep asking them questions, keep them interested. If students are falling asleep, or getting distracted by outside diversions, you are not doing your job as a trainer.
Combat units do not attend lectures or classes. They TRAIN on combat tasks. Hands-on training is the best way to impart tactical training to students. Don't be shy about making students get dirty, wet, and cold, or sweaty and hot. They will appreciate your efforts.
Have students brief-back your training to you, to review it and ensure they have fully understood all of the relevant lessons.
Put your team in an actual training scenario, on a relevant piece of representative terrain. If you live and expect to operate in a built-up, urban environment, don't expect them to remain interested if all of your training takes place in a state park somewhere, out in the woods. It's not relevant to their needs, and they will recognize that, thus losing interest.
Do NOT waste training time. Use it effectively. Have a well-developed training plan. Train to the plan, and only modify it if the training demands it. Do not train to a time standard, train to the standard, no matter how long it takes. If you have a limited training time window, due to other constraints, pause the training and restart where you ended the next time you can get the students in the same place for training. Do not rush through something that is not fully understood (trust me, doing so will fuck you in the long run. --J.M.).
Challenge the students on the team. Push them to exceed their preconceived limits. During training, make them perform to higher standards. During evaluations, require them to perform to gradually increasingly difficult standards. Teams that successfully overcome real, unexpected challenges will enjoy greater cohesion courtesy of the increased individual levels of morale amongst the group members.
Reward a well-practiced training session. If your students/team performs their training well, and meets or exceeds the standards, reward them. Buy the whole team pizza, or a case of beer (if appropriate!). Provide morale-building team t-shirts (again, if appropriate, with due consideration to OPSEC/PERSEC concerns).

The well-organized, prone to success tactical unit will have a written, published training plan and program (before someone posts a stupid comment, I'm not referring to sending your training program off to a publisher for binding and sale. I'm referring to having it written down, put together, and available for access by all members of the team/unit. --J.M.). The well-developed training plan should include a task-conditions-standards statement for every individual and collective training task that the element will be expected to train and master. It should include a standing order list of necessary equipment needed to perform that training. The training plan should include appendices that include the format for warning orders and operations orders, to ensure adequate notice is provided to team/unit members prior to training events, to ensure that all available personnel show up, at the right time, with the right equipment to complete scheduled training. Proper prior planning prevents piss-poor performance.

I recognize that many inexperienced people seem to believe that SOF war-fighters are “fly-by-the-seat-of-the-pants,” “make-it-up-as-we-go,” improvisational masters. To a degree, that is an accurate assessment. It's only possible however, because we operate off a plan that happens to offer us multiple contingencies in case something changes. While modifying a plan to fit changing METT-TC conditions is perfectly acceptable, you must have a plan to start with in order to change it. Anyone who thinks they can just “wing it,” in training, or in combat, is fucking delusional. I highly suggest, if someone shows up, offering you training, or leadership, and their stated teaching method is, “I make it up as I go,” or some variation thereof, run, as fast, and as far as you are able, to put space between you and them.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

BUILDING SMALL TEAMS: DEVELOPING COMBAT-EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS

2012-02-06T03:35:00.000-07:00

“Soldiers have to eat soup together for a long time before they are ready to fight.” --Napolean

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. That is the science of armies in a nutshell.” --Ardant du Picq

Perhaps the two most often cited perceived weaknesses of all resistance movements are the numbers arrayed against the resistance by regime security forces, and the ability of regime security forces to utilize technological advances to attack the resistance elements.

While numbers always matter, there are historically proven methods to increase the quality and combat-effective power projection of smaller forces, especially the tactical maneuver elements that constitute the lethal “tooth” end of the fighting force. Human factors are the critical components that must be exploited to compensate for a disparity of mass within the battlespace.

Through the exploitation of fundamental “soldier power,” a resistance force can leverage human factors and basic soldier skills to build combat power even in the face of larger, more organized, and better-equipped security forces. Durable, combat-effective small-unit elements are built on the foundation of good morale, esprit de corps, and unit cohesion.

Morale is a largely subjective psychological state that encompasses many factors, including respected leadership, logistical and material support, history and tradition, weather, casualty rates, and the reaction to exposure to stress. Morale, an individual psychological factor, can be defined as the enthusiasm with which a member of a group participates in the activities of that group.

Esprit de corps on the other hand, is not an individual factor, but a group psychological trait that complements and reinforces morale and cohesion through the mechanisms of group pride and devotion to upholding the reputation of the group. Esprit de corps is the relationship between individuals and the group as a whole, whereas cohesion is the relationship between individuals on a face-to-face, personal level. One common method of demonstrating and measuring esprit de corps is the willful adherence to external, formalized standards of behavior. In traditional militaries, these can extend to such details as uniform appearance, military courtesy and respect for rank, and of course (as it relates to the irregular force), an insistence on the acceptance and practice of certain prescribed behavioral standards in combat.

Cohesion is the bonding of small-unit members as a close-knit group, in order to enhance the individual members' commitment to the group. Fundamental to the concept of unit cohesion is the ability and willingness of every individual member to subordinate his individuality to adhere to group norms. The individual MUST feel a sense of responsibility to the group and be willing to submit his pesonal concerns to the imperative of the group's welfare (this is not “communism,” as one anarcho-capitalist argued to me several months ago. Nor is it “slavery.” It is logic and common sense, tempered with a healthy dose of experience. There is a reason I do not possess a great deal of respect for the combat survivability of most anarcho-capitalist “survivalists.” --J.M.). In truly high-performing combat units, this imperative for group welfare may demand extreme self-sacrifice, even to the point of willing death, for group survival, or the achievement of group goals. In elite combat units, this requisite bonding occurs as a result of the face-to-face, daily interpersonal relationships developed between individual fighters and their leaders (thus the reason a twelve-man SF ODA will generally be a more-effective combat force multiplier than a standard infantry platoon three times it's size. The ODA commander sees his men on a personal level, far more frequently than an infantry second lieutenant does. The ODA has far better cohesion, as result of daily interaction and higher levels of mutual respect and trust).

Cohesion, despite its relationship to morale (and to a lesser extent esprit de corps), is fundamentally a small-unit concept. While resistance fighters may develop real strength from their individual level of morale, and their relationship to the resistance as a movement, their ability to continue to carry on and fight, despite the stresses of functioning as part of the resistance will occur as a result solely of small-unit solidarity. The individualist will fall out and become combat-ineffective due to the debilitating effects of fear, the first time he comes close to compromise. The member of a small group may be able to continue the fight, despite wounds or injuries, simply due to his unwillingness to “let down” his friends and comrades.

The criticality of small-unit cohesion takes on its greatest importance when one considers the potential future battlespace. In contrast to classical conventional formations, in which the available weapons technology mandated large massed formations, modern and future warfare has witnessed the development of precision weapons that can decimate large formations at little risk to the operator. This leads to an increasing dispersal of combat forces across the battlespace. On these more lethal battlefields, small-unit leadership and cohesion are the critical elements in success (the use of irregular guerrilla tactics by American colonial fighters, such as Francis Marion's fighters in South Carolina, or Daniel Morgan's Riflemen further north, are prime examples of this. The ability of the colonial rebels to operate in small, irregular units, ambushing and killing large numbers of British soldiers, through the application of precision rifle fire, mandated a change in military tactics that the British were extremely slow to adopt. This inflexibility led to the loss of the Empire. Proof is ample when one studies the incursions of Empire forces into Afghanistan and India, as well as the Boer and Zulu conflicts in Africa. --J.M.).

Primary group, small-unit cohesion is not the ONLY factor that plays a part in irregular warfare success. Effective leadership, good planning at an operational and tactical level, logistics, training, and quality intelligence gathering and dissemination are all critical elements. Unit cohesion however, is the cornerstone that allows these other factors to function.

In order to achieve their full potential, small-unit combat elements must develop strong, cohesive bonds of trust and faith. Trust, confidence in each other, and group identity are the basic ingredients of unit cohesion. These are achieved through friendship, positive social interaction, high-quality, effective, realistic training, and the resultant confidence in each other's abilities, and good leadership.

It is critical to possess and utilize a set standard for training. A quantifiable, external measure for evaluating the abilites of the unit are critical for building confidence within the small-unit element. These measures are objective and fair, and allow each member of the team to witness that every other member of the team possesses the ability to meet clear and known performance standards.

Nevertheless, tactical excellence, aggressiveness of spirit, physical courage, and mental tenacity, and inspirational leadership are difficult (I would argue, impossible. --J.M.) to assess numerically. Yet, these are as much a measure of unit cohesion and thus, effectiveness, as meeting a set of published standards. There must be a symbiotic relationship between these elements that creates the unit pride that bonds individual fighters together into combat-effective elements.

Cohesive units are made up of comrades, friends, even “brothers.” Strangers do not fight, bleed, and die for one another. Men do not kill other men over apple pie and their mother's virtues as a homemaker. When they face the interpersonal hatred of close-quarters, knuckle-and-skull, bayonets-fixed brawling that is small-unit combat, men kill to ensure their friends stay alive. (this is the problem I see with many “militia groups.” Their hearts are in the right place, but they seem to lack a conceptual grasp of the realities of why men fight. You don't assign people into units in irregular, partisan resistance elements. Even the traditional colonial militia didn't. Those units are formed by the bonds of friendship and the known relationships between neighbors. --J.M.). The most important motivation for fighters in combat is not self-preservation. It is the drive to live up to the standards of the cohesive group and meet the expectations of one's friends. The trust and moral support of one's friends are what drives men to courage in battle.

This cohesion developed when fighters bond with others in their group when the group meets their needs for social affection, self-esteem, and protection from outsiders, as well as their physical needs for food, water, shelter, and other logistical support.

Cohesive, combat-effective small-unit elements are what matter in irregular, small-unit warfare. Even in highly aggressive, offensive operations, smaller, weaker forces have often overwhelmed because they were better trained and more motivated by the effects of small-unit cohesion and spirit. Trust in one another and in their leaders is what makes creates combat-effective units that win.

Unit cohesion at the small-unit maneuver element level is a powerful force multiplier that is completely unrelated to technology. It is a people-based competency that results from positive social-interaction between members of the unit and their immediate leadership, and a faith in the quality of the training they have received. For light-infantry forces that are trained to close with and kill the enemy at contact distances, unit cohesion is a critical moral imperative. It not only increases the combat effectiveness of a light-infantry element, but alos creates greater physical and psychological safety for individuals. Good equipment, the effective leveraging of available technology by resistance forces, and a sound understanding of the tactical and strategic doctrine of partisan resistance operations all help to improve the combat effectiveness of potential future resistance units. Every one of those elements is completely worthless however, if those elements can not develop into effective, symbiotic cohesive units.

The demands of a future potential conflict will include the ability to remain mentally agile, moving seamlessly from the ability to interface with local civilian population leadership, both official and unofficial, to the ability to kill the enemy without remorse, at contact distances with whatever weapons are available. These capabilities are not technology-dependent, but are based on people. The only way to accomplish this is to recognize that people are more important than hardware, and quality is far more critical than quantity (despite the famous Stalin-esque stance that “Quantity has a quality all its own). Because the number of available potential future resistance fighters is limited, it is imperative that those individuals and groups be trained to the highest levels possible. The most advanced technological leverage in the world will be completely useless without highly-motivated, well-trained war-fighters in combat-effective, cohesive small-unit teams.

Highly trained, cohesive units can operate effectively as independent partisan elements against security forces; possess the maturity and flexibility to span the spectrum of unconventional warfare missions from direct-action combat operations to rapport-building with local civilian populations; train to higher standards, and with higher technology equipment than rag-tag, last-minute, cobbled together “local militias;” and are versatile enough to adapt to changing paradigms within the battlespace.

Unit cohesion as a requirement of combat-effectiveness is unrelated to technology. From the ancient hoplite, to today's special operations military units, elite levels of small-unit cohesion provide smaller, safer, more effective light-infantry forces.

Cohesive small-units fight better at the tactical level, because they possess a higher sense of self-sacrifice for their fellows. A well-organized, well-trained, and well-led unit provides positive peer pressure for the individuals who comprise it. The known, witnessed, and experienced fighting ability of his comrades is what increases the individual's confidence in his own combat abilities and survivability. A fighter can only move towards the sound of the guns when he knows his comrades are supporting him.

The same training, organization, and leadership of a small-unit that allows individuals to develop confidence in it, provides more well-developed individual and collective skills that result in greater combat-effectiveness and fewer casualties. Leaders who know, like and are trusted by their men make more level-headed, accurate risk assessments, and do not willingly sacrifice the lives of subordinates in search of glory or promotion. The teamwork inherent to a cohesive unit results in greater efforts to evacuate casualties, also leading to reduced casualties, and reduced chances of capture and imprisonment by security forces.

Individuals within cohesive units, due to their drive to protect and support their friends within the unit, push themselves and their comrades to achieve even higher levels of expertise in training. It is a cyclic phenomenon. Quality, effective training builds unit cohesion, and unit cohesion builds the drive to execute higher-quality, more effective training. Stable, cohesive units, comprised of friends who stick together because of shared social experience and values, are a requirement for progressive training. The structure of a stable unit, without a rapid turn-over of members, allows an ongoing progression of skills development within the unit. There is no need to continually start over at zero, thus reducing stagnation and apathy. This implicit continuity allows units to continually refine their training and expertise to higher level skills development and the addition of more challenging tasks.

Refresher trainin on previously learned and well-honed skills is quicker and more effective when performed with the same men who the fighter learned the skill with initially. The effectiveness of collective task training is entirely and directly dependent on the cohesiveness of the unit. Well-trained, long-time friends display an intuitive level of communication that is built on shared experiences in complex interactions.

Cohesion is built, in small-units, through shared social experiences, mutual respect and confidence, high-quality, effective training, and good leadership. As the old saying claims, “The team that plays together stays together.” This does NOT mean that every member of the unit needs to go out drinking together (I've been around ODAs where that was the accepted form of bonding. It works really well...until one guy's wife decides that he's spending too much time and money at the strip-club and divorces him...”if mama ain't happy, ain't nobody happy” is true. A divorce is a sure way to get a guy's mind of his work, and to prove to him that the team really doesn't give that much of a shit about him. --J.M.). It does mean that the unit needs to spend time, outside of training, in social settings (if your “unit” is comprised of a bunch of strangers that you would not be caught dead with in public, you need to re-think your organizational priorities. Shared political values are important. Shared social and philosophical values are more important. A responsible, married family man, stuck on a team with a bunch of twenty-something single guys who like to party, drink too much, and smoke dope, is a recipe for disaster. There will be no cohesion. They can't understand his need to spend time with the wife and kids. He doesn't have any interest in chasing strippers at 0300...if he does, he's a maggot that they shouldn't trust anyway. --J.M.). Historically, effective resistance units, whether paramilitary guerrilla elements, or subversive underground elements, have been comprised of groups of friends and/or family members who banded together to resist. They knew each other, and respected each other, before they decided to take up arms. Potential future resistance fighters today have the benefit of foresight, allowing them to begin training now, in order to reach a more advanced level of training before hostilities begin in earnest, but they fundamental organizational paradigm of keeping small-unit combat elements comprised of known friends and neighbors should remain.

To further develop the team spirit and cohesion of an irregular resistance element, leaders (official or not), should schedule non-training activities that allow the families of unit members to build rapport with one another as well. Picnics, family daus, pick-up sports competitions, etc, are all ways to build this type of social rapport within the organization.

On one level, while it is critical for unit members to maintain and even develop further, relationships within the community, it is equally critical that the group itself provide most of the members' immediate needs for social interaction, as well as physical needs assistance that may arise. If a member of the unit is suddenly unemployed, he should not need to file for unemployment, because the other members should be stepping up, helping him find a new source of income, making sure his family has groceries, etc. If the child of a unit member needs medical care, and insurance is not available, or is unwilling to cover the expense, and the family cannot manage it alone, the group should be stepping up to the plate to help. These types of actions build interdependency, trust, respect, and peer bonding (On the other hand, this type of group support does possess and intrinsic risk of abuse. That should never be tolerated. If the suddenly unemployed remains unemployed, or sits on the couch bemoaning his fate, instead of working his ass off to try and find a new job, he needs an ass-kicking from his friends. If a family with two kids suddenly has three necessary medical procedures in a month's time, meanwhile, they're eating out every night, driving a brand new SUV, and the kids are packing around $400 iPhones, there is a serious issue going on that must be dealt with...--J.M.).

High-quality training, and individual and group dedication to realistic, effective training is a necessary precursor to combat-effective training and the resultant boost to unit cohesion. Potential future resistance fighters have other obligations besides training of course. The time available for training will, necessarily, be limited, and proper planning of training must take this into account, to squeeze every last benefit out of the available training time.

Induced stress in training increases the quality of training, as well as improving the process of team cohesion. Individual training should occur on individual time, but evaluations of individual ability, especially in front of the rest of the team, are valuable for building trust in the others. Team training time must provide opportunities for evaluations of physical conditioning, rifle marksmanship and general combat weaponscraft, fieldcraft abilities, etc. (a suggestion: If a team meets once a month to train together, for a weekend session, the first training block of the weekend should be on Friday evening, and encompass either a PT test, a rifle qualification, a forced-march with sustainment-level load, a practical shooting match, or something similar, followed by a group meal. This not only takes care of proving individual training is taking place, at the beginning, but also builds an opportunity to build rapport and cohesion within the team. --J.M.) The true value of team training time however, is in the development of tough, progressively difficult mission training that builds morale and team pride. Teamwork and cohesion is built by learning the strengths and weaknesses of the individual members of the group, and learning to overcome the weaknesses through the strengths of the group. Teamwork is developed by learning to trust peers and fight together. Team training should be focused on collective task training: learning and mastering battle drills, patrolling, and induced stress, can be utilized to create team-building events with a direct combat-effectiveness value to the team. The continuous communications and high-level sociological interactions that are required to address stess-filled training scenarios build cohesion and are the same skills needed to function in combat. The mental and physical stress induced in these types of training opportunities becomes a psychological external threat. An external threat to the group provides an opportunity for increased team cohesion. The more stress that can be safely induced in these training opportunities will provide more benefit to the cohesion of the group.

Success in a group enterprise builds team cohesion. Frequent successful exertions to the very limits of their physical and mental abilities teach group members their own capabilites and demonstrate to them that they can rely on each other. The success of overcoming realistic, stressful training challenges provides opportunity for shared experience, shared confidence, and shared celebration. Success raises the intrinsic status of the group in the view of group members, and thus those members are more likely to feel loyalty to the group. They will tend to feel that, as members of an “elite” group, they too are “elite” (ask me how I KNOW this...--J.M.). Group success and group cohesion are cyclic. The greater the cohesion, the greater the chance of success. The greater the success, the greater the group cohesion. Leaders of small-unit elements must provide timely, realistically positive after-action reviews for all training. Individuals may be singled out for praise for singular successes during training, but commendation should focus on the group effort, more than individual performance. The type of man who prepares for war and becomes a fighter prides himself on overcoming hardships and facing danger. This pride is critical to overcoming future challenges and inoculation against the fear, both physical and psychological, that will exist in combat.

Building a successful network of resistance activists is critical to long-term success of any potential future resistance movements. The development of small-unit elements and training them to function as combat-effective, cohesive teams in any future hostilities will be one critical step in this development. There are a couple of take-aways from this article that I want to put into the simplest English my foul-mouth is capable of:

Your “units” need to be comprised of people you like and associate with anyway. Getting on some internet forum somewhere with an advertisement for “militia members wanted now!” is fucking stupid. If you don't have friends that you already know and, at least at some level, trust (you have “friends” you don't trust? You've got a far different definition of the word than I do!), you need to consider a new social circle before you need to worry about developing some super-duper, Ranger/Commando/Delta Force partisan combat unit. This doesn't mean you can't have multiple social networks. It just means that, as your FRIENDS, your “unit” should be a group of people you would turn to for help in normal times anyway. If your normal social circles don't possess enough right-minded people to put together a two-man scout/sniper element, or a four- or six-man maneuver element, or more, you either need to develop a new social circle, move somewhere with more right-minded people, or focus on developing an individual cache of subversive underground or auxiliary support materials to offer when/if the resistance stands up (or, you need to face the reality that you're an anti-social loser and eat your gun...but that's probably a very permanent and irreparable solution to the very easily remedied problem of not being a nice person. Instead, go read Dale Carnegie three times, and put his principles into practice.)
If you do not have a written, published set of training standards for individual and group training, you're delusional. There's nothing inherently wrong with a bunch of buddies playing airsoft in the woods on the weekends (well, yeah, actually there is, but that's largely irrelevant to the conversation at hand), but that's not training. It's recreation. Training needs to be quantified and evaluated to have any real value. How do you know you're improving if you don't have anyway to test your training and level of readiness? You don't. If you aren't improving, you aren't really training.
If your “training” doesn't make you cry, puke, or occasionally bleed a little bit; if it doesn't regularly scare the ever-loving-dog-piss out of you, then you're not pushing yourself or your team hard enough. Combat is not a fucking nature walk. It's loud, it's scary, and it's physically and psychologically HARD. You have to live hard to be hard, and most American lives today are pretty fucking far from hard. Use your training to overcome that, and make it hard. Quit being a pussy. “It's too windy to go to the range.” “Are you crazy!? It's snowing outside! Why would I want to go sleep outside in the snow?” “Man, it's 110 degrees Farenheit outside! I'm not going to put on an 85lb rucksack and go walk 12 miles in two hours! I'm going to sit on the couch and watch the ball game!” Is it a game, or is it real? You have to decide, individually, and as a member of the group, then you have to decide to “do the work.”

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

CYBER-SPACE APPLICATIONS, AND A COMMENT

2012-02-05T22:17:00.002-07:00

Davy Crockett asked, in a comment, about the applications of cyber-space to resistance movements. Rather than respond in comment form, I decided to respond here.

Davy,

I think there are some valuable insights in your response.

As far as the cyber-space applications, it's important to remember that, at heart, I'm nothing more than a knuckle-dragging gunslinger. However, I would argue that on one level, the blogosphere is an obvious application of the cyber-space paradigm to the initial phases of any future potential resistance. The communications/liaison possibilities represented by this mode of communications should be obvious. In the end however, when/if more active resistance becomes necessary, I think it will get to the point where we will all need to employ more active countermeasures such as open-source encryption, proxy servers, and other cyber-security measures such as the expanding interest in darknets, etc.

On a more direct level, regardless of one's opinions on the different resistance movements arising and functioning internationally right now, I think we've seen ample evidence of how it works, between the applications by the Arab Spring/Sharia Summer activists in the Middle East, Anonymous, and hell, even A/Q. I know Arctic Patriot has expressed some interest in seeing how the use of R/C aircraft and some of the currently available microprocessors can be leveraged into the creation of open-source, free-market UAV/UAS.

As far as further applications? I'll have to revert to my knuckle-dragger status and leave the conversation to the more tech-savvy amongst the readership.

On a completely unrelated couple of notes, I started posting information on this blog on 6JAN12. That was 31 days ago (for the mathematically-challenged). In that time, this blog has received just over 42,000 visits, while the articles have elicited 225 comments, as of now (although that number includes my comments in response to other comments).

I started this blog, largely because of the great deal of sometimes flat wrong information I saw put out in both articles, forums, and books. Obviously (to me at least) others have recognized that need as well. Even I'm not so arrogant as to believe there have been three or four guys running around to the blog, clicking on it 10,000 times each.

I was asked, via email, if I was planning on putting out an archival CD/DVD. Short answer is no. I'm not enough of a fan of tech to do so. I have however, considered cleaning up the editing far more thoroughly than my blog articles have received, and placing them in book form. I haven't figured out the details, but since my thoughts have revolved around waiting for the 100 post landmark, I've got a little while to figure it out.

In addition to the doctrinal/philosophical considerations present in many articles, it would focus also on actual training programs, for both individual and collective task skills. Any interest from the readership?

In closing, I want to thank everyone who's read this blog, and especially those who have spread the word of its existance, for the time you have each invested in it. You have my appreciation.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

VIOLENT POLITICS: AN EXCERPT, WITH COMMENTARY

2012-02-04T20:11:00.002-07:00

The following excerpt is from a 2007 book titled “Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, And Guerrilla Warfare From the American Revolution to Iraq” by William R. Polk, published by HarperCollins.

I've included the excerpt because, as I read it, it occurred to me how amazingly relevant his conclusions are to the current topic of discussion, specifically, the first phases of the organization of a resistance movement. I highly recommend the book so far (I'm not done with it yet). I find it useful to refer readers to other source besides myself, who are able to verify (and sometimes disprove) my conceptual framework I present. Please note that my comments are highlighted, and italicized in bold font. Any highlighted and underlined original text emphasized is my doing.

“Each of the with which I deal—and others that are too numerous to be fully recounted here—begins with almost ludicrously tiny groups of disaffected people who sally forth against vastly superior armies and police forces. The odds appear impossible—even absurd. Consider the record:

In this preliminary stage, the insurgents are too few to fight as guerrillas so they fight as terrorists. This is what happened in Cyprus, where fewer than eighty men attacked the ruling British colonial government that was supported by thousands of troops and police. In the Palestine Mandate, a tiny group to be known as Irgun Zeva'i Le-umi split off from the Jewish Agency's military force, the Haganah, to attack the British Administration; briefly during the Second World War, the Irgun ceased attacks on the British and Avraham Stern split off to form a new group, known as Stern or LEHI, and gathered a handful of followers, probably fewer than twenty, to continue attacks against the British...In Yugoslavia, for example, Drazha Mihailovic, a Serb who had been a colonel in the defeated royalist army, began the Cetniks with only twenty-six like-minded former officers and soldiers. In Greece, the resistance was formed by only fifteen men. Then, in Vietnam, the first action by the Viet Minh against the French in 1944 involved their total force—only thirty-four Vietnamese. Such small groups could not engage in guerrilla warfare. For them, acts of terrorism were the only possible acts...

As terrorist acts succeed other angry men and women join or form similar small groups. When the dominant government seeks to suppress them, two things frequently happen. Almost inevitably the government disrupts the lives of innocent bystanders and hurts or kills still more. In 1808 in Spain, Napolean's soldiers routinely hanged all rebels they caught and those suspected of favoring them. The relatives and friends of the hanged quickly came to hate the French. Against the Phillipine rebels, first the Spaniards and then the Americans undertook search and destroy operations that killed thousands of people in the 1890s, tortured or humiliated many more, and burned scores of villages. Doing so triggered Philippine resistance. In Yugoslavia during the Second World War, the Germans employed a draconian system of reprisals, executing not only all the partisans they captured but hundreds of civilian hostages in retaliation for the death of each German soldier. The relatives, neighbors, and friends of those killed by foreign troops sought revenge, and the place to get it was in the ranks of insurgents. So from a handful, their numbers grew (while the abuses of the regime are a key catalyst for recruitment to the resistance, I would argue that a successful PSYOPs campaign, focused on building rapport with the civilian population through infrastructure support will accelerate this process, helping to prove to the people, that the resistance truly does have their best interests at heart).

On Cyprus, the insurgent force tripled in a year, from about 80 to 273 active combatants back up by perhaps three times that many part-time fighters. Castro overthrew the foreign-supported Batista dictatorship with a rebel force that grew from a dozen or so to a force of about 1500 within a year. The Viet Minh military force grew from 34 in 1944 to about 5000 in just a few months. In Algeria, the guerrillas began with fewer than a hundred and ultimately reached about 13,000 in their fight against 485,000 French and Foreign Legion soldiers.

Numbers were important because they made possible the spread of insurgency and also because they attenuated the forces of their opponents, whom they forced to protect more territory. More important than numbers, however, was that in their operations, the insurgents came to symbolize the nationalist cause. Mao thought that identifying with the people was the single most important task of the guerrilla. Tito captured the position of national leader because, unlike Mihailovic who temporized, husbanded his resources, and even made deals with the Italians and Germans, he fought....

...some insurgencies never progress beyond this first, terrorist, phase. The reasons are several. Among them, perhaps the two most likely are that the original group fails to capture the aura of legitimacy or leadership and so cannot recruit enough followers, or that it cannot find sufficient space for maneuver into true guerrilla warfare....”

(I tend to think this last section may be the most detrimental to potential future resistance activities in America. One, too many people have been too brain-washed into believing the lie that following orders is being a good citizen and that the government always has their best interests at heart, even if they can't recognize it. Two, let's face reality, there are a LOT of rather disagreeable individuals within the Liberty community. The prevalance of many anarcho-capitalists, with their perceived “Me first! Everyone else, what-the-fuck-ever!” is not going to win friends and influence people in a positive manner, in a Judeo-Christian culture. Until the movement can present a public face that demonstrates its true character in a manner that is palatable to the general public, there will be little reason for Joe Snuffy the Ragman to believe that the Liberty movement offers him anything different than the current regime, with it's socialized health care schemes and welfare-based “free money.”

The final quoted line, regarding maneuver battle-space is the reason that I continually harp on the lack of realistism in the expectation of performing guerrilla combat operations from suburbia. You absolutely HAVE to possess sufficient space—that can be secured from regime encroachment—in order to build a guerrilla base support network.)

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

CLOSE-QUARTERS COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING: A SUGGESTED POI, PART FOUR

2012-02-04T19:11:00.000-07:00

Training Session Six: Failure-to-Stop Drills and Weapon Transitions

Whether the enemy is equipped with ballistic protection in the form of body armor, is jacked up on some form of chemical stimulant, or just happens to be tougher than the fighter's ammunition is deadly, there are numerous reasons that even a properly delivered round of high-velocity ammunition may not put him down. For this reason, it is imperative that the shooter develop a consistent, trained plan for continuing to engage the enemy until the enemy is no longer a threat.

Traditionally, the method technique taught for this was the “Mozambique” drill (Named by LTC Cooper, for a former student who used it during the unpleasantness in that country a couple decades ago. For you young guys, go Google it. --J.M.). The idea behind the Mozambique drill is that, if two to the chest did not kill the bad guy, more may not work either, so shut him down in a hurry with a shot to the head. Unfortunately, even a person who just took two in the chest may still be moving his head erratically enough to prevent a solid hit to the brain box (While I do advocate practicing and mastering head shots with the pistol at near-contact ranges inside of 15 feet or so, to counter the body armor threat, I have my doubts as to its realistic application any further away than that. --J.M.).

Currently, it appears there are two major methods being taught, other than the Mozambique drill, for dealing with a failure-to-stop situation. The first is to simply continue putting rounds into the upper thoracic cavity, as rapidly as possible. The concept behind this is that pistol rounds, even the vaunted .45ACP, are really pretty anemic when it comes to putting bad guys down. There may be some legitimacy to this argument.

However, rifle rounds (yes, even the “mousegun” 5.56mmNATO!) tend to do serious damage at CQC ranges, If two rounds to the chest don't put a bad guy down-and keep him down-there is something else at work. In that case, the fighter must transition to an alternative failure-to-stop solution. One method currently being commonly taught (that I personally happen to agree with –J.M.) is the use of a follow-on “anchor” shot to the pelvic girdle, previously mentioned as an alternate aiming point. The idea behind this, besides the structural damage to the enemy's ability to remain standing is that, while it may not kill him as quickly as a shot to the head, it generally leaves him stationary enough that the fighter is able to walk up and put a round into the head, if necessary (shoving the muzzle of your weapon against the back of the dude's ear is a pretty good way to ensure you get a hit, regardless of how much he wants to move his head –J.M.). This is the method endorsed in this POI when the term failure-to-stop is used.

A weapon transition is the act of switching from the primary carbine to the back-up sidearm. This may be due to a malfunction of the carbine, running it dry, or simply the need for a more compact weapon such as clearing an extremely small room. All of the fundamentals of both carbine and pistol handling must be applied to the weapon transition. The shooter must fire quickly and accurately with his primary weapon, transition to a smooth, fast drawstroke, and then fire quickly and accurately with his sidearm as well. This last step is typically the most difficult for new shooters to master. The novice tends to rush the shot with the sidearm, throwing the first several shots away in the hurry to get the weapon into action and rounds downrange. Fire superiority is critical, but only hits count. As the old saying claims, “You can never miss fast enough to win a gunfight.”

Task: At the 10-yard line, from the holster, the shooter will draw and engage a single silhouette target using a rhythm drill.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with a single silhouette target at a measured range of 10-yards, during daylight hours. The shooter will be required to utilize his sidearm with holster, and four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will be required to draw his sidearm from the holster, and engage the target with a rhythm drill, ensuring that every round impacts within the vital zone of the upper thoracic cavity.

Task #2: At the 10-yard line, from the holster, the shooter will draw and engage a single silhouette target with a controlled-pair, assess that the target is still a threat, and re-engage with a controlled-pair to the pelvic girdle, for the failure-to-stop.

Standards: The shooter will be required to draw his sidearm from the holster, and engage every target with a controlled-pair, ensuring that every round impacts within the vital zone of the upper thoracic cavity. The shooter will assess the target as still presenting a threat. The shooter will re-engage the threat with a controlled-pair to the pelvic girdle.

Task #3: At the 10-yard line, from the ready, with the carbine, engage multiple silhouette targets, then execute a weapon transition and re-engage each target with a controlled-pair with the sidearm.

Conditions: the shooter will be presented with multiple silhouette targets at a measured range of 10 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize his carbine, a sidearm with holster, one rifle magazine, and one pistol magazine.

Standards: The shooter will be required to engage each target with a controlled-pair from the carbine, with every round impacting within the vital zone of the upper thoracic cavity. Upon bolt-lock, or malfunction of the primary, the shooter will transition to his sidearm, and re-engage every target with a controlled pair from the sidearm, ensuring that all rounds impact within the vital zone of the upper thoracic cavity.

Training Sequence:

Lecture/Demonstration of the “Rythm Drill.”
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the holster, draw and fire a rhythm drill to a 6-inch dot overlay target, from four magazines with five rounds each.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the holster, draw and fire a controlled-pair to the vital zone of a single silhouette target. Assess the target as still a threat, and re-engage with a controlled-pair to the pelvic girdle. Fire four magazines of eight rounds each.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the ready position with the carbine, fire a rhythm drill to a 6-inch dot overlay target, from four magazines with five rounds each.
Live-Fire: From the 25-yard line, from the ready position with the carbine, fire a controlled-pair to the vital zone of single-silhouette target. Assess the target as still a threat and re-engage with a controlled-pair to the pelvic girdle. Fire four magazines of 20 rounds each.

(The “rhythm drill,” sometimes called the “Bill Drill,” after gunsmith and IDPA co-founder Bill Wilson, is typically a string of six rounds fired as rapidly as possibly, maintaining a steady rhythm and speed, while ensuring every round impacts within the designated target area. I use a five-round rhythm drill simply because it rounds off more easily when running multiple iterations out of the same magazine load. In addition to teaching you to run the gun in rapid-fire strings more efficiently, it also helps teach the brain to continue shooting the threat until a conscious decision is made to cease fire.--J.M.)

More to follow, but probably not right away. This framework was intended to provide inexperienced readers with a model framework for developing their own training program, more so than it was to provide a specific POI. Hopefully it will help. The skills discussed, briefly, in this article series are some of the BASIC gun-handling skills needed to run a weapon in a fight effectively. They are not every skill you will ever need. They are not every skill I normally teach in a class. They are a beginning point.

Now, it's up to you to do the work to figure out what skill sets you need in your group of right-minded friends, and develop a training outline similar to this, but focused on your shooting needs.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

CLOSE-QUARTERS COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP: A SUGGESTED POI, PART THREE

2012-02-04T01:24:00.002-07:00

(It occurred to me this morning that, perhaps I should specify what I mean when I discuss the vital zone of the upper thoracic cavity, rather than telling riflemen to aim “center-of-mass.” While the specific aiming point on a given enemy fighter will be situationally-dependent, the best point-of-aim, whenever possible, is within the triangle formed by the base of the neck and the two nipples of the chest. This target zone maximizes the probability of the round penetrating to, and destroying, major organs and blood vessels, thus rendering the best chance of securing a fast kill with a minimal expenditure of rounds.

Optionally, if the upper thoracic cavity target area is unavailable, due to the use of body armor by opposition personnel, the pelvic girdle makes a good alternative. The pelvic girdle is rich in major blood vessels and nerves. A solid hit in this region will generally result in a mechanical collapse or dysfunction. Some argue the obvious point that a shot to the pelvic girdle is not as immediate a fight-stopper as a shot to the head. While this is true, a shot to the pelvis is a pretty solid method of anchoring the bad guy so you can shoot him in the head. --J.M.)

Training Session Four: Controlled Pairs

When engaging hostiles in CQC, ample experience and historical research has demonstrated that the most secure method of ensuring the rapid cessation of the threat potential is to place multiple rounds in the hostile's vital zone as fast as possible. Historically, double-taps have been taught as the preferred technique to accomplish this in limited-time multiple hostile situations. Fortunately, current doctrine teaches the obvious drawback to double-taps is that the second round fired is un-aimed. Every round the gunfighter fires must be accounted for. This is especially true for the guerrilla fighter, since not only is his ammunition re-supply limited, but he cannot risk being responsible for an errant round killing an innocent member of the civilian population if it is at all avoidable.

Instead, controlled pairs/”hammers,” are taught. Follow-through and recovery, as well as proper sight-pictures, are stressed throughout the training process. Trigger pull is accelerated, but never to the point of jerking. The trigger finger should never lose contact with the trigger throughout the firing sequence (this results in trigger slapping that will interfere with accuracy of rapid-fire strings). Shot groups should remain tight, but controlled pairs can be, with practice, executed extremely fast.

Task: From the holster, the shooter will engage the vital zone of a single, stationary silhouette target with controlled pairs with his sidearm.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with silhouette targets and dot overlay targets at a measured range of 10 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize a sidearm with holster and four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will draw the holstered weapon and fire a controlled pair to the vital zone target in less than 2.5 seconds.

Task #2: The shooter will engage the vital zone of a single, stationary silhouette target with controlled pairs with his carbine.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with a silhouette target at a measured range of 10, 25, and 50 yards, during daylight hours. The shooter will be required to utilize a carbine and four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will engage a single, stationary silhouette with controlled pairs to the vital zone target with the carbine.

Training Sequence:

Live-Fire: From the 10 yard line from the holster, draw and fire a single shot to a six-inch dot target with four magazines of five rounds each. Perform a speed-reload after each magazine. Utilize the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line from the holster, draw and fire a controlled-pair to a vital-zone target with four magazines of six rounds each. Perform a speed-reload after each magazine. Utilize the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire a controlled-pair to a vital-zone target with four magazines of six rounds each. Perform a speed-reload after each magazine. Utilize the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 25-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire a controlled-pair to a vital-zone target with four magazines of six rounds each. Perform a speed-reload after each magazine. Utilize the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary (it should be obvious that a controlled-pair at 25 yards will be noticeably slower than a controlled-pair executed at 10 yards. Nevertheless, this can still be performed in less than a second, with practice, especially if you are running decent optics on your carbine. --J.M.)
Live-Fire: From the 50-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, drop to the rice-paddy prone or a kneeling position, and fire a controlled-pair to a vital-zone target with four magazines of six rounds each. Perform a speed-reload after each magazine. Utilize the Tap-Rack-Banf malfunction clearance when/if necessary (I tend to use the rice-paddy prone more than the kneeling, due to old paratrooper knees. When I do use a kneeling position, for CQB purposes, I prefer the so-called “urban kneeling,” where I drop straight down on both knees...another reason for the use of high-quality knee pads for CQB. --J.M.)

Training Session Number Five: Sidearm Tactical Reload, and Multiple Target Transitions

Until now, the focus has been on speed-reloads. This is the most efficient method for a magazine change in a firing engagement. It gets the gun back into the fight in the fastest possible time. Lulls in action, or even just being behind cover while a partner fires, makes it possible for the fighter to reload his weapon to full-capacity without first firing to bolt-lock. This can be critical during sustained firing engagements. The argument is often correctly made, that the guerrilla fighter cannot afford to leave spent magazines behind, due to the obvious logistical limitations of the guerrilla supply train.

While there is a great deal of truth to this, the argument can and should be made, that in the middle of a fight, if the weapon is run dry, or suppressive fire needs to be brought to bear to cover the maneuver element, the least important concern should be worrying about magazines. The mantra that the fighter should remember in training for reloads is, “Use tactical reloads when you can; use speed reloads when you need to.”

(The traditional tactical reload, wherein the shooter brings the new magazine up to the weapon, releases and grabs the spent magazine in the same hand, and feeds the new magazine, before finally placing the spent magazine in the dump pouch, pocket, or shirt-front, is obsolete. It never really worked particularly well under stress, anyway. The current, cutting-edge doctrine is the “reload with retention.” Strip the partially spent magazine and shove it in the dump pouch. Grab and feed the new magazine. Get back into the fight! This is the method I teach, and thus is the method I speak of when I refer to “tactical reloads” within this article.--J.M.)

To this point, shooters have engaged only single targets. Real world shootings, whether in defense against criminal assault, or in combat, generally require the ability to rapidly engage multiple hostiles. The shooters should not begin to be introduced to multiple targets in the training program. There are two methods of identifying and engaging hostile targets. The first method is to identify the targets and engage them as individuals. This works well on targets that are well-spaced and relatively far away, although still at CQB distances. The second method, useful for extreme close-quarters, is target indexing. Instead of identifying and engaging the targets individually, the shooter identifies all the hostiles, as a group, and engages them as one target. Instead of recovering on the initial target after shooting, he recovers his sight picture, through the recoil cycle, on the next target without re-identifying it. This second method should be utilized by the guerrilla fighter only when he has already positively identified all members of the group as hostiles. It does not work as well when hostiles and innocents are intermingled.

Task: From the holster, the shooter will engage multiple silhouette targets with his sidearm, utilizing a tactical reload after each shot string.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with multiple silhouette targets at a measured range of 10 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize a sidearm with holster and four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will be required to draw the sidearm from the holster, engage multiple targets with controlled pairs, executing a tactical reload between strings. He will be required to place every round in the vital zone of each silhouette target.

Task #2: From the ready position, the shooter will engage multiple silhouette targets with his carbine, utilizing a tactical reload after each shot string.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with multiple silhouette targets at a measured distances of 10, 25, and 50 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize his carbine and a minimum of four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will be required to engage multiple targets with controlled pairs, executing a tactical reload between strings. He will be required to place every round in the vital zone of each silhouette target.

Training Sequence:

Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line from the holster, draw and fire controlled-pairs to a 6-inch dot overlay target, using four magazines loaded with six-rounds. Perform a tactical reload after each magazine.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire controlled-pairs to a 6-inch dot overlay target, using four magazines loaded with six rounds. Perform a tactical reload after each magazine.
From the 10-yard line from the holster, draw and fire controlled-pairs to the vital zones of 2-4 silhouette targets. Repeat 5 times. Perform a tactical reload following each shot string.
From the 10-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire controlled-pairs to the vital zones of 2-4 silhouette targets. Repeat 5 times. Perform a tactical reload following each shot string.
From the 25-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire controlled-pairs to the vital zones of 2-4 silhouette targets. Repeat 5 times. Perform a tactical reload following each shot string.
From the 50-yard line from the ready position, with the carbine, fire controlled-pairs to the vital zones of 2-4 silhouette targets. Repeat 5 times. Perform a tactical reload following each shot string.

Again, more to follow.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

BLOG CHANGES

2012-02-02T23:16:00.000-07:00

I've had several email requests to change the layout color scheme of the blog, to alleviate the eye strain some readers have been suffering. My initial concept with the colors was obviously a “camouflage/tactical” look. Rather than following my first instinct and telling them to “suck it the fuck up,” I decided to be a nice guy. They're welcome.

I still can't figure out why some of my words are inadvertantly high-lighted in grey though. I really need a serious class in computer tech skills, apparently. I should've been an Echo...

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

2012-02-02T23:08:00.002-07:00

Arctic Patriot asked for a description of the Four-Count Drawstroke...

I'll describe it from concealed carry.

For the record, I CCW my G-19 using the Appendix, Inside-the-Waistband method. It works awesome for me, is as comfortable as concealed carry gets (in other words, not very...), and is smoking fast, even from under a fleece and shell jacket.--J.M.

Position Number One: I use my free-hand (assuming I'm not beating the shit out of the dude with it, or using it to control him in the clinch or a grappling match on the ground), to grasp the front, bottom edge of my cover garment(s), since I wear closed-front fleece jackets about 98% of the time (In summer, I tend towards long-sleeved t-shirts or button-front short sleeve shirts). Firmly grasping the hem, I JERK the whole front of the garment up (I do mean JERK! I've actually busted myself in the chin doing it), as my gun hand grasps the holstered grip of the weapon in a firing grip. My thumb will be flagged straight up, in relation to the bore axis of the gun, which means it's generally parallel to the ground. My trigger finger is indexed straight along the side of the holster, and my remaining three fingers are in an actual firing grip on the gun (I've had to do minor Dremel tool work on every A-IWB holster I've ever owned, to ensure I can get my grip high enough on the frame of the gun). That is Position/Count #1.

In the event my free-hand is tied up with something, like throat-punching someone, or gouging an eye out, I use the thumb of my gun hand to clear the garment high enough to establish my firing grip. Either way, the only reason I can't shoot the gun at this point, is because it's still in the holster.

Position Number Two: This is defined differently by different people. I use the same definition as “SouthNarc,” based on what I was taught at SOT. I JERK the gun straight up. My wrist stays locked, and my elbow comes straight up and back. The laws of physiology mandate that, at its highest point, this means the gun is aimed approximately gut level on an adversary of my same height at contact range. THE FUCKING WRIST STAYS LOCKED, PEOPLE! (I tend to have to repeat this a lot during classes. Everyone wants to cant their wrist so the muzzle is pointed at the upper thoracic cavity, even though it's just not necessary).

You can shoot from this position, in the clinch. You will make hits, at contact distances. I guarantee you, if you dump your magazine into a dude's pelvic area at contact distance from the #2 position, he WILL lose interest in continuing the fight....and will probably lose his ability to father children.

You will know this position is dialed-in if the outside of your thumb joint is indexed on the corner of your pectoral muscle (“SouthNarc” sometimes calls this the “pectoral index” position. I like his term, but don't use it myself, typically). It is generally a good idea to train yourself to cant your weapon's slide outboard in this position to prevent fouling the recoil action of the slide with fabric from your shirt or jacket.

Position Number Three: Your free hand mates with your gun hand in the center of your chest, or slightly higher (honestly? My hands tend to meet in front of my chin. It gets my sights into my sight plane faster). This is sometimes referred to as the “retention position” even though most people who teach the four-count drawstroke consider the #2 the true retention position (I concur, but concede to the majority in developing written course material, for ease of understanding).

Position Number Four: This is any position from Number Three all the way out to full extension. You can engage hostiles at any point from Position #2 on, depending on the range.

Critical Note: The concept is, the gun is always moving UP. It should never “arch” to position.

I'm a big advocate of the Modern Isosceles method of shooting the pistol. I was originally taught the classic Gunsite Weaver, as a youth. In the Ranger Regiment, and later at SOT, I learned the Mod-Iso, and continue to use it. It is, demonstrably, the fastest, accurate method of putting multiple rounds downrange.

THISLINK is an Options for Personal Security instructor demonstrating a variation of the Four-Count Drawstroke. I don't agree with his Position #2, since he has the kid rotating his elbow (I tend to teach it more like you're trying to slam your elbow in the face of a tall dude behind you) to bring the bore axis up more, but other than that, it's not too bad. If I'm shooting from open-carry, pistol only, I do the hand in the center of the chest thing too. Typically though, if I'm shooting pistol from open-carry, my free hand is controlling my carbine in a chest-hold retention type position, until Position Three?

Clear as mud?

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

CLOSE-QUARTERS COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP: A SUGGESTED POI, PART TWO

2012-02-02T22:25:00.001-07:00

(the following is a continuation of yesterday's article, and the follow-up lessons I utilize when teaching novice gunfighters the tricks of the trade. I've taught this program with each training session lasting several hours, and I've taught the entire program in a two-day block. Assuming a qualified instructor with a solid grasp on the principles of adult teaching methods, who can effectively utilize the crawl-walk-run method of instruction, and the explain-demonstrate-practice method of teaching, it can be done. Nevertheless, this POI is generally taught over a span of as long as three weeks, with 5-10 times more dry-fire practice, to master the fundamentals, than actual live-fire practice. --J.M.)

Training Session Two: Slow Aimed with the Carbine

While this course is predicated on a practiced grasp of the fundamentals of basic rifle marksmanship (BRM), the reality is that BRM as normally taught in the military and in the civilian rifle world generally does not teach fighting with the carbine from a standing, CQC posture. Therefore, this session should focus on the basics of fighting with the carbine: proper stance, firing grip, sight alignment and sight picture, breathing control under stress, trigger control, follow-through, and recovery.

During CQC, the fighter will generally find it necessary to make a majority of his shots from the standing position, despite the fact that the standing position is the least stable firing position available. This does not preclude the need for making shots from the kneeling position variants, the squatting/”rice paddy prone” position, or the prone position (different CQB instructors in the civilian world teach some different positions as well, from the SBU prone to, in SGM Lamb's case at least, the “Brokeback Mountain Prone,” for shooting around various types of barriers/cover. I rely on the fundamentals, and allow the student to explore different variations based on his METT-TC needs. --J.M.). While doctrinally, CQC range is generally considered 50 yards or less, for the guerrilla fighter, there will occur the need to make successful one-shot stop hits on hostiles in excess of this 50-yard definition. For these shots, it is imperative that the shooter know and understand how to utilize the other positions in a hasty manner (I should add that I do include regular practice at making upper thoracic cavity hits at 100 yards, from the standing position. I can generally accomplish it in around 1.5 seconds. --J.M.).

Task: From the ready position, the operator will engage a single, stationary silhouette target with his carbine, at ranges of 10-50 yards.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with silhouette targets and small-diameter dot targets at measured distance of 10-50 yards during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize a magazine-fed rifle or carbine with a minimum of four magazines.

Standards: The fighter will utilize proper firing stance and shooting grip to ensure proper sight alignment and sight picture, and place every round within the vital zone aiming point of a standard silhouette target.

Training Sequence:

Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the retention position, fire a single round to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the pistol, ball-and-dummy drill, for five rounds total.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the retention position, fire a single round to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the pistol, with four magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the ready position, fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary (this is an awesome opportunity to utilize the 5+1 drill I mentioned at the end of Part One of this article. So, instead of 10 repetitions, the student shooters actually perform 60 repetitions, while only expending 10 rounds. --J.M.)
Live-Fire: From the 15-yard line, from the ready position, fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 25-yard line, from the ready position, fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 50-yard line, from the ready position, fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire: From the 50-yard line, from the ready position, drop to either the kneeling or rice-paddy prone position, and fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, using the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.
Live-Fire” From the 100-yard line, from the ready position, drop to either the kneeling or rice-paddy prone position, and fire a single shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target using the the carbine, with two magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use the Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if necessary.

Training Session Three: The Four-Count Drawstroke and Controlled Pairs

(I didn't invent the drawstroke method I use and teach, nor did I name it. I learned it as a young Ranger, doing FamFire (Familiarization Fire) with the M9 pistol, and again at SOT. The first time I heard the term “four-count drawstroke” used to describe it was sometime around late 2003 or early 2004, by now well-known and extremely well-regarded trainer “SouthNarc,” in an online forum discussion, either at his site totalprotectioninteractive.com, or the now-defunct selfdefenseforums.com. --J.M.)

Once the basics of slow aimed fire have been learned and understood, the shooter should begin to learn the four-count drawstroke method of getting the sidearm into the fight. Not very many people walk around with a pistol already in their hand, ready to fight. Whether the resistance fighter is carrying his weapon concealed, to faciliate covert operations, or in the lastest high-speed, low-drag tactical holster, on his LBE, the need to get the pistol into the fight in a hurry mandates a smooth, fast presentation of the weapon from the holster.

It is important to remember the gunfighter's mantra of “slow is smooth and smooth is fast.” Unfortunately, the term has been used too loosely by many internet commandos, without understanding the Truth behind the phrase, lending it a poor reputation (as SGM Lamb likes to say, “Smooth is fast. Slow is just friggin' slow!”). While initially the fighter's shot groups on the target will undoubtedly expand somewhat because he is focused on the mechanics of the drawstroke, with practice they will reduce in size again. The biggest mistake the shooter can make is to try to get the gun out and shooting faster than he is able to do so accurately.

Controlled pairs are the answer to the generally wasted second round of the classic “double-tap.” It involves two rounds, fired as fast as possible, with each round being correctly aimed, in accordance with the requisite aiming method for the range and target presented.

Task: From the holster, the shooter will execute a four-count drawstroke and engage a single stationary target with his sidearm at 10 yards.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with a single silhouette target at a measured distance of 10 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize his sidearm with holster and four magazines.

Standards: By the numbers, the shooter will be required to bring the holstered weapon to ber and fire one round to the vital zone of a silhouette target at a measured distance of 10 yards within 3 seconds (the intermediate goal should be 2.5 seconds. The advanced goal should be less than 2 seconds. I aim for less than 1.5 seconds, and consider it a great day when I break the 1 second mark, from concealment. --J.M.).

Task #2: From the ready position, at a range of 10 yards, the shooter will engage the vital zone of a silhouette target with two aimed rounds.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with a silhouette target at a measured distance of 10 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize his carbine and four magazines.

Standards: The shooter will be required to execute controlled pairs with the carbine, to hit the 5”x5” vital zone of a silhouette target in less than 2.5 seconds (I can personally assure you that, with practice, it is relatively easy to lower that time requirement to one second and still get consistent, successful controlled pairs in at the stated range. --J.M.).

Training Sequence:

Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, with the sidearm, from the retention position, fire a single shot to a vital zone target, with four magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Utilize a Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if needed.
Lecture/Demonstration of the Four-Count Drawstroke.
Dry-Fire: 25-50 repetitions of the Four-Count Drawstroke, with an emphasis on the proper, efficient bio-mechanics.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, with the sidearm, from the holster, draw and fire a single shot to a vital zone target, with four magazines loaded with five rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Utilize a Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance when/if needed.
Lecture/Demonstration of Controlled Pairs with the Carbine.
Live-Fire: From the 10-yard line, from the ready position, with the carbine, fore a controlled pair to a 5”x5” vital zone target using four magazines loaded to full-capacity.

More to follow....

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

A NOTE ON GUERRILLA COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPTS

2012-02-01T23:35:00.001-07:00

Following the article on this subject a few days ago, a reader emailed me the THIS LINK, with a cost-effective alternative to the rather expensive field telephone option for guerrilla base communications. I've included it for reader study, if interested.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

CLOSE-QUARTERS MARKSMANSHIP: A SUGGESTED POI

2012-02-01T23:19:00.000-07:00

(One characteristic aspect of Special Forces that potential future guerrillas need to recognize the importance of is the ability to take the raw material of willing recruits to the resistance and train them to be combat effective. While every American male considers themselves to be a cosmopolitan blend of Carlos Hathcock, Buffalo Bill, and Daniel Morgan, all rolled into one fine piece of American marksmanship, the reality is, the vast majority of American gun-owners are pretty lousy marksmen under combat field conditions. The ability of the future resistance cadre to develop the willing material into a capable gunfighter will be instrumental in continuing the fight over the duration.

The following article is a fundamental outline I utilize when teaching close-quarters combat marksmanship to aspiring gunfighters. It is based largely on the doctrine of the 1^st Special Warfare Training Group of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Training Center and School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, as well as the methods used by me personally as an 18B when tasked with teaching foreign national personnel to utilize their personal weapons more efficiently.

While this particular POI focuses on close-quarters marksmanship, inside of 200 yards, in recognition of the need to “hug the enemy's belt and punch from the inside,” it is not intended to suggest that my aforementioned emphasis on being able to engage hostiles from 0-500 yards is any less valid.

It is not a set-in-stone type of POI outline. It is one SF soldier's interpretation, based on experiences in irregular warfare, of what the critical skills are to run a rifle and sidearm in combat. Use what you like, discard the rest. --J.M.)

Period One: Fundamentals of CQM

If future guerrilla fighters are going to function effectively in combat, they must be willing to utilize deadly force against the enemy. The ability to engage the enemy with expert skill-at-arms in a confident and competent manner will help to ensure the guerrilla's ability to fight and win. The course of instruction will deal directly with the use of the carbine and sidearm in close-quarters combat. Fighters will be taught to engage hostiles while moving, when appropriate, weapons transitions to the sidearm, tactical and speed reloads and the appropriate conditions to perform each, malfunction clearance methods, and how to utilize different sighting techniques under combative conditions.

Terminal Learning Objective: As a trained guerrilla fighter, resistance operative will be able to engage single and multiple hostiles quickly and effectively through the application of the fundamentals of marksmanship.

Enabling Learning Objectives:

1) The fighter must be able to summarize and demonstrate the eight fundamentals of marksmanship, as they apply to the carbine and sidearm, in the CQM paradigm.

Demonstrate and explain the fundamental combative stance. Feet should be approximately shoulder-width apart. The weak-side foot may be slightly forward (2-4 inches is typical, I keep mine squared to the target, unless I'm moving, to ensure I am keeping my hips and shoulders square to the target –J.M.). The knees should be bent and the weight forward. 60+ percent of the bodyweight should be aggressively forward to help absorb recoil. The body should lean forward from the hips (not the waist), to lean into the weapon. Shoulders and hips should be square to the target, with the head tucked into the neck, but upright. The elbows stay tucked into the rib-cage. It is critical that the stance should be comfortable.
Demonstrate and explain the critical aspects of an effective combat grip with both the sidearm and the carbine.
Explain the fundamentals of proper sight alignment with iron-sights and the optic of choice with the carbine, and iron-sights on the sidearm.
Describe and utilize an effective sight picture to ensure all shots strike the center-of-mass of the aiming point, whether that is the upper thoracic cavity or the cranial vault.
Explain and demonstrate proper breathing control, including the utilization of the natural respiratory pause.
Demonstrate proper trigger control and squeeze, breaking the shot at the moment the sight-picture and alignment are correct, even at the rapid speeds demanded by close-quarters combat.
The fighter must be taught to make a conscious attempt to maintain all the control factors and fundamentals of marksmanship throughout the firing cycle. It is critical that the fighter learn and master the ability to maintain front sight focus and correct sight alignment throughout the firing stroke in order to ensure the surprise trigger break with no recoil anticipation to spoil the shot.
The fighter must learn and master the importance of recovery, in order to effectively apply the fundamentals of marksmanship at close-quarters speeds. Recovery is the return of the weapon and shooter to the pre-shot state of readiness. Correct grip, stance, and trigger control will help ensure a rapid and repeatable recovery. This allows for immediate follow-up shots. As soon as the weapon fires, the fighter should immediately begin reapplying the fundamentals, in order to ready for the next shot as soon as the recoil cycle ceases.

2) The guerrilla light-infantryman, trained in close-quarters marksmanship, must be able to discuss the differences between slow, aimed-fire, rapid aimed-fire, aimed quick-kill, and the flash sight picture with an iron-sighted carbine (while I recognize the amazing robustness of modern optics, I still believe that every guerrilla fighter MUST master the use of iron sights. As I repeatedly point out, technology is a product of human ingenuity. What one man can think up, another man can fuck up: technology fails –J.M.).

Slow Aimed-Fire: When learning to shoot, or when range and time allow, the fighter should utilize slow, aimed-fire to engage hostiles. Take the time to focus on applying each one of the fundamentals of marksmanship, in order to concentrate on proper technical execution.
Rapid, Aimed-Fire: When engaging targets at close-range (doctrinally, within 15 meters) there is no time for perfect sight alignment. The fighter looks through the rear sight, lines the front sight up on the target center-of-mass (COM), and squeezes the trigger. Utilize the proper fundamentals of marksmanship, but do so quickly. At this range, speed beats surgical accuracy, although accuracy is still critical (at this range, even with iron-sights, I can consistently make first-round hits to a three-inch aiming point, in less than one second. Speed and accuracy are not mutually exclusive –J.M.).
Aimed Quick-Kill: When utilizing aimed quick-kill with the AR15/M4 carbine family of weapons (and most other “modern” fighting rifles), the fighter uses the same cheek-to-stock weld that he normally would during slow aimed-fire or rapid aimed-fire. Instead of looking through the rear aperture however, the fighter glances over the rear sight and simply ensures that the front sight post is properly positioned in relation to the target COM (on the M16A2 family of weapons, the 0-2 large aperture is large enough that you can perform rapid aimed-fire almost as rapidly as aimed quick-kill). For the more experienced fighter, aimed quick-kill is effective for COM hits out to 10-12 meters. Utilizing the 0-2 rear aperture will extend this range, with no noticeable detrimental effect on speed. Nevertheless, it is critical for the potential future guerrilla to master aimed quick-kill without the rear aperture, in case he finds it necessary to pick up a non-aperture equipped rifle in battlefield recovery.
Flash Sight Picture: The flash sight picture is effective out to ranges of 7 yards with the carbine. It involves using just the front sight post to aim, with no concern for the rear sight (the special operations doctrinal definition of flash sight picture does differ somewhat from the commonly accepted definition put forth by the late LTC Cooper). The front sight is simply centered on the target's COM and fire. It is the same concept as using a front bead sight on a shotgun to shoot trap. The flash sight picture is of little use when any degree of precision is necessary in close-quarters shooting. For the guerrilla light-infantry fighter, who must ALWAYS consider the political implications of collateral damage and avoid them at all costs, this is a critical element to consider before utilizing the flash sight picture in training.

3) The guerrilla fighter must be able to execute a speed reload of the carbine and the sidearm. While the tactical reload, or reload with retention should always be the primary choice of the guerrilla, the speed reload is an absolutely critical skill (trust me, when you're laying down suppressive fire as you move to cover, and suddenly find yourself with an empty gun before reaching cover, the speed reload will be the single most important skill in your repertoire at that moment! --J.M.).

4) The trained guerrilla fighter needs to be able to instantly transition from the primary to the secondary, without conscious thought. At close-quarters ranges, inside 75-100 feet, a malfunction of the primary, or running the primary dry, is most effectively remedied by the transition, rather than the slower malfunction clearance. The critical element should be to continue engaging the enemy with accurate, effective fire until the situation is resolved or cover has been reached.

5) The guerrilla light-infantry fighter must master the skill of rapid, concrete immediate-action drills for malfunction clearances with the sidearm or carbine. While the transition is the preferred method of dealing with a malfunction of the primary weapon, the ability to get either weapon back into the fight following a malfunction is absolutely crucial. If hostiles are engaging the guerrilla element with accurate fire at ranges beyond pistol range, it will be absolutely crucial for the guerrilla with a malfunction to get his weapon back into the fight before the entire element is destroyed.

(The above training session is generally the largest part of my introductory lecture when teaching a CQM program. While, based on the needs of the audience, I may incorporate other aspects, such as legality issues for a home-defense focused class, this is the important part, since it deals with the direct, technical aspects of using the guns effectively in the anti-personnel role. Every skill that is described is explained, demonstrated, and then practiced under supervision, by the students. --J.M.)

Period Two: Marksmanship Training

When learning to shoot a sidearm effectively, in the anti-personnel role, the shooter must initially concentrate on the fundamentals. The fundamentals of marksmanship should be thought about individually and properly applied in a slow progression, in order to ensure that the correct technical skills are learned and mastered. Repetition will bring proficiency and subsequent speed of execution. Since there are eight fundamentals of marksmanship, and the novice shooter needs to concentrate on each of them sequentially, he will begin by firing individual shots.

The two most common mistakes made by novice shooters is not focusing on the front sight and improper trigger control. The ball-and-dummy drill is a tested and proven method to address the trigger control issue. The instructor should ensure that the shooter us utilizing proper shooting stance and grip . During the presentation of the pistol from the holster, the instructor should focus on the weapon, ensuring that the shooter uses proper trigger control to make a clean shot break every time. If the shooter is applying incorrect trigger pressure, it will become apparent through any movement of the weapon during the trigger stroke during the dummy round of the ball-and-dummy drill.

Training Session One: Slow Aimed-Fire with the Sidearm

Task: From the retention position, the shooter will engage a single target with one round from his sidearm, at a range of 5-15 yards.

Conditions: The shooter will be presented with silhouette targets and small-diameter dot targets at measured distances of 5, 7, and 15 yards, during daylight hours. He will be required to utilize a sidearm with holster and four magazines.

Standards: Utilizing proper firing stance and shooting grip to ensure proper sight alignment and sight picture, from 15 yards, the shooter will be required to place every shot within the 5”x5” “vital zone” aiming point on the upper thoracic cavity of a silhouette target (I use two index cards, side-by-side, long sides together, for a vital zone representation. As the cliché claims, “aim small, miss small.” --J.M.). From 5 to 7 yards, the shooter must be able to place every round within the three-inch circle of a small-diameter dot target.

Training Sequence:

Dry Fire: Focus on stance, grip, and sight picture from the retention position, at 5, 7, and 15 yards.
Live-Fire: From the 5 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single shot to a 3-inch dot overlay target, ball-and-dummy drill with five rounds total.
Live-Fire: From the 5 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single shot to a 3-inch dot overlay target with four magazines loaded with 5 rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance if needed.
Live-Fire: From the 7 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single-shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, ball-and-dummy drill with five rounds total.
Live-Fire: From the 7 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single-shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target with four magazines loaded with 5 rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use Tap-Rack-Bang malfunction clearance if needed.
Live-Fire: From the 15 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single-shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target, ball-and-dummy drill with five rounds total.
Live-Fire: From the 15 yard line, from the retention position, fire a single-shot to a 5”x5” vital zone target with four magazines loaded with 5 rounds each. Perform a speed reload after each magazine. Use Tap-Rack-bang malfunction clearance if needed.

The Ball-and-Dummy Drill (BADD) is utilized to help shooters learn proper trigger control. The shooter fires a weapon that has been loaded with a dummy round. Because there is no recoil, any trigger control errors made by the shooter can be easily seen by the coach. The most common errors seen during the BADD will be jerking or mashing the trigger and flinching in anticipation of recoil.

(Another tool I am fond of is the 5+1 drill. I learned it from the senior bravo on my ODA, and then later found it described in Paul Howe's book The Tactical Trainer. Five dry-fire shots are made for every live-fire round fired. This allows the instructor to study the shooter's bio-mechanics during the dry-fire “shots,” instead of wasting live ammunition trying to figure out the cause of misses during live-fire. --J.M.)

Continued in the next article....

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

EQUIPPING THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER, PART THREE (THE SUSTAINMENT LOAD)

2012-01-31T23:07:00.000-07:00

Recognizing the importance of always striving to reduce the mobility-destroying load-bearing requirements of the guerrilla fighter, it is critical to first dispel some long-cherished myths regarding the historical American woodsman-scout. When most Americans consider the archetype of the woodsman-scout, their visualization typically involves a frontiersman (eastern long-hunter or western “mountain man”) slipping silently and effortlessly through the timber, carrying everything he owns in a shoulder-slung “possibles” pouch or a small knapsack slung across his back. This, like the cowboy-plainsman with his bedroll strapped behind the cantle of his saddle, is for the most part, nothing more than Thoreauan mythology.

Prior to the World War Two introduction of realistically practical off-road motorized transport, long-term travel in the backcountry almost always involved the use of livestock for transportation of personnel and logistics. Guerrilla and irregular forces have historically made wide-spread use of the local indigenous beast of burden as well, whenever possible, even as recently as the GWOT (SF made rather extensive use of animal transport in the early days of OEF, thanks to the Northern Alliance's reliance on horseback transportation. Both SOF and conventional forces have continued to make use of pack animals, in various degrees, according to my sources, especially in the more remote, extremely alpine regions of Afghanistan.--J.M.). Nevertheless, for the light-infantry force, the paradigm in large part remains the focused on man-portable sustainment load-bearing equipment, in the form of rucksacks.

It is neither necessary nor desirable to pack the “kitchen sink” in the guerrilla sustainment rucksack load. A guerrilla light-infantry patrol is not a recreational backpacking trip. Focusing the sustainment load packing list on the basic necessary logistics of survival and combat effectiveness, rather than creature comforts, and the regular utilization of pre-positioned re-supply caches, makes it possible to minimize the guerrilla fighter's load to the barest minimum possible.

Among the simplest, but most certain methods of reducing sustainment load weights is the development and use of “standardized” packing lists within a guerrilla patrol element, and the enforcement of these packing standards by key leaders during pre-combat inspections. At its simplest level, the light-infantry sustainment load should encompass only the basic necessities to ensure human survival: water, food, and adequate shelter for the given environmental conditions. This minimalist approach leave the light-infantryman a load-bearing capability far below the standard of conventional force infantry forces, while allowing for the addition of some mission-essential equipment without exceeding the ability of the fit war-fighter to move and fight effectively.

Packs

The selection of a load-bearing pack design for the guerrilla fighter is most critically dependent on the demands of the immediate operational environment. A guerrilla force operating from an urban enclave guerrilla base, with ample support from a complex, established subversive underground and extensive auxiliary support network, will have a significantly different logistical sustainment requirement than a less well-supported organizational element operating from a swamp/jungle base or in an alpine environment.

At its most fundamental level, Che Guevara's recommendation of a poncho and light blanket may be all that is required for shelter in many environments (as a young hooah, training throughout the southern US and many tropical and sub-tropical environments, even as far north and south a temperate regions, we utilized nothing more than a poncho and poncho liner as a “sleeping bag,” even in winter. --J.M.). Along with a decent water bottle, water purification method, and food supplies for several days, a complete sustainment load could theoretically be carried in no more than a small assault pack, or even an old ALICE buttpack (for those still dedicated to the ALICE LBE system). With regular re-supply from caches, the guerrilla could conceivably operate in the field indefinitely.

In more extreme environments, requiring more extensive shelter protection, or for longer duration patrols without the benefit of auxiliary support and/or pre-positioned caches throughout the operational area, a larger sustainment system load-bearing pack option may be necessary. The small assault pack/buttpack option may not be viable (on the other hand, even in winter in extreme alpine environments, it is theoretically possible that it may be sufficient. The interior of a snow cave maintains a pretty steady temperature just above or at freezing. I've stayed comfortably warm in snow caves with nothing more than a poncho, poncho liner, and casualty-type quilted “space” blanket with just a small candle for warmth and light. Of course, on the other hand, I've also frozen my dick off laying in a tank track in the mud of an early spring sleet storm, wrapped in a poncho and poncho liner, with MRE heaters shoved under my ass for additional heat! --J.M.) in some environments.

Larger rucksack options for the potential future guerrilla light-infantry fighter range from military/military-surplus options such as the LC-2 ALICE rucksack (with frame) to the newer MOLLE designs (despite the total lack of any sort of contemporary ergonomic engineering, I still own, use, and love the “big green tick” ALICE ruck. My body long ago learned how to mold itself to fit the idiosyncracies of the “tick.” While I love the carrying capacity of the MOLLE II ruck, I still can't bring myself to trust the integrity of the plastic frame, after seeing them break just being tossed out the back of HMMWVs and five-tons. A MOLLE II ruck on an ALICE frame though? What's not to love? --J.M.), to the option of civilian mountaineering packs from companies such as Gregory, Dana Designs, North Face, and Kelty. While these typically lack the modularity or sheer brutal toughness of the military designs, it is important to remember that, despite the sometimes odd-ball aspects of the mountaineering sub-culture, serious alpinists are extremely physical athletes who demand a lot from their equipment.

Further, the relatively innocent appearance of this equipment, in some areas may assist the guerrilla's attempts to blend with the local civilian population in regime-controlled denied-territory, when moving through built-up areas (consider the idea of a small guerrilla force infiltrating a an urban area solo or in pairs, to rendezvous/link-up at a pre-arranged, auxiliary-operated safehouse, to conduct final planning and isolation functions prior to a HVT raid within the regime-controlled urban area...Anyone been to Portland, Oregon, or Seattle, Washington? If so, do you see the point?).

Finally, there is the obvious option of selecting the sustainment-load rucksack from the current offerings of companies catering to the military and PMC markets with non-issue, COTS rucksack and load-bearing gear, such as Kifaru, Eberlestocke, and others. While they offer a remarkably attractive blend of the best of both worlds, they do suffer from two potential drawbacks, dependent on the operational environment. One, they are incredibly expensive (although often no more expensive than comparable civilian backpacks, they are seldom found used, in thrift stores and second-hand stores, dirt-cheap, the way the civilian models often are), and second, they are obviously military in appearance, meaning they offer little advantage to the urban-based guerrilla who will need to avoid piquing the curiousity of security forces.

Ultimately, the selection of a pack for the sustainment load will depend on the physiognomy of the individual potential guerrilla fighter, what is locally available and affordable (although, as long as the internet is still available, “local” is a loose term in this case), and the operational/environmental constraints of the local environment.

If the priorities of survival are considered honestly, the importance of packing the sustainment load with adequate water, food, and shelter may vary in criticality dependent on the local operational environment. It truly is a METT-TC consideration. Conditions vary greatly across North America and across the globe. What constitutes adequate shelter in downtown Miami Beach, Florida in July will differ greatly from what constitutes adequate shelter in the Bears Paw Mountains near Chinook, Montana in January.

While potable water will be a major concern in most months of the year in the Sonoran desert environment around Yuma, Arizona, the winter months in the area of Heber City, Utah mean there will be adequate water in the form of snow to validate a very light packing list for water in the sustainment load.

At a fundamental level, clothing is shelter. Wearing adequate clothing for the operational environment will greatly reduce the necessary sustainment payload for shelter (for example, in the above example of using an ultra-light shelter option in a snow cave, had I not been wearing polypropylene long underwear, fleece second-layer, Gore-Tex shell garments, and a polar fleece balaclava, I would not have been anywhere near as comfortably warm in the snow cave. Further, the fact that I was not wearing anything but basic summerweight BDUs and jungle boots when I tried to bivvy up in the tank track, the mild sleet storm would have been far more tolerable with just a poncho liner and poncho. --J.M.). Additionally, since time is generally on the side of the guerrilla (thus the term “The Long War”), the utilization of field-expedient shelters such as snow caves, brush lean-tos, and even dug-out, roofed over fighting positions, further reduce the environmental protection needs of sustainment load shelters. While the very real potential of having to bivvy up in the middle of a thicket of thorny brush must be considered, the guerrilla should recognize that, outside of an active E&E, he should never rely just on the supplies on his back. He must think outside of the box (further, the thermal mass represented by an earth-covered fighting position or a snow-cave offer interesting countermeasures to the threat of regime security force thermal imaging devices...--J.M.).

(For the record, while in many seasons I am able to get by in the field with the poncho liner/poncho shelter combination, I do own several of the military three-bag sleep systems. For winter conditions above 8000 feet, it just makes sense to hedge my bets on staying warm. In the event I need to occupy a guerrilla base in the mountains, rest assured, these will be well utilized within the housing developed inside the secure guerrilla base area. While there are some comparable, and even a few superior civilian options available, the price was perfect for me. It sure makes sense to make good friends with the supply NCO...--J.M.)

Dear Reader,

It is late. Despite not having completed this installment of the third installment of this article series, I am going to post it, and try to complete the rest of the article tomorrow. My sincerest apologies, but it did take awhile for OpenOffice to download this evening after I got off work. I am now back to having a real word-processing system, and my wife, significantly younger than I, and thus far more tech-savvy, managed to do some stuff to the computer today to ensure the continued viability of WinDoze until I can get the Linux disc I burned this weekend to boot properly.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

TECH ISSUES UPDATE: LAPTOP IS STILL TARFU

2012-01-30T22:45:00.002-07:00

I've still not resolved the tech issues I'm dealing with. I downloaded LinuxMint to a DVD-R this weekend, but every time I start to boot from the DVD, the computer loads, but screen goes black....hmmm......

Additionally, while I DID download OpenOffice onto the computer's hard drive, within WinDoze, I ended up having to re-set the computer, so my OpenOffice promptly disappeared. It's currently struggling to re-download with our fiendishly slow WiFi connection.

So, in order to get this posted, I utilized the guerrilla mindset, and found a way around the obstacle. By utilizing web-based email, I was able to type the article as a message, then copy and paste it, before deleting it from the email system, without ever sending it...once again, leveraging the available technology to meet the needs of the guerrilla/resistance.

If something happens and I do not post for a lengthy time (call it a week at the outside), it is simply because the WinDoze finally crashed, and the computer has to go to a tech guy to fix. Unfortunately, in our small mountain hamlet, the only tech guy is WAY over-priced. I'd rather wait until I make another trip to town, even if it means making an unscheduled trip.

In the meantime, I hope every one is doing their PT, spending some quality time at the range, working with friends on developing small-unit tactical skills and TACSOPs, and getting their shit in order.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the Mountains

GUERRILLA FORCE COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPTS

2012-01-30T22:37:00.003-07:00

(In lieu of the promised third installment of the "Equipping the Guerrilla Fighter" series, which is still in the writing stages, I offer the following for readers. This article came about as a result of a conversation on the topic with a co-worker on Friday It subsequently brewed in my head until I felt obligated to include my thoughts on the subject within the blog.

I've also decided to tone down the formality of my prose style somewhat. While I've tried to keep the prose very third-person and somewhat inoffensive, the reality is, that's not how I speak. So, while I will still attempt to keep the profanity to a dull roar, I hope readers will pardon the somewhat less formal tone I will take as these articles continue. --J.M.)

In the real-world of small-unit warfare, communications are absolutely critical to surviva and success. Whether it is organizing and conducting "combined" operations, with the subversive underground and/or other guerrilla force elements, coordinating re-supply from caches wth the auxiliary, or maintaining security of the guerrilla base with LP/OPs and roving security patrols, secure, effective communications networks must be developed and maintained.

While the relative merits and shortcomings of various radio communications devices, such as amateur radio/HAM, FRS/GMRS, and citizen's band/CB radio are discussed, ad nauseum, in various "survival" forums and blogs, this is, at best, a half-measure approach. While some elements ad patrols my carry a radio or radios, the very real danger of signals intercept must never be overlooked. Additionally, despite the LoS advantages facilitated by ridge-top or roof-top LP/OPs, ultimately, radio communications in alpine environments (and to a lesser extent, urban areas) tend to be extremely unreliable. This is most often due to three factors: terrain masking effects of ridges and timbered areas (and large buildings interrupting the LoS), the often unavoidable rough-handling electronic equipment receives under combat conditions, and the adverse weather conditions common in mountain regions.
The effectiveness of radio communications for the guerrilla force (and the resistance in general), ultimately will depend on the resourcefulness and ingenuity of communications personnel. The proper, effective use of expedient, directional antennae will be of value, as will maximizing the use of the afore-mentioned ridge-top LP/OPs as "relay stations," although the static interference of adverse weather will still have to be considered. The extreme and rapid changes in temperature normally encountered in alpine regions crate condensation problems, further exacerbating the problems, by increasing the difficulty in keeping radio sets and batteries dry.

While the technological difficulties iherent to the use of radios by the mountain guerrilla must be considered in the planning process, equal consideration should be given to the tactical issues involved. Considering the technological advances typically available to regime forces for electronic signals intercept, even brief use of radio communications should be minimized as much as humanly possible. The primary purpose of sending communications messages in the field is to transmit information to other elements. If intelligence information is to be useful, it myst be transmitted and delivered in time to be acted upon effectively. The inability to accomplish this requirement by any other communications means is the only justifiable reason for the guerrilla force to risk radio communications rather than more "primitive" methods. Operational planning should incorporate communications planning, including the useof freuently changing personnel and unit call-signs, pre-planned electronic communications windows, and (whenever possible/tactically feasible) pre-planned rendezvous/link-up points and times for courier-based message transmission.

When utilizing radio communications, resistance elements should only power up their radios during the planned "random" transmission windows. Receiving elements should not need to respond to transmissions, unless absolutely critical to operational success. Immediately following communications windows, radios should be powered down, and elements must leave the vicinity as rapidly as possible. It must always be assumed that regime security forces are constantly-and successfully-utilizing signals intercept capabilities.

(Personally, my exception to the general rule of not using radios would be for close-range, intra-team tactical communications, utilizing low-powered 0.5W FRS/GMRS two-way radios. The pathetically weak transmission power of these units mean that they are extremely difficult to intercept unless the enemy is already nearby and has the element pin-pointed within a very small geographical area. Th only time these intra-team radios should be used is in contact, in which case, it's probably fair to assume that the enemy already has a fairly good idea of where you are. --J.M.)

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One method available to resistance forces to leverage available technology for communications security is the use of couriers, carrying a USB thumb drive, or similar device, with the message encrypted using open-source free-ware type encryption systems. While the NSAs purported inability to decrypt these programs is probably urban myth (or good advertising/disinformation), a current court case in Colorado seems to indicate that, even at the federal level, law enforcement agencies at least, do not possess the ability to crack this level of encryption. If the courier is simply given a dead-drop location to leave the encrypted device, with no information as to the content of the message and/or passphrase, he/she will not be able, regardless of the level of maltreatment by regime forces during interrogation, be ble to compromise the security of the communications net, beyond the location of the pick-up and dead-drop. If good fieldcraft is practiced by the resistance, the compromise of either of these should not be an issue of great concern, since they will realize the locations are compromised and drive on.

(This is, specifically, one of the concepts I'm referring to when I dicuss the idea of resistance/irregular warfare elements utilizing the available technology to augment traditional UW TTPs to their advantage. --J.M.)

Messengers are of course, necessarily slow, due to the nature of their need to travel clandestinely and/or covertly. The use of couriers for communications should be closely scrutinized for applicability when planning for the transmission/delivery of time-sensitive communications. Nevertheless, when couriers are proven trustworthy, and have received excellent field-craft training, they are one of the most (if not the most) secure methods of communications available to resistance forces.
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Visual signaling methods such as semaphore or light-transmitted Morse code, are often overlooked by contemporary potential future resistance personnel, but havethe potential to be extremely useful tactical communications methods for resistance forces in both urban and alpine operational environments. The long lines of sight afforded by ridge-top and roof-top LP/OPs provide many opportunities, and the light weight of the requisite equipment (two bright pieces of cloth for semaphore, and the already present flashlight for light-based signaling) makes them far more easily carried than heavier radios and sustainment batteries for the woodsman-scout guerrilla, or the clandestine urban saboteur/subversive.

The semaphore method of signaling hs been historically demonstrated to be extremely functional. It is easily learned, and provided environmental conditions contribute, can be easily seen at distances well over 5K, provided the receiving element has the benefit of decent magnified optics such as field glasses and/or spotting scopes. While it is critical that key leaders, couriers, and communications support personnel master reading and sending semaphore, all resistance operators should be trained to a basic level of proficiency (remember, in the days of wooden-ships, illiterate, press-ganged seamen learned to read semaphore proficiently...it ain't fucking rocket science! --J.M.). The average person can learn the semaphore alphabet in five or six hours of instructions, and minimal amount of refresher training/practice thereafter should maintain a functional, if not fluent, proficiency.

A decent flashlight and understanding of simple alpha-numeric Morse code can be utilized for visual signaling at night at distances of over 2K (I once got verbally hammered by friends on another ODA due to poor light discipline. On a refresher night land nav course in mountain desert, I flipped on a halogen-bulb headlamp to dig a sweatshirt out of my ruck. From a mapped ten miles away they not only saw the light, but later reported that it was obvious someone was using a "hand-held" light. --J.M.).
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The final method of secure communications readily available to the potential future resistance force is the use of wire-based communications, such as older military-surplus field telephones. Obviously, the difficulties inherent to laying the wire preclude its use by fast-moving, small-unit maneuver elements for most purposes, but its ultimate, ideal use is for communications within the urban or alpine guerrilla base.

The laying of wire for these networks must be accomplished with extreme care and excellent camouflage (one mission of LRSU, SF SR teams, and other tactical intelligence-gathering units is "tapping" into enemy wire lines and subsequent signals intercept. Vietnam-era SOG teams performed this mission a great deal, often with outstanding success.). Nevertheless, the use of field telephones and wire, especially for security networks connecting LP/OPs to TOC/CPs in the guerrilla base should be seriously considered as an option during the development of the guerrilla base and security and communications network planning.
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Consider the advantages of a series of LP/OPs, connected to the TOC/CP by landline wire and field telephones, augmented by roving foot-mobile patrols comprised of individual guerrillas with exemplary fieldcraft abilities, who can easily communicate with the separate LP/OPs via semaphore...or consider the use of FRS/GMRS radios for intra-team communications by fast-moving, highly mobile guerilla maneuver elements, augmented by couriers who can be used to communicate with outlying LP/OPs at the edge of guerrilla-controlled territory, who in turn can communicate with the TOC/CP via land-line field telephone. With properly established LP/OPs camouflaged from both visual and thermal view, there is very little COMINT signals intercept possibility for regime security forces to take advantage of. Figure out ways to leverage the available technology to benefit the resistance movement! --J.M.)

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the Mountains

WORD PROCESSING PROGRAM SHIT THE BED!

2012-01-26T20:14:00.001-07:00

A year ago, I switched to Linux and didn't look back....Until my laptop died about six months ago (cause unrelated to Linux). I bought my current laptop two months ago, and haven't been able to download Linx on it, due to an exhaustingly slow internet WiFi connection.

Tonight, the Windows Office Starter program that comes as part of the box package shit the bed. I cannot open any Word Starter files at all...Fotunately, I write all my articles out, longhand on yellow legal pads (Yes, I really AM that fucking old school!), so I won't lose any of my new content. However, I am unable to type and post tonight's article. I will probably not be posting anything over the course of the weekend either. I have promised to take my wife to "town," which implies a four-hundred mile round-trip, overnight stay...We'll be there all weekend. She'll be buying groceries and stuff for the baby. I'll be stocking up on S-4 materials.

I will also be trying to find a way to utilize a faster WiFi connection to download Linux and get it booted onto this laptop, so I can wipe this MS horseshit from my box and get on with the mission.

I highly encourage each reader to dedicate him/her self to doing one of three things:
1) Spend at least a couple of hours at the range, running practical defensive combat shooting drills.
2) If you are a potential future "G," throw on a fifty-pound rucksack and go for a (long) walk. 15-20 KM should do for a start...assuming you think you are in shape.
3) Spend at least two hours, pen in hand, paper on the table in front of you, and make a list of training, logistics, or research efforts you need to undertake, and develop a plan to implement these into your life.

Nous Defions!
John Mosby
Somewhere in the Mountains

PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT

2012-01-25T19:51:00.002-07:00

I am going to interrupt my normal broadcast to comment on some comments regarding the recent articles “Equipping the Guerrilla Fighter,” made on the Western Rifle Shooters blog.

I don’t know if current readers have gone back and read every article I’ve ever posted on this blog. However, doing so is pretty critical in order to maintain currency with the thought processes behind current articles.

That having been said, in case you, dear reader, decide to say, “Fuck you John! I’ve got better shit to do than read what some has-been SF guy blathers on about,” there are some critical things to consider regarding resistance movements. If this is all theoretical mental masturbation for you, swell, go on fantasizing. I’m cool with that, seriously.

OTOH, if you are seriously concerned about the route being followed by Federals, there are some things you HAVE to face, regarding resistance movements. As I mentioned in previous articles, there are three different aspects to a successful resistance movement: the paramilitary guerrilla force, the subversive underground, and the auxiliary. It is absolutely, undeniably essential to understand the role of each of these elements and the differences between these elements. If you live in suburbia, and believe you’re going to run some sort of paramilitary guerrilla operations like movements-to-contact, raids, and convoy ambushes, you’re delusional. There is no way, in a suburban neighborhood, in a totalitarian regime, that you are going to maintain the OPSEC necessary to pull it off. That doesn’t mean you won’t have the opportunity to fuck up the bad guys, or otherwise help the resistance. It just means you need to ditch the John Wayne and Red Dawn fantasies.

Let’s face reality, a suburban neighborhood is NOT an area that can be secured, the way an urban, inner-city neighborhood, an alpine valley, or triple-canopy wetlands can. If you live in the sort of terrain that is not conducive to the development of a “guerrilla base,” you need to be focusing your preparatory efforts on the development of support networks to stand-up a subversive underground or auxiliary. Instead of buying load-bearing equipment, purchase and cache the materials and equipment to construct roadway barriers, and communications gear that can be utilized by resistance forces in the future. Purchase, store, cache (and record the location of the cache) foodstuffs that will last, that can be utilized by yourself, your family, your community, AND the resistance (including the guerrilla force) in the event of future hostilities.

If you do not have the physical capabilities to hump a ruck up and down the mountains to get to rendezvous points to link up with auxiliaries operating the transportation networks, stop fantasizing about running combat patrols and raiding security force compounds. It’s not going to happen. Instead, focus on researching the methods of building anti-personnel and anti-material weapons when those are necessary (Note: Do NOT start building bombs and IEDs until you personally feel the time has come. I do NOT advocate getting thrown in the federal prison for doing stupid shit.). Learn a valuable trade, even as a hobby, such as machining, welding, or something similar (machining would be an extremely valuable skill for the subversive underground AND the auxiliary. A good machinist should be able, with some reference material, to start small-scale manufacture of everything from indirect-fire weapons like mortars, the ammunition casings for them, to the external components of IEDs/EFPs.)

Please note, if you do continue to read this blog, instead of deleting the link in a huffy little bitch-tantrum, that I am try very hard, to be very precise with the English language. I minored in English in college and am an avid reader of classical and historical literature. I understand the power of language, so I attempt to make it precise. When I speak of “equipping the guerrilla fighter,” I am talking about the paramilitary guerrilla. I am not talking about the subversive underground activist/fighter/saboteur. I am not talking about the auxiliary supporter.

That having been said, lest anyone think I am the one having a huffy little bitch-tantrum, I want to clarify that I appreciate ANY feedback on the content of my blog, even negative, if for no other reason than it helps me refine the delivery of the knowledge I’m trying to share.

Good hunting, and I promise to return to your regularly scheduled programming tomorrow!

Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

EQUIPPING THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER, PART TWO (The Fighting Load)

2012-01-24T23:15:00.000-07:00

(In the previous installment of this article, we discussed the implementation of a 1^st line “survival load” for the guerrilla fighter. The overwhelming theme was, and should be, to minimize the amount of weight and equipment that the guerrilla carries to the minimum necessary. In this installment, I will delve deeper on a couple of the items of the survival load that are also de facto parts of the survival load. Further, we will discuss tactical equipment load-out elements of the 2^nd line fighting load-out. –J.M.)

(The selection of tactical equipment in preparation for future social unpleasantness must be predicated on some major philosophical constraints. Among these is the recognition that the world and nation we have known is rapidly imploding around us. If this recognition exists, there are some critical issues that must be addressed.

The first of these is the degree of seriousness in one’s preparations. If it is simply a hobby, because you enjoy shooting guns, that’s okay. There is certainly nothing wrong with that in a free society. You don’t need to invest any more time or money than you fell like spending. You will get away with airsoft-quality gear and base-level, budget firearms and tools. However, if you genuinely believe that “bad times, they are a-comin’” then you have to look at your preparations in a far more serious light. In this brighter, more intensely focused light, then quality becomes a far more important issue. How much is your life actually worth? How about the life of your children and spouse? What about a successful restoration of the Constitution and the Republic?)

Keeping in mind the previously mentioned importance of maintaining the lightest load possible for the guerrilla fighter to operate in the woodsman-scout model, the foundation of the 2^nd line fighting load-out is the load-bearing equipment (LBE). While it for a guerrilla fighter to toss a spare rifle magazine in his pocket, a bag of lunch and a blanket in a knapsack, and traipse off to war, experiences and battle damage assessments (BDA) conducted in Afghanistan have demonstrated that this is far from an ideal way to go about the business (on numerous occasions, following airstrikes on Taliban/AQ positions, SF ODAs have conducted BDA, and found dead enemy fighters with this very load-out). Such a poorly equipped soldier, regardless of the depth of his religious motivation, is a lousy match for a properly-equipped opponent with good training. While the guerrilla may spend a great deal of time in nothing more than his basic 1^st line “survival load” while in secure areas or performing covert operations in denied areas, whenever possible, when conducting combat operations, the guerrilla should be wearing adequate LBE to complete his mission.

With the wide-variety of LBE available on the market currently, how does the concerned citizen or potential future guerrilla fighter determine the type of LBE set-up that might be ideal? Should he copy the equipment used by an infantryman of the 82^nd Airborne Division or the 1^st Marine Division? Perhaps a set-up like that used by a member of the Ranger Regiment or the SEAL teams would be more suitable? Considering the difference in missions, logistics support, and organization of all of these organizations, the argument should be obvious that none of these is an appropriate model for the guerrilla fighter.

The guerrilla fighter must base his load-out on the likely circumstances of his future operations. While it is obvious to most that future guerrilla forces will not possess the logistical support services enjoyed by conventional military forces, it is also important to realize that even many historical guerrilla models will not fit. The potential future American guerrilla cannot expect external support from friendly nation-states, such as enjoyed by the Viet Cong from the North Vietnamese and Chinese, the Iraqi insurgency from Syria and Iran, or that the Afghani resistance forces enjoy from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan via the services of the Pakistani ISI. Even during World War Two, the French Resistance, from whom this blog borrows its title, enjoyed a high level of material, moral, and technical support from the Allied Forces High Command. Instead, the American guerrilla will necessarily be forced to literally, “live off the land,” turning to his friends and neighbors, as well as battlefield recovery, for logistic support.

While the utilization of auxiliary support will facilitate the occasional use of vehicles for transportation of both personnel and supplies, the ability of the regime to utilize airborne and space-borne surveillance and reconnaissance assets for vehicle-tracking/pursuit, means that vehicular transport for the guerrilla combat force will, in many cases be extremely limited. The resulting necessary reversion to “primitive” light-infantry foot-mobile travel will act as a limiting factor in the fighting and sustainment load-outs of guerrilla fighters.

For several decades, the standard-issue load-bearing equipment of the United States military’s ground forces was the LC-1 and LC-2 “ALICE” system. Comprised of a wide, thick pistol belt with various equipment pouches and canteens hung off it, this system used a pair of suspenders to help hold the loaded belt around the soldier’s mid-section. The ALICE system was sufficient, if not ideal. Drawbacks included the fact that the ammunition pouches were cumbersome and slow to reload from, the canteens tended to result in occasionally disabling (and always annoying) chafing, and the general reality that the system was neither well-balanced on the soldier’s body, nor ergonomic.

In the middle 1990s, the Army’s Natick Laboratories, in cooperation with elements of the United States Special Operations Command and the U.S. Marine Corps (with the exception of some units in USASOC, the USMC amazingly adopted the MOLLE system before the Army did), began development of a new, modular, lightweight load-bearing system, referred to as MOLLE gear. This new system, and the advances that have been developed since, offered several distinct perceived advantages to the modern war-fighter. With MOLLE gear, equipment-carrying layout can be tailored to the needs of the individual war-fighter, rather than a doctrinal SOP, equipment can be spread more evenly over the fighter’s torso, reducing fatigue, and since it is held closer to the body’s center-of-gravity, the MOLLE gear offers considerably less of a hindrance to combat athleticism.

The current ready, inexpensive availability of the older ALICE gear on the military surplus market makes it an obvious, popular choice for many potential future guerrillas, as well as auxiliary support personnel to stockpile for future support of resistance activities. There is nothing wrong with this, but the reality is, for all intents and purposes, some variation of the MOLLE system is an effective leveraging of the currently available technology for the guerrilla to take advantage of.

The foundation of a MOLLE-based 2^nd line fighting load-out comes in one of three basic forms: the plate carrier, the chest harness, and the new, “War Belt” configuration, based loosely on the older ALICE system.

Plate carriers, designed to carry ballistic protection against small-arms direct-fire threats, as well as load-bearing (with a notable exception that will be discussed below), offer one huge advantage over the other two options: they can save the guerrilla’s life by stopping enemy bullets! The use of body armor in current conflicts has saved an untold number of American lives from small-arms fire, as well as shrapnel threats from IEDs and indirect-fire weapons.

For the guerrilla fighter however, there are several mitigating drawbacks to plate carriers that must be considered. First among these is the fact that the weight of body armor may be detrimental to mobility for the foot-mobile guerrilla. While no one who has ever been on a two-way firing range will argue the inherent value of body armor, there are some within the military who have questioned whether some of the lives “saved” by body armor were not in fact, “saved” because they needed to be saved since they couldn’t move fast enough to exit the path of incoming fire.

Certainly, the use of a ballistic-protection “outer tactical vest” such as the Interceptor vest, with groin protection, side plates, deltoid protection, and throat guards are best left to vehicle-mounted war-fighters. The weight of these systems and the resulting decrease in mobility is what led to the development of what are now termed “plate carriers,” designed to hold a single plate in front of the vital areas of the torso, and another in the back. Currently, there are plate carrier systems available that, combined with ceramic, multi-hit protection, NIJ Level Three rifle plates, weigh less than 15 pounds (I don’t know about you, but I can run pretty damned fast, even with an extra 15 pounds on if I’m scared enough! –J.M.). The applications of a plate carrier in fighter survivability should certainly be considered when developing the 2^nd line fighting load-out.

Chest harnesses, unlike plate carriers, are simply lightweight panels of nylon with MOLLE/PALS-compatible webbing straps, covering the front of the torso. While the chest harness suffers the obvious drawback of not offering any ballistic protection whatsoever, they do offer increased mobility due to reduced weight. The guerrilla can move much faster and possibly more quietly, with a loaded chest harness on than with the same load attached to, or over a plate carrier. In hot weather, the reduced weight and increased ventilation of the chest harness may be life-saving, due to the reduced risk of heat-related injury or death.

One major complaint about the chest harness MOLLE system in the recent past has been constant lower back strain as a result of the load being unbalanced towards the front of the torso. While this is correctly remedied by the addition of a small assault pack or filled hydration bladder on the back, a new model of MOLLE load-bearing gear was developed instead. The “war belt” or “battle belt” system involves the use of a MOLLE-compatible belt system, often (but not necessarily) supported by a set of suspenders with padded shoulder straps. This system has found a great deal of favor in the civilian tactical shooting world, and apparently among some contractors and special operations personnel.

One combination of these systems that has the potential to offer great benefits to the guerrilla fighter in the future is the use of a low-profile plate carrier, with no MOLLE webbing, that can be worn under a baggy sweatshirt or coat, for ballistic protection from rifle threats, with a chest harness that can be quickly donned if necessary, or the addition of a war belt system (while I currently train with a “normal” external plate carrier, and attached pouches for gear, I am seriously contemplating this idea, due to the theoretical ability to utilize the plate carrier, even during covert operations in denied-area, regime-controlled territory, that require no readily visible paramilitary signature. –J.M.).

The final decision of whether a plate carrier, chest harness, war belt, or combination system (or older ALICE system) is most suitable for a particular potential future guerrilla must be based on the needs and preferences of the individual, including physical fitness levels, preferences, perceived future missions, and of course, current budgetary limitations.

Regardless of the final choice of systems, if the guerrilla fighter selects a MOLLE-based system, the next important choice is the selection of a manufacturer. With the current demand for MOLLE-compatible LBE, for the war efforts, law enforcement militarization, and the civilian enthusiast, there are a vast number of companies producing MOLLE gear in one form or another. Unfortunately, this high level of demand also means the cost of quality MOLLE gear is still relatively high, especially when compared to older surplus ALICE gear. While it is possible to procure less expensive imported gear, it is imperative to remember that most of the imported equipment manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is intended solely for use by the recreational airsoft culture. (While it looks, at first glance, comparable to hard-use gear, relying on equipment intended for a kid’s game in a life-or-death situation is stupid. If the guerrilla chooses the cheapest airsoft gear he can find, and dies because of an equipment failure, I will personally make it a point to laugh at his funeral. Yes, I am an asshole like that! –J.M.)

(Domestic manufacturers of quality tactical MOLLE gear that I have personal experience with include—but are not necessarily limited to:

· Blackhawk Industries. Ironically, although much of their manufacturing now takes places in the PRC, the chest harness I have from them has had the ever-loving dog shit kicked out of it, and is still going strong.

· Eagle Industries.

· High-Speed Gear, Incorporated.

· Special Operations Technologies.

· Special Operations Equipment.

· 5.11 Gear. Although 5.11 is the least expensive of these manufacturers, I LOVE their gear. My 1^st line pistol mag pouches are 5.11, as are some of my PC-mounted rifle mag pouches, and my assault pack. Not a single complaint from me.

· TAG/Shellback Tactical. –J.M.)

The guerrilla light-infantryman must consider the historical triumvirate of infantry duties: shoot, move, communicate. The necessity for mobility for the woodsman-scout paradigm of the light infantry leads to the oft-quipped line, “Travel light freeze at night.” While used as a self-mocking joke amongst infantrymen in the military, the humor is found in the truth. It is essential that the guerrilla ensure that every piece of gear on his fighting load is focused on the two tasks of shooting (fighting) and communicating.

The key phrase of “shooting” is actually intended to cover all of the actual tasks involved in fighting and killing the enemy. Primary among the logistical demands of this is, of course, ammunition for the primary personal small-arm, ideally a rifle. Opinions on how much ammunition the individual war-fighter should carry on his fighting load differs, based on who you ask and what their specific mission experience has been. Some tactical trainers insist that, for the armed citizen, no more than three or four rifle magazines will ever conceivably be needed. Former special operations sergeant-major Kyle Lamb (USA, retired) is an advocate of this approach, even for military special operations. As he explains in his excellent book “Green Eyes, Black Rifles,” three magazines of 30 rounds each, equals 90 rounds. Assuming it takes three rounds per bad guy to nail him to the ground, that still allows for 30 dead guys accounted for by each shooter before he runs out of ammunition. If a person is in THAT serious of a fight, then either he’ll have plenty of buddies around to borrow magazines from, or there will be plenty of rifles and magazines lying around to pick up. There’s quite a lot to be said for that argument, including the fact that such a minimalist load will do a great deal to ensure maximum mobility for the guerrilla light-infantryman.

On the other hand, unlike a military special operations soldier, the guerrilla does not have the option of counting on a regular re-supply of ammunition, nor the ability to readily call for a heli-borne quick-reaction force if help is needed. It is entirely possible, and far from uncommon, for every soldier in an unconventional warfare, small-unit element, such as an ODA, or a LRS team, to run through more than three magazines performing just one “Australian Peel” break-contact maneuver. Additionally, in the event of a contact, it is plausible that, while performing an exfiltration from the immediate battle area, a guerrilla unit could be forced into a further contact with pursuit forces, before having the opportunity to re-supply from a pre-positioned re-supply cache. It should be considered that the U.S. Army doctrinal “basic load” of ammunition, 210 rounds, could serve as a MINIMUM basic load for a guerrilla unit (As a young Ranger, I was blessed to have a squad leader who encouraged us to carry nine magazines on our old ALICE LBE, and one in the rifle. When I was an NCO, as an 18B, my personal rule was to carry 12 full magazines: one in my rifle, one in a “butt-cuff” pouch, and ten on my LBE. My current standard is 10 magazines: one in the rifle, one in a speed-reload pouch on my belt, and eight on my plate carrier or chest harness. All of my magazines are 30-round capacity, and all of my magazines are loaded to full-capacity. I’ve never suffered a malfunction due to the rumored propensity of 30-round M16 magazines to not function reliably with more than 28 in the box. –J.M.). While this certainly adds more weight to the load-out, the reduction in weight from other items that are unnecessary, attenuates this drawback. Considering the probabilities of being out-numbered and pursued by regime forces, it’s unlikely the guerrilla fighter will ever be carrying “too much ammunition.”

While a sidearm is considered part of the 1^st line survival load, it should be noted that there are various options for carrying it, once the LBE is added. The obvious method for carry of the sidearm solely as part of the 1^st line load is a concealed carry holster (Appendix, Inside-the-Waistband Glock 19 for me, since I know you were dying to ask, if I haven’t previously mentioned it. –J.M.). Once the guerrilla is carrying a fighting load, on LBE however, the facility of concealed carry holsters is greatly reduced. In these cases, any number of holsters might work, dependent on the preferences of the individual. It should be noted however, that it is important to remember that the sidearm is, ultimately a next-to-last-ditch weapon, followed only by the fighting knife and unarmed combatives. As such, it should remain attached to the individual, not the fighting load LBE (I have favored a drop-leg holster for as long as I’ve been able to carry a sidearm in the field. While some supposed internet “experts” deride these as suitable only for the airsoft crowd and “keyboard commandos,” this is ignorance speaking. Remember that this design was introduced to the world of gunfighting by none other than the British SAS. From the sands of North Africa in World War Two, to the Princess Gate hostage rescue, to the mountains of Afghanistan today, David Stirling’s boys stand second to no one as a fighting unit. The drop-leg holster is not intended to be worn hanging down to your knee like some Hollywood-mythic gunslinger, a la Angelina Jolie in “Tomb Raider.” It should be worn low enough to clear your body armor or LBE, but otherwise, as high as possible on the thigh. In such a position, it is more than adequately comfortable for long-term wear, and is still accessible when needed, as it will be when needed, in a hurry! –J.M.).

In addition to rifle ammunition and a sidearm (which is, ultimately, not to be considered any sort of mandatory item for the light-infantryman of any genre. While I would not forego my pistol to save a couple of pounds, there is legitimately, no reason for every war-fighter to “need” a sidearm…unless he feels he needs it), the 2^nd line fighting load-out should include spare ammunition for the sidearm (I keep two spare magazines on my trouser belt as well.—J.M.) and a combat/utility knife.

The combat knife, like the 1^st line survival load-out pocket knife, may very well see its primary usage for general field-craft and utility applications. On the other hand, it is far more likely than the 1^st line knife, to be used in an anti-personnel role, so it should feature more characteristics of a “combat” knife. One perennially popular example among special operators (in my experience –J.M.) is the classic Marine Corps stand-by, the Kabar. Developed during World War Two and in constant service with the Corps since, the Kabar has a well-earned reputation as a general utility knife, as well as an effective fighting weapon (On the other hand, my personal choice is a Cold Steel push-dagger, despite the lack of utility for general field-craft chores. I carry plenty of utility knives. Since I have boxed for over 20 years, the delivery system of the push-dagger makes total sense to me, requires no difference in my combatives training program to use efficiently, and, well…I just like a push-dagger! –J.M.).

In addition to the actual weapons-specific fighting gear above, the last critical element of “fighting” gear on the fighting load-out of the guerrilla fighter should be an individual first-aid kit/”blow-out kit.” A serious injury or wound can be the single most mobility-reducing issue to impact the combat effectiveness of a guerrilla fighter. With the development of the military’s Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC or TC3) protocols, first adopted by USSOCOM in 2000, there exists a single, doctrinal methodology for providing battlefield aid to casualties that makes complete sense and takes into account the necessities of actual combat (If you are unfamiliar with these protocols, I suggest you spend some serious time studying and mastering them. They do, and will, save lives in combat! –J.M.). Predicated on actually receiving training in how to perform this protocol of care and wound management (preferably before getting into a firefight), an individual blow-out kit should be based around them. The equipment required is minimal, weighs very little, but will prevent death from most small-arms fire wounds if treated properly and rapidly. The TC3 protocols require trained medical personnel to execute above the basic, level one “Care Under Fire” guidelines, but in essence, should be considered an integral part of planning for medical care for the guerrilla force.

Beyond the fighting portion of the “shoot (fight), move, communicate” aspects of the 2^nd line fighting load-out, the issue of communications within the guerrilla force should be considered. While there are ways to leverage the technology of two-way radios into the communications package of the guerrilla force/resistance effort, the communications security (COMSEC) protocols demanded are beyond the scope of this article. The use of two-way radios, especially FRS/GMRS radios (unlike many “survival” and “preparedness” writers, I recognize the weak transmission strengths of these line-of-sight radios as a strength, since it actually reduces the chance of successful signals intercept at any extended range. Further, in alpine environments, using ridge-top LP/OPs, the line-of-sight transmissions of these radios is more than sufficient for use in guerrilla base security networks. Additionally, their limited range is not an impediment for intra-unit communications needs. –J.M.) however, should never be allowed to overshadow the effectiveness and usefulness of written and/or oral communications, delivered via courier to the guerrilla force. There is a reason that guerrilla wars are referred to as “long wars.” Time ultimately, favors the guerrilla, if he maintains his security.

Ultimately, this is the fundamental load for the guerrilla 2^nd line fighting load. While there are numerous other equipment items that could be useful for the guerrilla fighter to add, from STANO to breaching tools, these should be assessed on a mission-essential basis, and only added to the load, when needed or warranted. The above load, when combined with a 3^rd line sustainment load, already exceeds the loads traditionally carried by historical guerrilla forces. The difference however, must be weighed.

Historically, guerrilla forces have not hesitated to “tax” the local civilian populace to support their efforts, as well as having been at a dramatic disadvantage due to the lack of available technological assets available. The potential future American guerrilla however, has no moral ground (in my opinion –J.M.) to tax the civilian populace, and should make every effort to leverage whatever technology he has available, as long as it does not in itself, become a burden by detracting from his field-craft skills and the application of true light-infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains.

EQUIPPING THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER, PART ONE (The Survival Load)

2012-01-23T22:53:00.000-07:00

The guerrilla fighter is a true light-infantryman in the classical sense of the term. He is essentially, a woodsman-scout. The guerrilla operates in a manner that emphasizes the expert use of his personal small-arms, the use of stealth in all of his movements, using the available terrain and cover to counter the supposed technological advantages possessed by regime forces, and an expert grasp of the fundamentals of small-unit, “hit-and-run” maneuver warfare.

The guerrilla possesses the trained ability to operate day and night, over varied, broken terrain, using his field-craft expertise and whatever technological assets are available to him, to escape enemy observation until he chooses to attack. When he moves, the guerrilla moves from one position of concealment to the next. He strives to utilize appropriate movement techniques to maximize the value of masking terrain. When not changing positions, the guerrilla remains motionless and hidden from observation by regime forces that may possess the most advanced STANO (Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Night Observation) tools available,

Like his woodsman-scout forebears, the guerrilla carries only the necessities to ensure his survival and combat effectiveness. Additional, unnecessary weight leads to excessive, accelerated fatigue, impedes and slows movement, and leads to a compromising over-reliance on the technology represented by the equipment, rather than his native wit and skill in field-craft.

The light-infantry paradigm is not found in Stryker Armored Fighting Vehicles, or even HUMVEE-mounted convoys to a disembarkation point two kilometers from an objective (although both of these certainly possess value in their own right). The light-infantry paradigm is found in field-craft, mobility, tactical expertise, and marksmanship. The ability to sneak inside the enemy’s reactionary gap un-noticed, strike with overwhelming violence-of-action at his weakest points, and then disappear into the surrounding environment before a reaction force can be mustered, is the key to interrupting the enemy’s OODA loop. This “hit-and-run” ability is the chief tactical advantage available to the irregular, small-unit force.

Conventional force militaries no longer possess a true light-infantry capability. The fundamental problem, over-burdening foot-mobile infantry soldiers has existed nearly as long as armies have existed. The modern development of advanced technological war-fighting assets has exacerbated the problem rather than remedying it. Despite the best efforts of military logisticians and theorists, the load of infantry forces has continued to increase. The modern, conventional-force “light” infantryman is often required to carry loads far in excess of 120 pounds, even when operating in difficult, broken, and steep terrain such as the alpine environment of the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan.

The load of infantry forces has been a subject of intense study since the 1700s, and is still a problem that has never been resolved. Technological advancements in weapons, STANO, communications, and personal protective equipment have added to the soldier’s load. This has only been partially mitigated by advancements in load-bearing technologies and attempts at miniaturization.

According to an unidentified infantry first sergeant of the 187^th Infantry Regiment (“Rakkasans”) of the 101^st Airborne Division, concerning load-bearing during Operation Anaconda during 2002,

“We had extreme difficulty moving with all of our weight. If your movement would have been to relieve a unit in contact or a time-sensitive mission we would not have been able to move in a timely manner. It took us 8 hours to move 5 klicks. With just the vest (Interceptor Body Armor vest) and LBV, we were easily carrying 80 pounds. Throw on the ruck and you’re sucking.”

Studies conducted by the United States Army following World War Two found that the average infantry rifleman had carried approximately 55 pounds during movements in the field. These studies concluded that this was the maximum weight for an approach-march load that would still allow the fighter to fight effectively when he got to the fight. A decade later, a follow-on study determined that this still applied, but allowed for a maximum 48 pound fighting load in actual combat, if carried by a conditioned fighting soldier.

The fighting load is doctrinally defined as the actual load carried by a soldier during combat. The approach-march load, on the other hand, is the load carried by the soldier in order to get to the fight. It includes the necessary equipment to survive until he gets to the objective.

Despite the advances made as a result of these studies, by 2003, soldiers engaged in dismounted combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan were carrying a 60-80 pound fighting load and an approach-march load that was often (during true dismounted operations, rather than vehicle-based patrols) in excess of 130 pounds. The heaviest loads, typically carried by M240 assistant machine-gunners, were often in excess of 150 pounds. These figures, it is important to remember, are the doctrinal loads, and do not include the almost inevitable inclusion of personal items by individual soldiers.

As the previous quote from the Rakkasan first sergeant illustrates, today’s conventional-force light-infantry soldier simply cannot move fast with his doctrinal load. Additionally, these loads were developed based on a regular re-supply via rotary-wing aircraft or ground-vehicle convoy every 48-72 hours.

The guerrilla fighter will not have these support assets. He will be forced to live out of his rucksack almost exclusively, with his re-supply provided by previously established caches hidden throughout the operational area. The guerrilla light-infantryman must overcome these liabilities. The ability to function as a woodsman-scout will be absolutely crucial to the survivability of the guerrilla fighter.

The survival load/fighting load/sustainment load model is a useful framework for the logistics planning of the future guerrilla. The surest way for the guerrilla to maximize his ability to apply his light-infantry capabilities is to minimize his load-bearing requirements while utilizing re-supply caches and safe-houses throughout the operational area.

The survival load is the items that the individual warfighter carries on his person, either in hand, in his pockets, or on his belt, but not attached to the fighting load-bearing equipment. The concept behind the survival load is that it will allow the operator to escape and evade hostile pursuit and survive indefinitely, if not comfortably, long enough to return to the control of friendly forces. For the guerrilla fighter, this is the perfect goal for the survival load. While the guerrilla is unlikely to conduct combat operations without the benefit of his fighting and survival loads, there are numerous reasons that he may need to have mastered the survival load concept. Whether conducting a clandestine infiltration of denied, regime-controlled territory to conduct an operation, or simply the need to dump all of his personal gear in order to run faster while trying to escape an overwhelming enemy force while breaking contact, the guerrilla must develop and carry a survival load that takes into account his personal field-craft and knowledge.

Too often, even among survival “experts,” the solution to the survival load idea is misinterpreted as a hardware issue. The trend to rely on a survival “kit” is not the answer. The guerrilla fighter should never rely on the “Altoids can survival kit.” Instead, the focus should be on the effective use of the tools he would normally carry on his person, facilitated by proper field-craft and survival knowledge. As in everything for the guerrilla, software trumps hardware.

At its fundamental level, the survival load consists of:

· Sidearm. In extreme evasion scenarios, or covert operations conducted in regime-controlled built-up areas, this will function as your primary arm. The primary attributes necessary are that it be utterly, unfailingly reliable, and readily concealable. Because of its role as a personal defense weapon, perhaps in direct-action combat missions, as opposed to simple self-defense against one or two hostiles, a magazine-fed, high-capacity semi-automatic pistol is the ideal choice.

· Knife. This is a field-utility knife. While the possibility of its use as a combative weapon should not be overlooked, this knife is far more likely to be used for fire-building, shelter and hide-site construction, and the manufacture of traps and snares under survival conditions than it is to be used for silencing enemy sentries by stabbing them in the throat. While a fixed-blade knife may be the ideal, a stout folding knife, kept suitably sharp, more than adequately fills this role, while simultaneously being eminently more concealable (in the interest of intellectual honesty, I feel obligated to note that I carry a Cold Steel push-dagger for an EDC knife, and generally have no fewer than three folding knives on my person at any given time. As a team sergeant once pointed out to me, “Sergeant Mosby, a man can just never have too many knives on his-self!” My Victorinox Swiss Army knife probably gets more daily use than any other tool I own, of any sort. –J.M.)

· Sun/Safety Glasses. In the mid-1990s, the Ranger Regiment issued Ray-Ban sunglasses as part of a new Ranger’s central supply issue. Nevertheless, Rangers were not allowed to wear them, because it was considered non-uniform (WTFO? I never did understand that. –J.M.). Today, thanks to the advances developed by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of safety lenses is generally accepted as mandatory. Polarized, tinted lenses during daylight, with ANSI Z87 safety ratings will increase visual clarity, reduce eye strain and fatigue, and protect the war-fighter’s eyes from battlefield debris and some shrapnel. The two most popular manufacturers of “tactical” sunglasses are Oakley and Wiley X, but any tinted safety glasses will suffice, and may look far less conspicuous than the latest cool-guy, CDI selections from U.S. Cavalry (again, in the interest of intellectual honesty, I have to admit, I wear Oakleys for work, and Wiley X for daily wear. –J.M.)

· Cordage. Cordage is, rightly, considered a critical tool in the survivor’s tool kit. The simple truth is, there is no such thing as too much cordage in a survival situation. Many long-range surveillance units (LRSU, the operational descendants of the older LRRPs) and some ODAs, make it part of their standard operating procedure (SOP) to replace the laces in their field boots with 550 cord. It’s out of the way, readily accessible, and the operator is never without the requisite material to construct field-expedient shelters, snares, fishing lines and nets, and even poncho rafts for water-crossing operations (to this day, every pair of boots I own has had the laces replaced with 550 cord. –J.M.).

· Compass. While the woodsman-scout background of the guerrilla light-infantryman means the fighter should possess the ability to determine directions, at least roughly, without a compass, he should rarely, if ever, be without a compass. The ability to reliably traverse terrain that the enemy considers impenetrable is the strength of the guerrilla. Possessing a compass, whether a standard orienteering compass on a lanyard around the neck, or a simple button compass on a watchband, should be considered a necessity for the guerrilla, as part of his ability to escape and evade when needed.

· Fire Starter. This may be a simple waterproof match-safe stuffed with weather-proofed “hurricane-lifeboat” matches, a flint striker, or a flint-and-steel kit. The serious survival expert will never allow himself to be caught without some means that he can use reliably, to build a warming fire to stay alive.

· Water Purification. The final aspect of the survival load that can never be overlooked is the ability to procure or manufacture safe drinking water. Historically, evaders have suffered horribly from dysentery after being forced by necessity, to drink stagnant, putrid water infested with bacteria. It is critical that the guerrilla devise a method of purifying water on the run in an evasion scenario. With the prevalence of store-bought bottled drinking water, soda, and sports drink, the guerrilla should always be able to find a receptacle to carry his water, as long as he can purify it to make it safe for drinking. Whether a small container of iodine tablets, a filter straw, or a pocket-sized, “standard” water purifier, it is critical to possess safe, clean drinking water to stay alive, healthy, and effective ( I use a product called “ION Stabilized Oxygen” for water purification. I’ve used it all over the world, purifying water from stock tanks and ditches, without ever getting ill. It’s smaller, lighter, and more effective than any micro-filter I’ve ever seen or used, and I can keep a bottle in the pocket of my jeans without noticing it.

Different experts on survival will recommend different elements to add to the “survival load.” When considering it as part of a layered, tiered approach to guerrilla equipment however, a minimalist approach, reinforced by proper field-craft training and survival knowledge, will more than adequately provide the essentials needed to keep the guerrilla fighter alive during escape and evasion scenarios in the remote chance that he has to ditch his fighting and sustainment loads, or is compromised and forced to E&E during covert operations in denied territory that precludes the carry and use of the normal fighting load.

Part Two of this article will discuss the layout of the guerrilla fighting load, with Part Three covering the sustainment load. The final installment, Part Four, will discuss strategies for the construction and use of re-supply caches.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

SOMETHING TO CONSIDER

2012-01-22T19:57:00.000-07:00

No article today. I would like to apologize to any reader disappointed, but I’m not really sorry. I’m working on a long one, that I think may be my best one yet, and it’s going to take me more than one day to write, because it’s going to cover a LOT of country.

Besides, I took HH6 and our little morale officer (baby), out today to visit friends in town. We had a good day. I didn’t get shit done for my “honey-do” list, but we spent some quality time together as a family. I hope everyone else did today as well.

In lieu of my typical articles, I’m going to share some motivational quotes for you to ponder. These are the ones I find myself going back into my notebooks to find and re-read regularly for moral support. I hope you appreciate them.

“These are the times that try men’s souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.”

--Thomas Paine

“Do your duty—and never mind whether you are shivering or warm, sleeping on your feet or in your bed.”

--Marcus Auerelius

“The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and hardship. Courage is only the second. Poverty, privation, and want are the school of the good soldier.”

--Napolean Bonaparte

“Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it.”

--Thomas Paine

“Legitimate, personal confidence in one’s own ability is the key to victory. Heart rate, blood pressure, and a host of other unavoidable, psychosomatic, bodily reactions are largely irrelevant.”

--Ron Avery

“The three most important components of stopping power are: bullet placement, bullet placement, and bullet placement.”

--Evan Marshall

“The strength of the Constitution lies entirely in the determination of each citizen to defend it. Only if every citizen feels duty-bound to do his hare in this defense are the constitutional rights secure.”

--Albert Einstein

“A guy who has 100-percent confidence in his ability to use his or any weapon doesn’t have to worry about his personal safety—he can concentrate on his mission.”

--Jack Singlaub, MG, USA (ret)

Chief of SOG, 1966-1968

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains